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Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103Q"). 
issues on Cross-Appeal 
Did the trial court err in reopening the evidence in this case after both sides 
had rested their case, presented written closing arguments, and the evidence 
was obviously insufficient to grant judgment in the Bank's favor? Reopening 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion after considering the totality of the 
circumstances. Lewis v. Porter. 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976) 
Determinative Legal Provisions 
None. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellant Franklin Credit ["the Bank"] is the successor-in-interest to 
a trust deed issued in favor of Bank One. The Bank sought to judicially foreclose 
the trust deed. Blaine Hanney ["Blaine"] resisted, claiming that his then wife, 
Shirley Hanney ["Shirley"] had falsely signed his name to the trust deed. The trial 
court agreed with Blaine and found the trust deed void. 
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Course of Proceedings Below 
The parties filed a complaint and counterclaim. After denying cross 
motions for summary judgment, the matter proceeded to trial. In preparation for 
trial, the court executed a lengthy pretrial order. R. at 994-1035, App. A. Trial 
was held on 20, 22, and 23 April 2009 before the Honorable Rodney Page. At 
the court's request, the parties presented written closing arguments. R. at 1058 
(the Bank's Post Trial Brief) and 1095 (Defendant's Closing Argument). 
Defendant's closing argument pointed out that Plaintiff had failed to present 
evidence of the amount owing under the trust deed and was therefore not entitled 
to a judgment of foreclosure. Realizing the defective nature of its evidence, the 
Bank filed a motion to reopen the evidence to cure the evidentiary deficiency. 
After oral argument, the trial court entered an order allowing the evidence to be 
reopened, subject to Blaine's right to object. R. at 1270-73. Because the proffered 
evidence was inadmissible hearsay, Defendant objected to it. R. at 1268-69. 
Judge Page issued a memorandum decision on 28 January 2010 in 
Defendants' favor. R. at 1277-87, App. B. Subsequently, Judge David M. 
Connors issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment in 
Favor of Blaine J. Hanney and Hanney Family Trust on 25 February 2010. R. at 
1288-1304 (Findings) and 1305-07 (Judgment). Notices of appeal and cross-
appeal were timely filed. 
-2-
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Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court declared the trust deed void. R. at 1277-87. Judgment 
entered in favor of Defendant Blaine J. Hanney and Hanney Family Trust. R. at 
1305-07. 
Facts 
I. Introduction and Blaine's Home 
Blaine and Shirley were married in 1973. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ["Findings"], If 8, App. C. Between 1998 and 2003, Shirley 
embezzled hundreds of thousands of dollars from her in-laws' family limited 
partnership. R. at 1386, vol. II, 33. To conceal this, she obtained loans secured 
by the marital home without Blaine's knowledge or consent. This case relates to 
the Bank's effort to judicially foreclose one of the trust deeds securing one of 
those loans. App. C, Findings, ^ 1. 
The real property was deeded to Blaine alone on January 20, 1978. App. 
C, Findings, Tf 3. Trial Exhibit 1, attached as App. D. Blaine's parents deeded this 
real property to Blaine at the same time that other lots his parents had developed 
were deeded to his siblings. App. C, Findings, f 5. Blaine and Shirley then 
proceeded to build a home which was completed lien-free. App. C, Findings, fflf 
6-7. 
During the marriage, Blaine and Shirley were always debt-free. App. C, 
Findings, If 7 (marital home was constructed and finished debt-free); R. at 1386, 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vol. II, 39-40. Over the years they put their money in a joint account out of which 
family expenses were paid. App. C, Findings, fl 11. Shirley was primarily 
responsible for keeping track of the family finances, paying the bills, seeing the 
taxes were taken care of and for the financial management for the family. She 
signed checks in Blaine's name and tax returns when he was out of town. App. C 
Findings, H 12. 
In 1991 Blaine's construction job begin to take him out of town most of the 
time and he would only come home once or twice a month. Shirley took on even 
more responsibility for family finances and he became less and less involved, 
relying on Shirley's representation as to how things were going. He trusted her 
completely. App. C, Findings, If 13. 
II. Hanney Development and Hanney & Hanney Construction 
For several years Blaine's family had been involved in the development 
and sale of the land owned by his parents. App. C, Findings, fl 14. In April 1993, 
the family organized Hanney Development, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership. App. 
C, Findings, fflj 15-16. Blaine, his mother, and his sister were designated as the 
General Partners with his other five siblings as Limited Partners. App. C, 
Findings, % 17. Shirley, though not a partner of the limited partnership, had full 
control of the finances of the company. She had authority on bank accounts, did 
the bookkeeping for the company, paid the bills, and deposited the funds. She 
dealt directly with the accountant in preparing taxes and prepared financial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reports for the members of the partnership. The partners relied on her to take 
care of the business's finances and on her reports as to the financial condition of 
the Partnership. App. C, Findings, If 19. 
Shirley started building speculative homes. To that end, Shirley formed 
Hanney and Hanney Construction. Initially, Shirley associated with another 
builder to build homes. She gradually began to build homes on her own. She also 
expanded into commercial work. R. at 1386, vol. II, 36-38. 
At the beginning, Shirley used only money that she and Blaine had agreed 
to use from their savings and construction loans. However, at some point she 
opened up a line of credit with First Security Bank which she paid off each year. 
Blaine had no knowledge of it and was not an obligor. App. C, Findings, If 41. 
Eventually, Shirley's business became overextended when she incurred a 
$160,000 concrete bill she could not cover. She begin taking money from 
Hanney Development accounts at Barnes Bank to meet her Hanney and Hanney 
Construction obligations. Neither Blaine nor any of the partners of Hanney 
Development had any knowledge of this. App. C, Findings, If 42. Shirley had no 
legal right to take these funds. 
Shirley manipulated the books and records of Hanney Development to 
conceal the money she had taken money from Hanney Development. App. C, 
Findings, f^ 43. Shirley controlled all of the records of both; she falsified the 
records and tax returns and withheld all information from Blaine. App. C, 
Findings, If 65. Shirley would create entirely new, and false, banking statements 
-5-
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to present to Blaine and the Hanney Development partners. She also created 
other false documents to conceal her betrayal. R. at 1386, vol. II, 28-31. 
III. Establishment of the Hanney Family Trust 
i 
In about 1995, Blaine and Shirley met with an attorney's representative to 
discuss a trust. They decided to create the Hanney Family Revocable Trust. App. 
C, Findings, jf 21. Blaine and Shirley executed a written trust agreement. Trial < 
Exhibit 6, attached as App. E. 
Blaine and Shirley signed the Trust on February 22,1995. App. E, Trust 
i 
Agreement; App. C, Findings, fl 28. At the same time, Blaine, as grantor, signed a 
special warranty deed conveying the home to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of 
the Hanney Family Trust. App. C, Findings, Tf 29. Trial Exhibit 4, attached as App. * 
F. This deed was recorded on April 10, 1995. App. F, Special Warranty Deed. 
App. C, Findings, If 31.
 ( 
As part of establishing their trust, Blaine and Shirley also signed reciprocal 
general durable powers of attorney. The general power of attorney were never 
a 
recorded. App. C, Findings, fl 32. It is this general durable power of attorney from 
Blaine to Shirley, that the Bank relies upon in this case. Trial Exhibit 8, attached 
as App. H. There is, however, no evidence that the Bank was even aware of this < 
power of attorney until after litigation commenced. Instead, the transactions with 
the Bank were consummated by a special power of attorney Shirley forged, which 
< 
will be discussed later. 
-6-
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Blaine and Shirley had some subjective-and erroneous-beliefs about the 
trust and related documents. They believed that the trust would become effective 
if something happened to either one of them, but would have no effect as long as 
they were both still alive. App. C, Findings, U 23, R. at 1292. They testified that 
they understood the trust would only take effect after one of them died. Moreover, 
they believed that the general power of attorney could only be used in the event 
one of them was disabled. App. C, Findings, ^ 33, R. at 1293. 
IV. Shirley Borrows from Bank One 
In August 2000, Shirley refinanced prior loans she had fraudulently 
obtained. App. C, Findings, fflf 44-57. Through its title agent, Inwest Title, Bank 
One sedulously avoided doing business with the trust. Instead, the home was 
conveyed, by deed from the trust to Blaine and Shirley individually, and then a 
trust deed was granted to the Bank. 
Inwest Title prepared, and Shirley executed the warranty deed conveying 
the home out of the family trust to Blaine and Shirley individually. This deed 
referenced no power of attorney; Shirley simply forged Blaine's name on it. Trial 
Exhibit 21, attached as App. G. It was signed on August 22, 2000 and recorded 
the on 29 August 2000 as entry No. 1610660. Blaine did not sign the document 
nor was he aware of it. App. C, Findings, |f 59. 
Before a trust deed could be executed, another impediment remained: 
obtaining Blaine's signature on the trust deed. As a condition of obtaining a 
-7-
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policy of title insurance protecting the lender's interest, the title company woudl 
not accept the general power of attorney. Instead, through its title agent, Bank 
One required Shirley to obtain a special power of attorney. R. at 1385, vol. I, 
172-75. Shirley obtained the form special power of attorney from the title 
i 
company, took it home, signed Blaine's name and had a notary falsely notarized 
the signature she forged, jd. Trial Exhibit 26, attached as App. I. It was recorded 
at the request of Inwest Title on August 29, 2000 as document No. 1610661, i 
immediately following the warranty deed and immediately before the trust deed. 
App. C, Findings, fl 61, R. at 1300. Blaine had no knowledge of the special 
i 
power of attorney. 
The trust deed at the heart of this case was next. Shirley executed this trust 
deed for herself and for Blaine by virtue of her deceitful special power of attorney. ( 
The trust deed was recorded at the request of Inwest Title on August 29, 2000 as 
document 1610662. Trial Exhibit 22, attached as App. J. Blaine had no 
knowledge of it. App. C, Findings, fl 60, R. at 1299-1300. There is no dispute that 
the general durable power of attorney was not used for this transaction. 
I 
To restore title to the Hanney Family Trust, Shirley then executed another 
quit claim deed. Shirley executed the quit claim deed for herself and for Blaine 
under the forged special power of attorney. This deed was recorded as entry no. < 
1610663. Trial Exhibit 23, attached as App. K. Blaine was not aware of this 
document. App. C, Findings, fl 62. The proceeds from this loan were used to pay 
-8-
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off the amounts owning to Key Bank and other obligations owing by Hanney 
Construction. App. C, Findings, ]f 63. 
None of the funds received by Shirley were used to improve the property or 
to provide for any family expenses. App. C, Findings, If 66, R. at 1301. In addition 
to the terms of the General Power of Attorney which did not provide Shirley with 
authority to engage in the transactions in question, the limits of her authority were 
further evidenced by the fact that the Bank's predecessor in interest would not 
allow her to proceed using the General Power of Attorney, but required a Special 
Power of Attorney as to specific property. App. C, Findings, % 67, R. at 1301. 
Blaine had no knowledge of the loan by Bank One to Shirley and never signed 
any of the documents or powers of attorney it was claimed he signed in 
conjunction with the loan. App. C, Findings, fl 68, R. at 1301-02. 
V. Reopening the Evidence 
Following the presentation of evidence, each side rested. R. at 1384, vol. 
Ill, at 32. The trial court asked for written closing briefs in lieu of oral closing 
arguments. The Bank filed its closing argument on 8 May 2010. R. at 1080; and 
Defendants responded on 27 May 2010. R. at 1128. Defendants observed that 
the Bank had failed to prove its case. The Bank presented no evidence of the 
amount owing under the trust deed and therefore the Bank was not entitled to any 
judicial foreclosure. R. at 1098-1102. 
-9-
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Recognizing the flaw, the Bank responded by requesting that the trial court 
reopen the evidence. R. at 1135-40. The issue was briefed and argued and the 
trial court allowed the Bank to reopen the evidence, with a caveat. R. at 1270-73. 
The Bank was to proffer its evidence and the Defendants had the opportunity to 
object to the proffer. The Bank's proffer was of evidence from the Bank's 
employee. Defendant timely objected on foundational and hearsay grounds. R. at 
1268-69. The Bank never responded to nor cured the objection. More importantly, i 
the proffered evidence was never presented to the trial court by the Bank.1 
Ultimately, the trial court signed an order permitting reopening the evidence 
i 
and purporting to find certain facts. However, the only basis for the conclusion 
regarding the principal amount owing in the trial evidence was trial exhibit 59. 
Exhibit 59 was a document prepared by Shirley. She noted the Bank One loan ( 
ambiguously: "oweing [sic] $245,590.25 ?." Beyond this, not a scintilla of 
evidence regarding the principal amount owing was presented by the Bank. No 
evidence establishing an interest rate due or the date from which interest would 
run was presented. Given that no evidence was actually presented by the Bank 
{ 
1. The record does not disclose any basis to determine the principal amount 
owing. The only reference to any amount owing was contained in Exhibit 59, 
attached as App. L. Exhibit 59 is a document prepared by Shirley, in her 
handwriting. With regard to the Bank One loan, Exhibit 59 contains the following 
reference: "oweing [sic] $245,590.25 ?." There is no indication in the record what 
this figure represents, other than some amount owing to Bank One. The record 
does not disclose whether this is a principal amount, principal and interest, a pay-
off, or some other figure. Neither does the record disclose whether this figure is 
current as of a date certain. 
-10-
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on this point, the trial court's order was wrong. Putting that aside, however, no 
evidence exists regarding interest. 
Summary of the Argument 
The Bank's attack on the Judgment and Findings amounts to two main 
points: (1) the claim that Shirley had authority, actual, implied or apparent, to 
execute the various deeds in question and (2) Shirley's actions were ratified. On 
cross-appeal, Blaine challenges the trial court's decision to reopen the evidence 
after Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prevail. The trial court erred in 
granting that motion. 
Shirley had no authority. The general durable power of attorney is 
inadequate as a matter of law to be used to exercise reserved or granted trust 
powers. It is also inadequate to allow a gratuitous transfer, as occurred here. 
Because Shirley never had any personal interest in the home, she had nothing 
individually which should could convey. The trust deed was ineffective to convey 
any interest to the Bank. 
Blaine did not ratify Shirley's actions. After he was informed of all the facts, 
he repudiated the loan. Prior to that, Blaine never was fully appraised of all the 
material facts. Moreover, there is no evidence that Blaine ever had any intent to 
ratify. Ratification did not occur. 
The trial court's findings and judgment should be affirmed. They are based 
on substantial evidence and correct legal analysis. Alternatively, the trial court's 
-11-
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grant of reopener should be reversed. Because no evidence sufficient to 
establish a judicial foreclosure was presented, no foreclosure will lie at all. This 
court may therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this alternate ground. 
Argument 
I. Response to the Bank's Brief 
A. The Trial Court's Findings Are Presumed Correct Because the 
Appellant Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence 
The unacknowledged core of the Bank's appeal is a direct challenge to the 
trial court's factual findings. Indeed, throughout the Bank's opening brief, it merely ' 
reargues its view of the evidence. Revealingly, the Bank fails to cite a single 
finding of fact in its Statement of Facts. App. Brief, 7-24. The Bank repeatedly 
asserts that various factual findings are against the "clear" evidence. App. Brief, 
42, 45-46. However, the Bank makes no effort, and no pretense of effort, to 
< 
satisfy its obligation to marshal the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court's findings 
of fact are presumed correct. 
To challenge findings of fact, an appellant has a duty to marshal the \ 
evidence. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Marshaling obligates 
an appellant to detail "'the evidence in support of the findings then demonstrate 
i 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence.'" Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, fl19, 
100 P.3d 1177 (quoting In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). < 
-12-
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This duty is not met by merely rearguing a losing position or by self-serving 
citations to the record. Chen, ^  78. 
When the duty to marshal is unmet, the appellate court assumes that the 
trial court's findings are supported by the evidence. Chen, If 80; In re Estate of 
Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). Even where the appellant seeks to 
challenge only a legal determination, if the correctness of the trial court's 
application of a legal standard is fact-sensitive, the appellant still has a duty to 
marshal the evidence. Chen, fflj 19-20. 
In the present case, the Bank has made no effort to marshal any evidence. 
Instead, the Bank relies on declarative sentences rather than marshaling. The 
Bank's marshaling not simply inadequate, it is nonexistent. Instead, the Bank 
merely recycles its argument from below; it does not actually challenge facts. 
Accordingly, in this appeal, the correctness of the trial court's factual findings is 
presumed. Because the factual findings support the trial court's legal 
conclusions, the judgment should be affirmed. 
B. The Trust Deed is invalid Since Shirley Never Had Any 
Transferrable Interest in the Home 
From 1978 until 1995, the home was vested in Blaine alone. Following 
1995, it was vested in the trust. As a spouse, Shirley had no interest in the home 
which was transferrable or to which any creditor's claim could attach. Apart from 
the forged power of attorney and deeds, the Bank also claims that Shirley's status 
as a spouse allowed her to convey some or all of the home held in the family 
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trust. The Bank's Brief, 48-50. Blaine concedes that, upon the commencement of 
the divorce in 2005, the home was a marital asset. Nevertheless, there was never 
any point in time when Shirley had any alienable interest in the home. 
A decree vesting marital property in one spouse takes effect "when a 
decree of divorce is rendered." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1). A spousal interest 
in marital property, during a marriage and prior to the commencement of a 
divorce action, is at most inchoate: unascertained, unallocated, undetermined, i 
unassignable, ungarnishable, and uninheritable. While no Utah case has 
addressed this issue, sister states with marital distribution statutes similar to 
i 
Utah's have. 
In Nielson v. Thompson. 982 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 1999), the plaintiffs obtained 
a money judgment against Mr. Thompson, which was uncollectible for several ( 
years. When Mr. Thompson filed for divorce, the Nielsons sought to intervene in 
the divorce, asserting a judgment creditor's claim to Mr. Thompson's interest in 
the marital estate. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that such intervention was 
improper because the judgment creditor held no interest which could be the 
subject of intervention in the divorce. The Wyoming Supreme Court explained: 
We conclude that the effect of our [equitable] distribution in divorce cases 
[statute] is quite similar to the effect ascribed to the Kansas statute in Cadv 
v. Cadv, 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358 (1978). That court held that prior to , 
the filing of the divorce petition a spouse had oniy an inchoate interest in 
property held in the name of the other spouse. When the divorce complaint 
is filed, however, that inchoate interest vests subject to definition and 
determination by the divorce court. At that juncture a species of common or 
co-ownership is identified, but that property is not then divided until the < 
ultimate decree of the court. 
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Nielson, 982 P.2d at 712. This species of co-ownership: 
. . . does not afford an ownership interest to the non-owning spouse; 
instead it is a right to have the assets included in the marital estate which 
the court will divide. Mr. Thompson had no possessory or marketable 
interest in Mrs. Thompson's property, and he had nothing to which a lien 
could attach. The limited purpose of the co-ownership right as identified in 
[prior Wyoming cases] does not provide Mr. Thompson with an ownership 
interest to which any rights of [a judgment creditor] could attach. It is clear 
that the [judgment creditor] could not have levied execution on any property 
involved in the marital estate until it was actually divided by the district 
court. 
id. (emphasis added). See also, In Re Marriage of Watson. 22 P.3d 1081, 1085 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, the effect of this doctrine is that during marriage 
property in one spouse's name is not exposed to the other spouse's creditors: 
Marital property was not subject to a lien or execution based upon a 
judgment obtained against one spouse or co-owner during the 
pendency of the divorce action because of the vested interest of the 
other spouse or co-owner. Smith made clear that the doctrine did 
more than remove property division transfers from the reach of the 
tax men. It also gave the previously uninvolved spouse property 
rights that trumped those of creditors seeking to collect from the 
involved spouse until the ownership of the property is finalized by the 
decree. 
Watson. 22 P.3d at 1085, citing In Re Marriage of Smith. 737 P.2d 469 (Kan. 
1987).2 
2. Many other courts have reached similar conclusions under equitable 
distribution statutes similar to Utah's. In Re Questions Submitted bv United 
States Dist. Court. 513 p.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974) ("[a]t the time a divorce action is 
filed, the inchoate martial interest becomes vested: "This interest which has 
vested is inchoate only in the sense that, prior to the division, the property to be 
transferred to the wife has not yet been determined . . . [But] upon the filing of the 
action, the court may protect this vested interest of the wife pending the division 
order, even though the property to be transferred to her has not yet been 
determined."); Sinha v. Sinha. 727 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (App. Div. 2001) (the 
marital interest is "unenforceable and unallocated" prior to the divorce action and 
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During the course of a marriage and before the pendency of any divorce, 
property owned by each spouse in their own name is that spouse's separate 
property. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-2 ("[contracts may be made by a 
wife, and liabilities incurred and enforced by or against her, to the same extent 
and in the same manner as if she were unmarried"); Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-5(2) 
("[t]he wages, earnings, property, rents, or other income of one spouse may not 
be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt, obligation, or i 
liability of the other spouse."). During the course of the Hanneys' marriage and 
prior to the initiation of any divorce, the interest of Shirley in the property was 
merely an expectancy. 
Shirley had, at most, an expectancy that in the event of divorce, the parties' 
home would be an asset of the marital estate subject to division. She had no ' 
interest to which any claim could attach. The parties deliberately so arranged 
their affairs that Shirley individually never had any interest in the home. At home, 
Shirley had an inchoate, expectancy interest. As a matter of law, such an interest 
is neither transferable nor attachable. Here, the Bank argues that it has a 
I 
"matured into a true ownership interest only upon the entry of the final divorce 
decree); Leibowitz v. Leibowitz. 462 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (App. Div. 1983) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing such interests as "mere expectancies"); 
McDuffie v. Com.. 638 S.E.2d 130, 142 (Va. 2006) (marital interest is unvested, 
inchoate interest; married woman's act, like Utah's, provides marriage does not 
give spouse interest in other spouse's property); United States v. 9894 South 
Titan Court. Unit 9. 75 G.3d 1470, 1478 (10th cir. 1996), partially overturned on 
other grounds, United States v. Urserv, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (under Colorado law, 
a spouse's inchoate interest "is neither a present nor a vested interest."). 
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property right based only upon the notion that the home was marital property. The 
trial court was correct to reject this claim. The Judgment should be affirmed. 
C. Shirley Has Never Had Authority-Actual, implied or Apparent-
to Convey the Home Out of Trust or to Herself Gratuitously 
The Bank rests its entire case on its claim that the general durable power 
of attorney blessed every action of Shirley. The Bank claims that the general 
durable power of attorney granted Shirley authority act in Blaine's name both to 
function as a trustee and to gratuitously transfer the property to herself. The Bank 
has failed to analyze Utah law regarding general powers of attorney; Utah law 
does not authorize such actions based upon a generic, general power of attorney. 
The general power of attorney did not authorize what Shirley did, either for Blaine 
personally or the trust. The special power of attorney was a forgery. Thus, 
Shirley was without authority of any kind here. The trial court's decision was 
legally and factually correct. 
The general durable power of attorney provided: 
I, Blaine J. Hanney . . . hereby make, constitute, and appoint Shirley 
Ann Hanney . . . my true and lawful attorney in fact for me and in my 
name, place and stead, giving unto said Shirley Ann Hanney full 
power to do and perform all and every act that I may legally do 
through an attorney, in relation to all of my property, real or personal, 
wherever situate, to carry out the purposes for which this power is 
granted, specifically including the power to make deposits, sign 
checks, endorse items, and withdraw funds from checking, savings, 
or other accounts. 
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App. H. The General Durable Power make no reference to the parties' Trust, and 
it does not empower any gifts. It has no other special powers, merely this general 
language. 
The universal view is that powers of attorney are to be strictly construed. 
Kline v. Utah Dept. of Health. 776 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing 
Huntsman v. Huntsman. 192 P. 368, 370 (Utah 1920). In this context, however, 
"strict construction" has a particular meaning: construction with the agent's 
fiduciary duties in view. In Re Trust of Franzen. 955 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1998). In 
Franzen. the settlor of a trust provided that his surviving spouse could make 
certain withdrawals from the trust, jd. at 1020. The settlor died and the surviving 
spouse attempted to make these changes through her brother, who she had 
appointed to be her attorney-in-fact. The Court noted that the common law rule 
held that 
Where a broadly worded power of attorney arguably authorizes acts that 
may be inconsistent with the principal's interests or intent, the instrument 
should not be interpreted as allowing the agent to undertake such acts in 
the absence of specific authority. 
jd- at 1021. In a similar vein, the Washington Supreme Court noted that the 
general view was that "gift transfers or transfers without substantial consideration 
inuring to the benefit of the principal violate the scope of authority conferred by a 
general power of attorney to sell, exchange, transfer or convey property for the 
benefit of the principal." Bryant v. Bryant. 882 P.2d 169,172 (Wash. 1994). 
Utah law, with respect to powers of attorney, is similar. 
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A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, 
as principal, authorizes another to act as agent. The scope of the 
authority so conferred may, by the terms of the instrument itself, be 
general or limited, but the instrument creating this agency 
relationship is to be strictly construed. 
Kline, 776 P.2d at 61-62 citing Huntsman 192 P. at 370.3 The Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
A power of attorney given to an agent to act in the name and on 
behalf of the principal, though couched in general language, must, in 
the absence of anything showing a contrary intent, be construed as 
giving authority to act only in the separate, individual business of the 
principal and for his benefit. It cannot be construed as permitting the 
agent to engage in transactions foreign or repugnant to that 
business, or to bind the principal by acts done, not for his benefit and 
in his behalf, but for the private benefit of the agent himself, or for 
other persons. 
Huntsman. 192 P. at 370 (quotations omitted). The facts of Huntsman are 
illustrative. A party was attempting to vindicate a deed issued by virtue of a power 
of attorney, claiming that a general power of attorney included sufficient authority 
to gift the property. The Utah Supreme Court held that a general power of 
attorney that did not specifically include the power to make a gift was simply not 
within the contemplation of the principal and that even a broad, general power of 
attorney could not be relied upon to vindicate the transaction. Huntsman, 192 P. 
at 370-71.4 Here, Shirley made a gratuitous transfer of the home from the trust to 
3. In 2003, Utah codified the common law rule that authority to modify a trust 
or to make a gift are powers that must be specifically stated a power of attorney. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-503(3). -
4. In Eaqar v. Burrows. 2008 UT 42, 191 P.3d 9, an individual was granted 
authority, pursuant to a power of attorney, which included a specific power to "gift 
property, whether real or personal". The court noted that "whether an attorney in 
fact has power to convey the principal's property for nominal consideration must 
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herself and Blaine. Such a transfer is without the authority of the power of 
attorney. 
In this case, it is undisputed that Shirley transferred the home from the trust 
to herself and Blaine without any consideration. She then granted a trust deed on 
the home from herself and Blaine. To find that the general durable power of 
attorney vindicated these faithless actions, the court would have to find either 
specific authority or at least substantial benefit to the principal: the trust and i 
Blaine. Neither exists here. 
Moreover, a power of attorney is insufficient, without more, to amend a 
i 
Trust. Kline, 776 P.2d at 61-62. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, citing 
Kline, has noted that "[t]he authority appears uniform that 'in the absence of 
express direction to the contrary, the power to revoke [a trust] is personal to the { 
settlor, when reserved to him, and does not pass to his successors in interest on 
his death, nor is it transferable by him." In Re Guardianship of Lee, 982 P.2d 
539, 541 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 1999). The Lee court continued: 
( 
be 'deducible from the language or manifest intent of the instrument.'" Eagar, ^ 
20, quoting Huntsman. 192 P. at 374. The Utah Supreme Court noted that 
because the power of attorney in Huntsman granted "no specific authority to gift 
the principal's real or personal property" no such power was conveyed. Eagar, 
U 20 & n.11. The Eagar court noted that though the language of the power of 
attorney in Huntsman was general, it lacked sufficient specificity to give the 
property away or convey it for mere nominal consideration. Id. The power of 
attorney in the present case is virtually the same as the one in Huntsman. It is a 
general power of attorney that does not include the power to make a gift or to 
convey Blaine's property away for nominal consideration. Moreover, it does not 
convey any authority with respect to the Trust. 
_on_ 
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Thus a trust reserving solely under the settlor the power to revoke 
becomes irrevocable upon the settlor's incapacity, notwithstanding 
execution of an otherwise general, durable power of attorney, where 
the trust and the power evince the settlor's intent at revocation that 
the revocation power be personal to the settlor. Kline v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
id. 
Since a power of attorney is to "be strictly construed," Muller v. Bank of 
America. 12 P.3d 899, 903 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000), an attorney in fact "does not 
have the power to revoke a trust where the settlor personally reserved the right to 
revoke." id.5 "Unless the settlor expressly states otherwise in the trust document 
or power of attorney, the power to revoke a trust is personal to the settlor and is 
non-delegable." Muller at 904. Similar cases from Utah's sister states illustrate 
these principles. 
5. The Bank suggests that Utah law may be different: "While Franklin has 
been unable to find a Utah case directly on point, two Utah cases suggest a 
power of attorney may be used to act on behalf of a trustee." App. Brief 32. The 
Bank then cites Eager v. Burrows, 2008 UT App 42,191 P.3d 9 and Davis v. 
Young, 2008 UT App 246, 190 P.3d 23 to support this proposition. Neither case 
provides any support for this proposition. The Davis court noted that reciprocal 
powers of attorney had been executed in connection with the creation of a trust. 
Far from holding that a power of attorney could be used to allow an agent to act 
as a trustee, the court noted, as a matter of fact, that a husband, armed with a 
general durable power of attorney, was not so acting when he signed a quit claim 
deed in his own name alone. Put another way, the mere existence of a power of 
attorney did not mean that the agent was acting under its power. 
Eager is even less helpful for the Bank. A power of attorney explicitly 
granted the agent the power to make a gift. The agent made a gift under the 
power. Because the gifts comported with the specific powers granted in the 
power of attorney, the gift was upheld. Eager contrasts favorably with the present 
case: the power of attorney had no gifting authority and therefore, Shirley's acts 
were beyond the terms of that power. 
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In Amcore Bank v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 174 (III. App. Ct. 
2001), a bank sued the defaulting borrower and guarantors on a loan. One of the 
guarantees had been executed by an attorney-in-fact for his father, jd. at 177-78. 
Like Franklin Credit, Amcore relied "solely on the broad grant of agency in the 
power of attorney's opening paragraph . . .givfing] the authority to perform 'every 
act of every kind and nature which may be deemed desirable or advisable to be 
performed." jd. at 182. The Court held that "'all-embracing expressions are 
discounted or discarded. Thus, phrases like 'as sufficiently in all respects as we 
ourselves could do personally in the premises"... are disregarded as 
i 
meaningless verbiage.'" jd., quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency. § 34, cmt. 
h, at 122 (1958). Even a broadly worded power of attorney is insufficient to grant 
authority to execute a guarantee, jd. Even the broadest general power is not { 
sufficient to grant a guarantee if it is not specifically allows. Here, even the broad 
power was insufficient to make a gift or alter the trust arrangements. 
Even when a gift would provide a tax benefit to the principle, a power of 
attorney cannot be used for a gift without express authority. In Re 
Conservatorship of Anderson. 628 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Neb. 2001). In Anderson. 
an agent purported to make gifts of the principal's assets-in order to reduce the 
principal's taxable estate-to himself and others, jd- at 237-38. Like Huntsman, the
 ( 
agents pointed to a general power of attorney to attempt to vindicate the gifts; like 
Huntsman, the court rejected the self-serving claims: 
< 
A power of attorney authorizes another to act as one's agent. Generally, an 
agent is required to act solely for the benefit of his or her principal in all 
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matters connected with the agency and adhere faithfully to the instructions 
of the principal. An agent and principal are in a fiduciary relationship such 
that the agent has an obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to the 
principal. An agent is prohibited from profiting from the agency relationship 
to the detriment of the principal. 
* * * 
This court has repeatedly held that no gift may be made by an attorney in 
fact to himself or herself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly 
granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear intent on the part 
of the principal to make such a gift. 
id. at 239. The benefit to the principal's estate of reducing estate taxes was 
viewed as almost entirely self-serving to the agents, who were also heirs of the 
estate. In a similar case, an agent purported to create a trust for the principal and 
to transfer the principal's assets into the trust. In Re Trust of Jameison, 8 P.3d 83 
(Mont. 2000). The Montana Supreme Court held that a broadly worded general 
power of attorney was insufficient to grant an attorney in fact authority to create a 
trust for the principal, id- at 87.6 
Finally, in a carefully reasoned case, the Delaware Supreme Court 
provided a thorough analysis of the effect of a self-interested agent making 
transfers under a power of attorney. In Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217 (Del. 
1999), an elderly woman granted a general power of attorney to her neighbor. 
Using the power of attorney, the neighbor transferred substantial property from 
6. Other courts have concluded that a general power of attorney is insufficient 
to allow the attorney to make a gift of the principal's property to herself. In Re 
Washington. 297 B.R. 662, 664 (S.D.Fia.Bnk. 2003)(a power of attorney not 
sufficient to allow bankruptcy petition to be signed without noting the power on 
the petition); In Re Trust of Franzen, 955 P.2d 1018,1021 (Colo. 1998); In Re 
Conservatorship of Anderson. 628 N.W.2d 233, 239-40 (Neb. 2001); Cheloha v. 
Cheloha. 582 N.W.2d 291, 297-98 (Neb. 1998). 
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the woman to herself or family members-generally consistent with the woman's 
orally expressed desires. ]d- at 220-21. These transfers were challenged by the 
residuary beneficiary of the elderly woman's will. Jd. at 221-22. The Court first 
addressed the fiduciary nature of an attorney-in-fact's relation to the principal: 
The common law fiduciary relationship created by a durable power of 
attorney is like the relationship created by a trust. The fiduciary duty 
principles of trust law must, therefore, be applied to the relationship 
between a principal and her attorney-in-fact. An attorney-in-fact, under the 
duty of loyalty, always has the obligation to act in the best interest of the 
principal unless the principal voluntarily consents to the attorney-in-fact 
engaging in an interested transaction after full disclosure. At common law, 
transactions which violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty were void. Under 
current Delaware law, these transactions are voidable at the behest of the 
beneficiary. ' 
id. at 225.7 "If the transaction is challenged, the burden of persuasion to justify 
upholding the transaction is on the fiduciary." ]d. 
i 
Thus, in the present case, at common law, Shirley's actions in using the 
powers of attorney were void. Accordingly, the Bank's predecessor in interest 
received nothing by her actions. However, even if only voidable, Blaine properly 
and promptly challenged the transaction and prevailed before Judge Page. 
< 
7. By statute, Utah appears to have altered the common law rule, which made 
self-interested transaction void. They are now voidable under Utah Code Ann. § 
75-5-504. This statute was enacted in 2003 and provides: 
Any loan, sale, or encumbrance on behalf of a principal with his 
attorney-in-fact, or with the attorney-in-fact's spouse, agent, or attorney, or 
any entity or trust in which the attorney-in-fact has a substantial beneficial 
interest, or any transaction involving the attorney-in-fact which is affected 
by a substantial conflict of interest, is voidable unless the transaction is 
approved by the court after notice to interested persons and others as 
directed by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504. 
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Further, in Schock, the trial court applied a "bright line" rule that an attorney in 
fact may not make gifts to himself or herself unless there is a clear, written 
expression of that authority, id. at 228, quoting Kunewa v. Joshua. 924 P.2d 559, 
565 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996). See also Eaqar. fl 20, quoting Huntsman. 192 P. at 
374. While holding that the bright line rule might not be desirable in every case, 
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the result of its use in Schock. id. at 228.8 
The Bank argues strongly that the general durable power of attorney 
granted Shirley power to either act as a trustee for Blaine or to unilaterally convey 
property out of the Trust. The general durable power of attorney did not grant 
authority to Shirley to convey Trust property under any circumstance. More 
important, neither the Trust nor the general durable power of attorney authorized 
Shirley to gift the property to herself or others. Huntsman. 192 P. at 370. Under 
Huntsman. Shirley took assets belonging to Blaine and the Trust and converted 
8. Moreover, the Schock and Kunewa courts noted that many jurisdictions 
employed the "bright line" rule: Fender v. Fender. 329 S.E.2d 430 (S.C. 1985); in 
Re Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1996); Whitford v. Gaskill. 480 
S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 1997), as amended, 489 N.E.2d 177 (1997); F.M. Stigler. Inc. v. 
H.N.C. Realty Co.. 595 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1980); Johnson v. Fraccacreta. 348 So.2d 570 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In Re Estate of DeBelardino. 352 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. 
Sur. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Estate of Casey v. 
Commr of Internal Revenue. 948 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1991)("When one 
considers the manifold opportunities and temptations for self-dealing that are 
opened up for persons holding general powers of attorney-of which outright 
transfers for less than value to the attorney-in-fact herself are the most 
obvious-the justification for such a flat rule is apparent. And its justification is 
made even more apparent when one considers the ease with which such a rule 
can be accommodated by principals and their draftsmen."). 
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them to her own use and purposes. The general durable power of attorney simply 
did not extend so far as to allow Shirley to act in this fashion. 
Here, Shirley's use of the general durable power of attorney was a breach 
of fiduciary duty. She transferred trust property to herself and Blaine in violation of 
her trust by gifting the home. She then further granted a trust deed on the 
property for her own benefit in violation of her trust. The general durable power of 
attorney contains no language authorizing such gratuitous transfers. Huntsman 
stands for the unambiguous principle that no power to make a gift will not be 
inferred. Huntsman, like most other states, voids the very power the Bank would 
. i 
rely on here. The trial court's ruling and judgment were correct. 
Asserting implied authority does not help the Bank. 
Implied authority, on the other hand, embraces authority to do those acts ( 
which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish 
or perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent. Implied 
authority is actual authority based upon the premise that whenever the 
performance of certain business is confided to an agent, such authority 
carries with it by implication authority to do collateral acts which are the 
natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized. This 
authority may be implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the 
facts and circumstances attending the transaction in question. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Utah 1988). 
To show implied authority, the Bank would need to point to some authority 
granted to Shirley from which the right to act was implied. Here, there is only the < 
general durable power of attorney. However, there is no evidence that Bank One 
had any awareness of the general power of attorney when the transaction was 
< 
consummate. Nor did Shirley have even a subjective belief that the power of 
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attorney was usable. There was, therefore, nothing from which an implication 
could arise. Moreover, even if the general power of attorney were considered, a 
power expressly disallowed by law cannot arise in contravention of the law by 
mere implication. The Title Company explicitly disallowed reliance on the general 
durable power of attorney. R. at 1384, vol. Ill, 10-14. The Bank, through its agent 
the Title Company, insisted that the loan be closed through the Special Power of 
Attorney, id- It is undisputed that the Special Power of Attorney was forged. The 
Bank's insistence and reliance upon the Special Power of Attorney is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Special Power of Attorney was recorded as part 
of the transaction.9 
Shirley had no authority to forge Blaine's name to a warranty deed or the 
special power of attorney. The general durable power of attorney did not grant 
her such authority and there is no other source of authority for her actions. Each 
of the conveyances, including the trust deed, was therefore void. The trial court's 
decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
9. The Bank continues to assert apparent authority also. Apparent authority 
exists only based upon the acts and statements of the principal to the person 
relying on the authority. Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp.. 2009 
UT 18, If 10, 210 P.3d 277. "It is the principal who must cause third parties to 
believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority." City Elec. v. Dean 
Evans Chrysler Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983). In the present case, the 
Bank can point to no action of Blaine upon which they relied which clothed Shirley 
with any authority whatsoever. Accordingly, any claim of apparent authority must 
fail. 
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D. The Trust Did Not Participate in the Loans and It Did Not Grant 
Any Power-Reserved or Granted-to Shirley to Act 
In an effort to vindicate its position, the Bank argues that either powers 
reserved to the settlors or granted to the trustees authorized Shirley's actions. In 
light of Bank One's care to avoid dealing with the Trust, this argument is ironic. 
Bank One did not extend credit to the trust and avoided doing business with the 
trust at all. The title company first prepared a deed to convey the home from the 
trust to Blaine and Shirley individually. The trust was neither a co-borrower nor a 
grantor of security in the Bank One loan. To pretend otherwise is to ignore the 
undisputed facts.10 
10. The Bank cites Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406 (2000)(now renumbered as 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-816) for the proposition that the terms of the Trust were 
not made public. This statute provides that terms of a trust are disclosed by deed 
when the deed provides the names of the trustees, their addresses and the name 
and date of the trust. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-816(3). App. F, transferring the 
home into the Trust complies with the each of these requirements, excepting the 
date of the trust. 
Moreover, this statute applies only to one who is a "purchaser of value who 
take[s] the property without notice of the terms of the trust." Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-816(2). Neither Shirley nor Bank One qualify. No evidence exists that Bank 
One was a purchaser for value without notice. To the contrary, the commitment 
for title insurance, admitted as trial exhibit 72 suggests otherwise. App. M. 
The Commitment for Title Insurance, App. M, issued 26 July 2000, 
expressly provided that the home was vested in the name of the Trust. Schedule 
C provided that "[tjhe following requirements must be met and completed to the 
satisfaction of the [title company] before its policy of title insurance will be issued: 
. . . a copy of Hanney Family Trust, as set out as Number 4, Schedule A, hereof." 
Exhibit 72. Title insurance was issued in this case. 
In light of Shirley's fraudulent act in conveying title from the trust to the her 
and Blaine individual and her subsequent conduct, the commitment for title 
insurance bodes ill for the Bank. Either (1) the Bank (through its agent, the title 
company) had actual knowledge of the trust's terms, and thus Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-816 has no application; or (2) the Bank opted not to deal with the trust at all 
and the statute had no application. 
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Whether speaking of powers reserved to the settlors or powers granted to 
the trustees, the Hanney Family Trust clearly required both Shirley and Blaine to 
act. The Bank looks to section 4.2 of the trust, referring to "Reserved Powers" to 
attempt to vindicate their position. App. E. Section 4.2 has the following 
introductory phrase: "[w]e each reserve to ourselves the following powers." jd. 
The reservation is not to an individual settlor, but "to ourselves"-as a group. 
Other portions of Article 4 support this view. For example, only joint 
decisions of Blaine and Shirley are given binding effect on the trustees, jd- at § 
4.5. Or, to indicate an exercise of reserved trust powers, section 4.7 provides that 
"[u]nless otherwise specifically provided herein, the powers we have reserved 
shall be exercisable by instruments in writing signed by us." jd. at § 4.7. Each of 
these sections-both applicable to section 4.2-require action by Blaine and 
Shirley. Under the plain language of the trust, when the settlors exercise a 
reserved power, they are required to do so jointly and in writing. It is undisputed 
that no such document exists here. 
Turning to granted powers, Shirley had no authority to act as a trustee 
alone, id. at § 11.2. The Trust expressly calls for action by a majority of the 
Trustees, jd. Utah law is clear that co-trustees who are unable to act 
unanimously must act by majority decision. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-703. 
Nevertheless, the Bank claims that Shirley was entitled to act alone. The plain 
language of the Trust persistently speaks of trustees acting jointly. 
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To support its untenable argument, the Bank seizes upon the word "sole" in 
section 11.1. Without considering the actual context, structure, or plain meaning, 
the Bank contends that this word modifies not the word "discretion" but the word 
Trustees. The actual context evinces an opposite intent. "The Trustees [plural 
noun] are authorized [plural verb] to examine the following powers . . . in their 
[plural modifier] sole and absolute discretion." Id. at § 11.1. Suggesting that this 
sentence authorizes one trustee to act alone simply ignores the plain meaning of 
these words and the Trust as a whole. 
The Restatement supports the view that the trustees were required to act 
i 
jointly: "If there are two or more trustees, the powers conferred upon them can 
properly be exercised only by all the trustees, unless it is otherwise provided by 
the terms of the trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 194. Shirley had { 
authority only in conjunction with her co-trustee, not alone. The Trust does not 
submit to the Bank's hermeneutic gyrations. 
When pressed to articulate Shirley's source of authority, the Bank is forced 
to return to the general power of attorney. The Bank must either be able to justify 
Shirley's actions based upon the power of attorney with regard to both the trust 
and her execution of the trust deed or lose this matter. The power of attorney 
must therefore grant authority to Shirley with respect to both trust matters and to ^ 
gratuitously transfer the home. As demonstrated above, the general durable 
power of attorney does not provide for such authority. 
< 
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"A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is vested 
in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of 
beneficiaries." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, 
Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2 
(1959)). Once the home was transferred into the Hanney Family Trust, its 
trustees had "exclusive control of the trust property, subject to the limitations 
imposed by law and the trust instrument, and once the settlor has created the 
trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has only such ability to 
deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Davis v. 
Young. 2008 UT App 246, U 18, 190 P.3d 23, citing Flake v. Flake. 2003 UT 17, If 
12, 71 P.3d 589. The Trustees were thus under a duty to convey the home upon 
request by the settlors, but it was "the trustees"-plura!-who were required to act, 
not a trustee alone. 
In this case, the Bank is forced to argue that a thief, Shirley, conveyed 
good and valid title to its predecessor-in-interest. A fraudster obtains no title to 
the subject of his fraud by virtue of her fraudulent activities: "Where one has 
stolen or embezzled the money or property of another, he obtains no title 
whatsoever." Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints v. 
Jollev. 467 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1970). See, also Western Sur. Co. v. Redding. 
626 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1981); Witherspoon v. Yeck. 551 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Utah 
1976); In re Two Bose Speakers, 835 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); 
Alamo Rent-A-Car. inc. v. Mendenhall. 937 P.2d 69, 73-74 (Nev. 1997). See, 
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also, 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales, § 409 (2009) ("[a] thief does not divest an owner of 
title. One who purchases stolen property from a thief, no matter how innocently, 
acquires no title in the property; title remains in the owner."). 
A breach of the duty of loyalty, by a self-dealing trustee, makes a tainted 
transaction voidable. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802(2). Indeed, at common law, 
such a transaction was simply void. Schock. 732 A.2d at 225. Statutorily, both 
Utah's Uniform Trust Code and Utah's enactment of the Uniform Durable Powers 
of Attorney Act provide that self-interested dealing by the fiduciary makes a 
transaction voidable. Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-504 ("any loan . . . which is 
i 
affected by a substantial conflict of interest, is voidable.") & 75-7-802 ("a sale, 
encumbrance, or other transaction . . . which is affected by a conflict of interest.. 
. is voidable."). While these statutes may not be dispositive, they are persuasive ( 
authority. 
As a trustee, Shirley had no authority to act unilaterally. Her only rights, 
either as a grantor of the trustee or as a trustee, were to act in conjunction with 
Blaine. The trust language is plain in its requirement of joint action. The trial 
court was correct to reject the Bank's arguments regarding the trust. The 
judgment should be affirmed. 
< 
E. The Bank's Ratification Claim Is Unavailing 
Before the trial court, Bank One argued that estoppel, waiver and 
< 
ratification applied to vindicate the trust deed. Evidently conceding that waiver 
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and estoppel have no application, Bank One appears to have abandoned these 
claims on appeal-at least they have not included such matters in their brief. 
Instead, Bank One concentrates on the doctrine of ratification. 
The Bank finally asserts that Blaine, in some fashion, ratified the loans in 
question. The undisputed evidence is that Blaine had no knowledge of the loans 
in question until February 2003. The parties immediately filed bankruptcy and, 
within several months, adversary proceedings were pending in the bankruptcy 
court. There was never a point in time at which ratification was made. 
The Bank recognizes that ratification is "mixed question of law and fact." 
App. Brief, 43. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusions are accorded at least a 
measure of deference and its factual findings are subject to a duty to marshal. In 
this case, the Bank does not satisfy its marshaling burden. It recites the trial 
court's findings, but fails to present the evidence. Marshaling requires more: 
"appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court, 
and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to their case. 
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the 
record in support of their position." Chen. 2004 UT 82, ^  78. Summarizing the 
trial court's findings does not constitute any type of marshaling. The trial court's 
findings are thus presumed supported by the record. 
Neither does the Bank fare better with the law. The Bank cites snippets of 
case law, not all. The Utah Supreme Court held that "ratification requires the 
principal to have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify." 
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Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). Additionally, where an 
original contract was required to be in writing-such as a conveyance of real 
property-the ratification must be written as well. jd. at 79. 
Here, the Bank's argument fails on three counts. First, there is no 
evidence-and the Bank points to none-that Blaine ever had any intent to ratify 
any of Shirley's wrongful acts. Indeed, trial exhibit 67, attached as App. N, is 
Blaine's letter repudiating the trust deed in question. R. at 1384, vol. II at 179-
80.*** In addition to never having any intent to ratify, prior to his repudiation, 
Blaine never had full knowledge of all the facts. Zion's First Nat'l. Bank v. Clark 
Clinic. Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988)(ratification requires full 
knowledge of all material facts). It is undisputed that Blaine learned of Shirley's 
betrayal in February 2003. Prior to then, he did not have full knowledge, and ( 
could not have ratified anything. Finally, ratification, in this case, would require a 
written ratification. No such writing exists. 
A good illustration of the principle of ratification isOckev v. Lehmer. 2008 
UT 37,189 P.3d 51. In Ockev, the plaintiff was the beneficiary of a trust 
agreement. The trust terminated when he turned 28, but the property contained in 
the trust was not conveyed to him at that point. Several years later, Ockey 
executed a document directing his trustee to convey the property to another - < 
entity. Ockey received a proportional interest in the new entity. Ockev, If 27. As a 
result of this transaction, Ockey received several million dollars of income. 
Quoting Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) the Supreme Court 
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noted that one "'may not be willfully ignorant, nor may he purposely shut his eyes 
to means of information within his possession and control and thereby escape 
ratification.'" Ockev, U 31, quoting Bradshaw v. McBride, 659 P.2d at 78. 
Contrasting Ockev with the facts of this case demonstrates that no ratification has 
occurred. 
In Ockev, the plaintiff actually signed an express direction to his trustee to 
undertake the action of which he subsequently complained. Ockey accepted and 
retained millions of dollars in benefits after giving his trustee these directions. In 
the present case, Blaine never signed anything in the nature of a ratification. 
Blaine immediately began to take actions, in the nature of repudiation, which 
included a written repudiation of the trust deed, filing of a bankruptcy, adversary 
proceedings, objections to Shirley's discharge in bankruptcy, entering into 
separate agreements with the bankruptcy trustee to preserve the present claim, 
and divorcing Shirley. 
The Bank also contends that Blaine had constructive knowledge of these 
matters by virtue of the fact that they were publicly recorded. One is under no 
duty to continuously monitor the county recorder's office to ascertain whether 
one's property has been wrongly conveyed to a third party. Christianson v. 
Commonwealth Land Title Ins.. Co.. 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983). There is no 
evidence that Blaine learned of Shirley's actions prior to February 2003. 
The facts do not support a ratification. The Bank also asserts that to allow 
its claims to fail would result in an unjust enrichment. Indeed, "[t]he mere fact that 
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a third person benefits from a contract between two others does not make such 
third person liable in quasi contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. There must 
be some misleading act, request for services or the like to support such an 
action." Southern Title Guaranty Co.. Inc. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), quoting Knight v. Post. 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). See also, Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings. Inc. v. Adams. 564 P.2d 
773, 774 (Utah 1977). Here, there is no misleading act, request for service or the 
like by Blaine. Blaine had no interaction with the Bank or its predecessor and 
requested nothing from them. There is no indication that Blaine received any 
i 
benefit from this transaction, and the trial court so found. App. C, Findings, If 66. 
Rather than marshaling evidence on this point, the Bank resorts to speculation. 
For example, the Bank argues that "Blaine personally benefitted from { 
Hanney & Hanney's debts being paid from the proceeds of the loan, particularly 
those debts such as payroll for which he may have been personally liable." App. 
Brief, 46. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support the claim that Blaine had 
personal liability for any Hanney & Hanney debt or obligation. Nor does the Bank 
point to any. Even the tax deductions do not help the Bank; there is nothing 
which unjustly enriched any Defendant at the Bank's expense with respect to the 
tax returns. There was a mortgage tax deduction because mortgage interest was
 { 
paid to Bank One. This is not an unjust enrichment at the Bank's expense, but an 
acknowledgment that the Bank, in fact, was paid interest income on this loan. 
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Ratification simply did not occur here. When fully informed, Blaine 
repudiated the trust deed. Blaine received no benefit from the loan and retained 
no benefit after being informed of the material facts. The trial court's rejection of 
ratification was correct and should be affirmed. 
II. Hanney's Cross Appeal 
The Bank's action had but a single point: its desire for judicial foreclosure. 
At trial, the Bank's evidence was mortally deficient. After written closing 
arguments and briefing, the Bank sought to cure this failure by moving to reopen 
the evidence. The Bank provided no explanation for its failure, nor did it disclose 
the nature of the evidence it sought to present. The trial court abused its 
discretion in granting this motion. However, the trial court's ultimate ruling made 
reopening moot. In the event that a remand is considered by this court, it is 
appropriate to consider and reverse the trial court's order reopening the evidence, 
and affirming the judgment on this alternate basis. 
The evidence presented at trial was-and remains even after 
reopening-insufficient to grant a judicial foreclosure. A decision to reopen a trial 
is a matter of discretion, granting a motion to reopen must serve the interest of 
fairness and substantial justice and be predicated upon a review of the totality of 
the circumstances. Lewis v. Porter. 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976).11 "[Cjourts 
11. In Lewis, a defendant chose to absent himself from trial; trial nevertheless 
proceeded with his attorney and both sides presented evidence. 556 P.2d at 497. 
When the defendant lost, he sought to reopen the evidence, claiming flaws in the 
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should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings." United States v. Blakenship. 
775 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1985). 
Generally, "once both parties have rested and the court has ruled on the 
sufficiency of the plaintiff's case it is simply too late to inject a new issue into the 
case." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church. 642 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah 
1982). "Counsel is entitled to control the presentation of evidence, and should 
there be a failure to present evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally viewed i 
as a waiver of the claim." Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983), 
rev'd on other grounds, Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 
i 
1998). Reopening the evidence can turn on the complexity of the evidence. 
Compare, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction. 1999 
UT 87 1HI22-24, 977 P.2d 518 (holding no abuse of discretion to allow reopening < 
when trial court observed that "there are some glaring misunderstandings in the 
presentation of the evidence") with Tanoaro v. Marrero. 373 P2d 390, 391 (Utah 
1962)(holding no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow reopening of case 
claiming satisfaction of promissory note by new note).12 
< 
evidence. id. When his motion to reopen was denied, the Utah Supreme Court 
had little difficulty in concluding that no abuse of discretion occurred, given 
defendant's "ample opportunity" to present his side of the case, id-
12. Tangaro's facts are illustrative. Plaintiff lent defendant's wife money. 373 < 
P.2d at 391. Plaintiff and defendant consolidated various debts of defendants into 
a single note and extinguished the first note. Plaintiff nevertheless brought suit 
on the extinguished note. id. The consolidated loan named defendant's spouse 
as an obligor, but not defendant. When plaintiff lost his claim against defendant, 
he sought to reopen the evidence to present "additional evidence on the renewal * 
note" presumably that defendant was an intended obligor, id. This motion was 
denied, and the Utah Supreme Court held that "[njothing is cited, however, to 
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The Third Circuit has distilled several salient elements to consider when 
faced with a motion to reopen the evidence: prejudice, timing, and the character 
of the proposed evidence are all important factors to consider. United States v. 
Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Kithcart. 
218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000). A review of the totality of the circumstances in 
this case reveals that the Bank simply is not entitled to the exercise of judicial 
discretion; the Bank had a full and fair opportunity to present its case. Having 
failed to present sufficient evidence, the Bank should be held to its proof. 
One factor is "whether the party opposing the reopening would be 
prejudiced if reopening is permitted." United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220 
(3rd Cir. 2000). See also, Lewis, 556 P.2d at 497. Unfair prejudice in this case 
exists. The Bank has never revealed any bank employee, witness, or document 
who would present the amount due under the trust deed. Even as late as the 
final pretrial order, the Bank never disclosed such a witness or exhibit. App. A. 
By allowing the evidence to be reopened, the trial court simply ignored the final 
pretrial order which required disclosure. 
In the present case, the Bank did not seek a reopening to present a few 
ignored excluded exhibits like Whipple. Neither did the Bank's motion come 
during the actual trial. Instead, the Bank waited until all the evidence had been 
submitted and arguments have been made to correct a fundamental flaw in its 
show any particular in which the trial court abused its discretion." jd. 
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case, like Tanqaro. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
In addition, "to properly exercise its discretion the district court must 
evaluate that explanation and determine if it is both reasonable, and adequate to 
explain why the government initially failed to introduce evidence that may have 
been essential to meeting its burden of proof." Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 220. Here, 
there was no explanation from the Bank to inform the trial court's exercise of i 
discretion. Absent an explanation, reopening should have been denied. 
The omitted evidence is the sine qua non of any judicial foreclosure in the 
i 
State of Utah: the amount and interest rate on under the foreclosed trust deed. 
When the trial ended, its record included no evidence—not even a Bank One 
business record—showing any such amount. A judgment of mortgage foreclosure { 
"shall include" "the amount due, with costs and disbursements." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-901(2). See also, Diener v. Diener. 2004 UT App 314, fl 12, 98 P.3d 
1178 (use of "shall" indicates a mandatory condition, eliminating judicial 
discretion). The amount due must be proven by evidence and reduced to 
judgment following judicial determination. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901(2); 
Associated Indus. Dev.. Inc. v. Jewkes. 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1984)(awarded 
judgment must be based "on evidence in the record."); Jensen v. Lichtenstein. < 
145 P. 1036, 1038 (Utah 1914). In the present case, the Bank utterly failed to 
adduce evidence to support its judicial foreclosure claim. 
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The Bank did not present any evidence to establish the amount due and 
owing under the note. Instead, the Bank merely presented: (1) that the original 
principle balance of the trust deed was $247,000.00, App. J, Bank One Trust 
Deed; (2) Shirley made monthly payments in undisclosed amounts from 
sometime in the fall of 2000 (no specific month was established) until November 
2002. There is, therefore, no way of knowing from the present state of the 
evidence what amount is owing under the trust deed. 
The Bank's evidentiary failure is more than mere arithmetic. To calculate 
the amount due and owing under an interest bearing note, one needs to know at 
least four specific points of data: 
(1) the interest rate; 
(2) the date interest begins to accrue; 
(3) the principal amount on which interest accrues; and 
(4) the amount and dates of payments. 
The Bank presented only 
(1) the principal amount upon origination; and 
(2) the fact that payments of unknown amounts were made from the time 
the loan originated until November 2002. This information is simply inadequate to 
allow any calculation. 
The amount owing under the mortgage is required so that a deficiency 
judgment may be established. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-902. A deficiency amount 
is established by deducting the sheriffs sale proceeds from the amount 
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established by the judgment as due. id. Of course, excess proceeds (that is, 
sales amounts in excess of the amount due) belong to the debtor or any junior 
lienholder, not the creditor. Mickelson v. Anderson. 19 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Utah 
1932). Here, Blaine's bankruptcy precludes a deficiency judgment, but it does not 
preclude the possibility of excess proceeds. If, at sheriff's sale, for example, the 
property sold for $400,000, but only $350,000 were owing to the Bank, Blaine 
would be entitled to this difference. , 
In addition to creating a situation in which no excess or deficiency amount 
can be calculated (and the concomitant risk that the Bank will obtain a windfall), 
the failure to establish an amount owing also may prejudice Defendant's 
redemption rights. "Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosures of 
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in cases of sales under ( 
executions generally." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-906(1). Redemption, in turn, is 
controlled by Utah R. Civ. P. 69C. To redeem, a redemptioner must pay the sales 
price from the sheriff's sale within 180 days after the sale, together with a 
surcharge of 6%, plus other amounts which may be owing on the property. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 69C(d) and (e). 4 
The redemption price is linked to the sales price, not to the amount due 
under the mortgage. See, e.g., Wasatch Oil & Gas. L.L.C. v. Reott. 2007 UT App
 { 
223, ffl| 12, 22-24, 163 P.3d 713. However, since foreclosing judgment creditor 
may credit bid the amount owed under the judgment at the sheriff's sale, failing to 
establish the amount due creates an absurdity. Because no amount owing has 
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been determined, the Bank cannot may any credit bid: there is no "credit" to bid. 
Without determining the amount owing to the Bank, any amount bid by the Bank 
or any other person at the sheriff's sale would be, by definition, an excess bid and 
belong to Defendant, not the Bank. Failing to establish an amount due is 
tantamount to establishing the invalidity of the mortgage. 
Alternatively, allowing the foreclosing creditor to unilaterally determine what 
is owed unfairly allows the Bank to determine the redemption price. By setting its 
"credit" bid high, the Bank may make redemption economically unfeasible. Such 
unfettered discretion is inconsistent with the language and intent of the mortgage 
foreclosure statute. Brockbank v. Brockbank. 2001 UT App 251, U 12, 32 P.3d 
990 ("To allow a foreclosing creditor to control the right of redemption is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the right to provide a check on bids that are well 
below market value."). See also, Wasatch. 2007 UT App 223, fl 23-24. Viewed 
from any perspective, the requirement of establishing the amount owing is a 
substantial protection required by the statute. 
Finally, the Bank's requested reiief on appeal-outright reversal and entry of 
a judgment in its favor-is problematic. Because no amount has ever been 
determined by the trial court, an outright reversal would be inappropriate. Even 
after three days of trial, memoranda and argument on the motion to reopen, an 
order allowing reopener, and an appeal, the Bank still cannot state-from the 
evidence-the amount (principle and interest) that it claims to be owed. Absent 
that evidence, remand would be meaningless. The Bank chose to rest its case 
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with the facts in a particular posture. The fact-the undisputed fact-that it chose 
to put no evidence of the amount of indebtedness or accruing interest before the 
trial court is fatal. The trial court's decision to reopen should be reversed and the 
trial court's judgment affirmed on this alternate basis. 
Conclusion 
The Bank opened trial with a trenchant declaration: "It is not only for what 
we do that we are held responsible, but also for what we do not do." R. at 1385, 
vol. I, 4. The Bank brought suit to obtain a judicial foreclosure. The Bank 
presented the case that it saw fit and failed to present the critical evidence. 
Reopening after the flaw was forcefully demonstrate was unfair. The trial court's 
decision on this point should be reversed and the judgment affirmed on this 
alternative basis. 
The Bank's failure does not stop at the reopener motion, however. In this 
appeal, the Bank challenges factual findings, but did not marshal the evidence. 
Instead, the Bank merely reargued its case. The findings should therefore be 
affirmed. Neither, however, does the Bank prevail substantively. 
The general durable power of attorney did not grant Shirley any authority to 
act for the trust or to make any gift. Her actions were contrary to the legal trust 
reposed in her. At the very least, Shirley's actions were voidable and timely 
challenged. At common law, Shirley's actions were void. Either way, her actions 
are not valid and the trust deed cannot be sustained on any of them. 
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Finally, the undisputed fact is that the Bank relied on a forged special 
power of attorney prepared by its agent, Inwest Title. That reliance is fatal, as the 
trial court found. The trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial 
evidence and its legal conclusions are correct. Its judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, this / 3 day of September 2010. 
irad C. Smith, Attorney for Blaine Hanney 
and Hanney Family Trust 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing brief to: 
Laura S. Scott 
Matthew D. Cook 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this /* day of September 2010. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual; et al., 
Defendants. 
JOINT FINAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
Case No. 050700241 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
I. 
The parties hereby submit the following Joint Final Pre-Trial Order: 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Franklin Credit Management Corporation 
("Franklin") is the assignee of Bank One, NA ("Bank One"). Defendants Blaine J. Hanney 
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("Blaine Hanney") and Shirley A. Hanney ("Shirley Hanney") are residents of Davis County, 
Utah. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were formerly husband and wife but are now 
divorced. Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff The Hanney Family Trust ("Hanney Family 
Trust") is a revocable trust which was created by Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney in February 
1995. Blaine Hanney and the Hanney Family Trust are collectively referred to as "the Hanney 
Defendants." Defendant American General Financial Services, Inc. ("American General") is a 
Utah corporation. 
II. GENERAL STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN'S CLAIMS, AMERICAN 
GENERAL'S CLAIMS AND HANNEY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES 
A. GENERAL STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN'S CLAIMS 
1. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were married for over thirty years and 
were co-owners of Hanney and Hanney Construction, Inc. ("Hanney and Hanney"), which was a 
"S" corporation. During their marriage, Blaine Hanney gave Shirley Hanney complete authority 
to handle all of their financial affairs. Having given her complete authority, Blaine Hanney did 
not concern himself with how Shirley Hanney was handling those financial affairs. He never 
reviewed the statements for their joint checking or savings account. He never reviewed the 
books of Hanney and Hanney. He never even reviewed their joint federal income tax returns 
before or after filing. Instead, he simply told his wife to "go ahead and sign [them]." 
2. The Hanneys were married in 1973. Approximately five years later, 
Blaine Hanney's parents divided their property into eight parcels so that each of their children 
could have one parcel. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney paid his parents small monthly 
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payments for several years to pay for their undeveloped lot. On November 2, 1982, Blaine 
Hanneys' parents recorded a Warranty Deed conveying the undeveloped lot to Blaine Hanney. 
The Hanneys then built a house on the Property using money that they had saved for 
approximately five years. Blaine Hanney did most of the labor and they paid cash for the 
materials. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney always considered themselves joint owners of the 
Property. Indeed, in Shirley Hanney is identified as the "joint tenant with rights of survivorship" 
of the Property in two Deeds Granting Easements recorded in 1979. 
3. In 1995, for estate planning purposes, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney 
executed a Revocable Trust Agreement of the Hanney Family Trust ("Trust Agreement") on 
February 22, 1995. Under the form Trust Agreement, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were 
appointed Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. They were also the beneficiaries. Also on 
February 22, 1995, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney, as grantors, conveyed the Property to 
Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney, as Trustees for the Hanney Family Trust, pursuant to a 
Special Warranty Deed. The Trust Agreement also recites that all of the Hanneys' checking and 
savings accounts were transferred to the Hanney Family Trust. Although these assets were 
ostensibly conveyed to the Hanney Family Trust, the Hanneys retained full dominion and control 
over their assets, including the Property. Indeed, the Hanney Family Trust did not file separate 
income tax returns or have separate checking or savings accounts. 
4. As Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust, Shirley Hanney reserved to 
herself the right to "dispose of any property by . . . mortgage" or "borrow money [or] pledge all 
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of part of the Trust Property" in her "sole and absolute discretion." Also in February 1995, ""' ^w 
Blaine Hanney executed a General Durable Power of Attorney appointing Shirley Hanney as his 
"true and lawful attorney" with "full power to do and perform all and every act that [he] may 
legally do . . . in relation to all of [his] property, real or personal..." 
5. Beginning in 1998, Shirley Hanney obtained several loans for Hanney & 
Hanney which were secured by deeds of trust on the Property. These loans were used to pay off 
creditors of Hanney & Hanney and to repay funds that Shirley Hanney had "borrowed" from , 
Hanney Development, L.P., a limited partnership of Blaine Hanney and his mother and siblings. 
6. On June 9, 1998, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney executed a Home 
i 
Equity Line Deed of Trust in the amount of $50,000 in favor of Key Bank National Association 
("First Key Bank Trust Deed"). On January 19, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Home Equity 
Line Deed of Trust in the amount of $80,000 in favor of Key Bank ("Second Key Bank Trust J 
Deed"). Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Second Key Bank Trust Deed "by 
POA Shirley A. Hanney." Some of the proceeds of this loan were used to pay off the First Key 
\ 
Bank Trust Deed and, consequently, a Deed of Reconveyance for the First Key Bank Trust Deed 
was recorded on March 31, 1999. 
7. On April 16, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Modification of Key Equity ( 
Options Agreement that increased the credit line from $80,000 to $120,000. Shirley Hanney 
signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Modification "by POA Shirley A. Hanney." On February 
28, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed an Open End Deed of Trust in the amount of $163,200 in 
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favor of American General Finance ("AG Trust Deed"), which was recorded on February 29, 
2000. Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the AG Trust Deed "by POA Shirley A. 
Hanney." 
8. On August 24, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed a Deed of Trust in favor of 
Bank One NA ("Bank One Trust Deed") to secure a loan in the amount of $247,000 ("Bank One 
Loan"). Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Bank One Trust Deed "by Shirley 
A. Hanney as attorney in fact." The proceeds from the Bank One Loan were used to pay off the 
loans from Key Bank ($69,997.00) and the AG Trust Deed ($167,087.00). The balance of the 
proceeds of the Bank One Loan was paid jointly to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney pursuant 
to check in the amount of $1,875.88. The beneficial interest under the Bank One Trust Deed was 
subsequently assigned to Franklin. 
9. The proceeds from the Key Bank Loan and AG Loan were used for 
Hanney and Hanney Construction. They were also used to repay funds that Shirley Hanney had 
withdrawn from the bank accounts of Hanney Development, L.P. ("Hanney Development"), 
which is a limited partnership owned by Blaine Hanney, his mother, and his siblings. Although 
Shirley Hanney was not a partner in Hanney Development, she assumed numerous duties and 
responsibilities in it. 
10. On April 17, 2002, American General executed a Subordination 
Agreement subordinating the AG Trust Deed to the Bank One Trust Deed. 
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11. From 1998 through 2003, the Hanneys deducted the interest on these 
loans, including the Bank One Loan, on their federal income tax returns. In 1998, the Hanneys 
deducted "home mortgage interest" in the amount of $2,192.00. In 1999, the Hanneys deducted 
"home mortgage interest" in the amount of $7,756.00. In 2000, the Hanneys deducted "home 
mortgage interest" in the amount of $17,152.00. In 2001, the Hanneys deducted "home 
mortgage interest" in the amount of $29,622.00. Finally, in 2002, the Hanneys deducted "home 
mortgage interest" in the amount of $25,852.00. 
12. In March 2003, the Hanneys filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy ("Bankruptcy 
Action"). They listed Bank One Loan as a "joint debt" on their bankruptcy schedules. When 
Bank One sought leave from the automatic stay to foreclose the Bank One Trust Deed, however, * 
Blaine Hanney asserted for the first time that he had no knowledge of the Bank One Loan and 
that Shirley Hanney forged his name on the Bank One Trust Deed. Consequently, the Chapter 7 
Trustee filed an Adversary Proceeding seeking to invalidate the Bank One Trust Deed on Blaine 
Hanney's one-half interest in the Property. The Trustee did not challenge the validity of the 
Bank One Trust Deed on Shirley Hanney's one-half interest in the Property. After discovery and \ 
the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment, the Trustee agreed to abandon his interest in 
Property and allow this action to proceed against Blaine Hanney, Shirley Hanney and the 
Hanney Family Trust in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, Utah. 
13. Blaine Hanney did not revoke the General Durable Power of Attorney 
until October 19, 2006, over six years after the Bank One Trust Deed was executed and recorded. { 
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Shirley Hanney Had Actual Authority to Execute the Bank One Trust Deed 
14. As Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust, Shirley Hanney had actual 
authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed and encumber the Property, including Blaine 
Hanney's interest in the Property. The Trust Agreement does not impose any limitations on the 
powers of Shirley Hanney to borrow against the Property. Nor is any such limitation imposed by 
Utah law. Shirley Hanney also had actual authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed 
pursuant to the General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney in February 1995. 
Shirley Hanney Had Apparent and/or Implied Authority to Execute the Bank One Trust Deed 
15. By giving Shirley Hanney complete authority to handle all of their 
financial affairs, by executing the Trust Agreement and the General Power of Attorney, and by 
allowing Shirley Hanney to execute his name on other important legal documents such as federal 
income tax returns, Blaine Hanney gave Shirley Hanney apparent or implied authority to execute 
the Bank One Trust Deed on his behalf, particularly because borrowing money is often a 
collateral act which is a natural and ordinary incident of handling the financial affairs of a family 
and a business. 
Bank One Trust Deed Valid Under Doctrines of Equitable Subrogation and Equitable Lien 
16. The Bank One Trust Deed is a valid and enforceable lien on the Property 
under the doctrines of equitable subrogation because it "stands in the place" of the Key Bank 
Trust Deeds and the AG Trust Deed, which were paid off from the proceeds of the Bank One 
Loan. 
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17. Alternatively, under the doctrine of equitable liens, the Bank One Trust 
Deed is a valid lien on the Property to the extent that the proceeds from the Bank One Loan were 
used for the benefit of Blaine Hanney and/or the Hanney Family Trust. 
Bank One Trust Deed Valid Under Doctrines of Equitable Estoppel, Waiver, Ratification & 
Unjust Enrichment 
18. Blaine Hanney and the Hanney Family Trust are equitably estopped from 
challenging the validity of the Bank One Trust Deed. Blaine Hanney was obviously aware that 
Shirley Hanney had obtained mortgages on the Property because he deducted "home mortgage 
interest" on his federal income tax returns beginning in 1998. He was also obviously aware that 
the amount of the mortgages had increased from 1998 to 2003 because the amount of "home 
mortgage interest" that he deducted on his federal income tax returns increased from $2,192.00 
in 1998 to $29,622.00 in 2002. Moreover, Blaine Hanney never challenged the validity of the 
Bank One Trust Deed until the Trustee objected to Bank One's Motion and, in fact, he included 
the Bank One Loan on his bankruptcy schedule as a "joint debt." Finally, Shirley Hanney is a 
Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust and her knowledge and representations are imputed to the 
Hanney Family Trust. 
19. Similarly, the Hanney Defendants' claims are also barred by waiver 
because Blaine Hanney accepted the benefits of the Bank One Loan without objecting to the 
validity of the Bank One Loan or the Bank One Trust Deed. . •  i • 
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20. Blaine Hanney, individually and as Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust, 
ratified the Bank One Trust Deed by accepting the benefits of the Bank One Loan with 
knowledge of all material facts surrounding the execution of the Bank One Trust Deed. 
21. Under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, Blaine Hanney or the 
Hanney Family Trust is obligated to repay the Bank One Loan because the proceeds were used 
for his benefit, including the paying off of the Key Bank Loan and the AG Loan, the funding of 
fund Hanney & Hanney, and the repayment of funds that Shirley Hanney improperly withdrew 
from Hanney Development. The Hanney Family Trust cannot avoid liability simply because one 
of its Trustees, Blaine Hanney, chose to not concern himself with any of the financial affairs of 
the family, the Hanney Family Trust or Hanney and Hanney. 
The Bank One Trust Deed is Valid Lien on Shirley Hanney's Interest in Property 
22. Shirley Hanney executed the Bank One Trust Deed and received the 
benefits of the Bank One Loan. Consequently, the Bank One Trust Deed is a valid lien on 
Shirley Hanney's interest in the Property, regardless of whether that interest derives from her 
joint ownership of the Property or her beneficial interest under the Hanney Family Trust. Shirley 
Hanney has an "individual" interest in the Property because martial assets were used to purchase 
the undeveloped lot and build the house on the Property. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney 
always considered the Property to be jointly owned. In his 2004 Examination and deposition, 
Blaine Hanney repeatedly referred to "our" Property. In 1979, two Deeds of Easements related 
to the Property were signed by Shirley Hanney and specifically refer to her as a "joint tenant 
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with rights of survivorship." Shirley Hanney signed the Special Warranty Deed, which 
conveyed the Property to the Hanney Family Trust, as a "grantor." All of the documents for the 
Hanney Family Trust refer to "our" Property. Finally, the schedules filed by the Hanneys under 
penalty of perjury and with the advice of legal counsel in the bankruptcy action refer to the 
Property as jointly owned by Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney. 
23. Shirley Hanney is also a beneficiary of the Hanney Family Trust. Asa 
beneficiary, Shirley Hanney was entitled to encumber her interest in the Property. Although the 
Trust Agreement includes a "spendthrift clause," the Hanney Family Trust is not a valid 
spendthrift trust with respect to Blaine Hanney or Shirley Hanney because they are the "settlors" 
of the Hanney Family Trust and they retained complete dominion and control over the assets of 
the Trust, including the Property. 
B. GENERAL STATEMENT OF AMERICAN GENERAL'S CLAIMS. 
American General's claims track the claims of Franklin very closely. For that reason, in 
the interest of brevity, many of Franklin's claims are simply incorporated by reference below. 
Where American General's claims differ from Franklin's claims, those differences are noted. 
1. American General incorporates by reference paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 
7 of the General Statement of Franklin's Claims ("Franklin's Claims") above. 
2. American General incorporates by reference paragraph 8 of Franklin's 
Claims, and adds that the proceeds from the Bank One Loan did not pay in full the debt secured 
by the AG Trust Deed. 
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3. American General incorporates by reference paragraph 9 of Franklin's 
Claims. 
4. American General incorporates by reference paragraph 10 of Franklin's 
Claims. Under the Subordination Agreement American General subordinated to the principal 
amount, but not to interest, on the Bank One Loan. 
5. American General incorporates by reference paragraph 11 of Franklin's 
Claims. 
6. American General incorporates by reference paragraph 12 of Franklin's 
Claims. In addition, the Hanneys listed their debt to American General as a "joint debt" on their 
bankruptcy schedules. 
7. American General incorporates by reference paragraph 13 of Franklin's 
Claims. 
8. American General incorporates by reference paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Franklin's Claims. The assertions in these paragraphs concerning the 
Bank One Trust Deed and the Bank One Loan apply equally to the AG Trust Deed and the AG 
loan secured by the AG Trust Deed. 
C. HANNEY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO FRANKLIN'S CLAIMS. 
Defendant Blaine Hanney and Defendant Hanney Family Trust are represented by Brad 
C. Smith of the law firm of Stevenson & Smith, P.C. Defendant Shirley Hanney has proceeded 
in this matter pro se. 
General Response 
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In August 2000, Bank One, N.A. loaned money to Shirley A. Hanney in exchange for a 
Trust Deed on property then vested in the Hanney Family Trust. Bank One's trust deed was not 
signed by Blaine J. Hanney, and Bank One, or its agents, refused to accept any valid power of 
attorney signed by Blaine J. Hanney. Instead, Bank One (or its agents) required a Special Power 
of Attorney for Blaine Hanney, which Shirley Hanney forged to obtain the loan. Additionally, 
Shirley Hanney forged a quit claim deed to transfer the property in question from the Trust to her 
own name to complete the transaction. Bank One's Trust Deed was not authorized by Blaine 
Hanney whether actually, apparently, or impliedly. Likewise, the February 2000 Trust Deed 
granted in favor of American General Finance, was also predicated upon a forged special power 
of attorney and forged quit claim deed. Shirley Hanney had no actual, apparent, or implied * 
authority to execute the deed. 
The Trust and Its Property 
I 
Prior to any of the transactions at issue in this case, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney 
owned a house and real property located at 3037 East 3050 North, Layton, Utah 84040. 
Immediately prior to each of the transactions at issue in this case, title to the house was vested in 
the Trust. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were jointly the trustees of the trust, which was 
established on February 22, 1995 by the execution of the trust agreement. Blaine Hanney, 
Shirley Hanney, and Blaine's two children from a prior marriage were the beneficiaries of the ^ 
trust. The trust granted broad authority to the trustees, including the power to sell, convey, 
pledge or hypothecate the assets of the trust. However, the trustees were required to act by 
( 
majority vote; a single trustee was without authority to act alone or unilaterally. 
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As to real property, only the house at issue in this case has ever been conveyed to the 
trust. The real property (prior to the construction of the house) was received by Blaine Hanney 
from his parents. During the course of Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney's marriage, the house 
was built, although title to the property was never vested in Shirley Hanney. Shirley Hanney's 
name appears in the chain of title for the property only when the trust was created and the house 
was conveyed to her and Blaine, as trustees. When the transactions in question were 
consummated, by way of a forged quit claim deed, Shirley Hanney caused title to transfer from 
the trust to herself. Upon completion of each transaction, she carefully reconveyed title to the 
trust. 
The Powers of Attorney and Their Use by Shirley Hanney 
As part of the execution of the trust agreement in February 1995, Blaine Hanney 
executed a general durable power of attorney in favor of Shirley Hanney. This power of attorney 
was the only power of attorney executed by Blaine Hanney in favor of Shirley Hanney. As to 
the two transaction in question in this case, neither transaction relied upon the general durable 
power of attorney. In fact, the lenders in question (or their agents) expressly rejected the use of 
the general durable power of attorney and required a special power of attorney. The two special 
powers of attorney relied upon in this action were each forged by Shirley Hanney. 
More specifically, on February 2, 2000, Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature 
on a Special Power of Attorney. This special power of attorney was presented to the title 
company to close the transaction. In furtherance of this fraudulent transaction, on February 25, 
2000, Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature on a Quit Claim Deed purporting to 
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transfer the property from the Hanney Family Trust to Blaine and Shirley Hanney in their 
individual capacities. On February 28, 2000, pursuant to the afore-mentioned forged special 
power of attorney, Shirley Hanney executed an Open-Ended Deed of Trust in favor of American 
General. On the same day, February 28, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed a Quit Claim Deed 
purporting to transfer the property from Blaine and Shirley Hanney individually, back to the 
Hanney Family Trust. 
Blaine Hanney did not authorize the execution of the February 2000 special power of 
attorney, the quit claim deeds, or the deed of trust in favor of American General, nor was he 
advised of their existence until 2003. Blaine Hanney did not receive any funds from the 
American General Trust Deed. 
As to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, in August 2000, Shirley Hanney arranged new 
financing on the property through Bank One, Plaintiffs assignor. Following a similar fraudulent 
pattern, on August 22, 2000, Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature on a Warranty 
Deed, purporting to transfer the property from the Hanney Family Trust to Blaine and Shirley 
Hanney individually. The Title Company informed Shirley Hanney the 1995 General Durable 
Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney was not acceptable. To further the transaction, 
Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature on a special power of attorney on August 18, 
2000. Pursuant to this newly created and forged special power of attorney, Shirley Hanney 
executed a Deed of Trust in favor of Bank One on August 24, 2000. On the same date, Shirley 
Hanney executed a Quit Claim Deed, transferring the property from Blaine and Shirley Hanney 
individually, back to the Hanney Family Trust. 
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Blaine Hanney did not authorize the execution of the August 2000 special power of 
attorney, the warranty deed, quit claim deed, or the deed of trust in favor of Bank One, nor was 
he advised of their existence until 2003. Blaine Hanney did not receive any funds from the Bank 
One Trust Deed, nor did he endorse any check made payable to him as proceeds therefrom. 
Other Matters 
It is true that for tax years 1999-2002, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney filed joint tax 
returns. During those years, Blaine was working full time out of state. Shirley Hanney had the 
tax returns prepared and signed Blaine's names to the tax returns. The tax returns used the 
interest paid on the two mortgages in question as a tax deduction. After Shirley Hanney's fraud 
came to light, Blaine Hanney sought and was granted innocent spouse relief by the IRS for taxes 
assessed by Shirley's activities. 
Shirley Hanney's fraud was not limited to the above-referenced transaction. It 
encompassed a scheme to cheat Blaine Hanney's family out of hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Ultimately, Shirley Hanney was charged with communications fraud, pleaded guilty and served 
several years in prison. 
Shirley Hanney Has Never Had An Individual Interest in the Property 
Plaintiff claims that its trust deed is a valid lien on Shirley Hanney's interest in the 
property. To the contrary, Shirley Hanney never had an individual interest in the Property. The 
undisputed facts establish that the Property was transferred to Blaine individually by his parents, 
with the reservation of a life estate. Subsequently, Blaine transferred the property to the Hanney 
Family Trust and Blaine's mother, Mabel Hanney, deeded her remaining life estate to the Hanney 
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Family Trust. No valid deed has ever created an individual interest in the property in Shirley 
Hanney. Shirley Hanney's interest in the property is limited to her role as Trustee for the Hanney 
Family Trust. Shirley Hanney has no individual interest in the property to which Plaintiffs lien 
can attach. 
Shirley Hanney Did Not Have A uthority to Unilaterally Encumber Trust Property 
Under the Hanney Family Trust Agreement, a Majority of Trustees Were Required to 
Encumber Trust Property. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts in its memorandum that M[t]he Trust 
Agreement does not impose any limitations on the powers of Shirley hanney to borrow against 
the Property." The Hanney Family Trust Agreement does not allow a single trustee to 
unilaterally encumber trust property. While the Trust Agreement would allow the trustees to 
execute Trust Deeds such as those at issue in this case, it imposes a clear limitation on the 
powers of the trustees in paragraph 11.2, which states: 
In the event the Trustees do not agree on any matter, and except as otherwise provided by 
the powers which we have elsewhere specifically reserved to ourselves or others, the decision of 
a majority of the Trustees shall govern and be binding on the Trustees and the Trust. If there is 
an even number of Trustees, another Trustee may be added pursuant to paragraph 13.2, below. 
(Exhibit C, Trust Agreement.) Under the Trust Agreement, a majority of trustees was required in 
order to exercise the enumerated powers reserved to the trustees. Shirley Hanney did not 
constitute a majority of the trustees. Indeed, because there were two trustees, unanimity was 
required, and absent the consent and express authorization of Blaine Hanney, Shirley Hanney's 
attempts to encumber Trust property were of no legal effect, nor were her actions binding on the 
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Trust under the plain language governing the Trust. Moreover, trust property can only be 
encumbered in accordance with the provision of the trust agreement. See, e.g., Banks v. Means, 
2002UT6549, 52P.3dll90. 
In addition, under Utah law in place at the time, Blaine Hanney could not delegate his 
trustee's powers via power of attorney. To the contrary, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-403 (2000) 
stated, "(1) The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire 
administration of the trust to a co-trustee or another." In addition to the trust containing no 
provision allowing delegation of authority to a co-trustee, state statute specifically prohibited 
such action with regards to a trustee's powers. Accordingly, Blaine Hanney's active participation 
and consent was required to encumber trust property. 
The 1995 General Durable Power of Attorney Did Not Grant Shirley Hanney Actual Authority 
to Encumber Trust Property. 
In Kline v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court wrote, 
"A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, authorizes 
another to act as agent. ... [T]he instrument creating this authority must be strictly construed." 
(Citations omitted.)(Italics added.) Moreover, "[a] court cannot imply authority of the 
attorney-in-fact that the power of attorney does not express." 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §28. 
(2006). While Plaintiff cites Kline for this same principal in its memorandum, Plaintiff asks this 
Court to do just the opposite, namely to loosely construe the power of attorney to imply authority 
in Shirley Hanney which was not granted nor contemplated. 
The 1995 General Durable Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney does not give 
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Shirley Hanney any authority to take any actions in regard to any property belonging to the 
Hanney Family Trust. Instead, Blaine Hanney delegated authority to his then wife to "do and 
perform all and every act that I may legally do through an attorney, in relation to all of my 
property, real or personal..." (Italics added.) While the power of attorney can be strictly 
construed to have allowed Shirley Hanney to dispose of property belonging to Blaine Hanney 
individually, it cannot even be loosely construed to imply any authority over or relationship to 
property belonging to the Hanney Family Trust. 
At all times relevant hereto, the Property was titled to the Hanney Family Trust. Blaine 
Hanney did not own the Property individually. The Property was legally titled to the Hanney 
Family Trust. The Property was not his property. Furthermore, the Trust Agreement makes no 
provision for any trustee to delegate their authority to act by means of a power of attorney. The 
Trustees were expected to act of their own stead, and the Trust provided a mechanism for 
protecting Trust property in the event that the Trustees were to resign or be unable to act. 
(Exhibit A, at ^|13.2.) The Trust Agreement and the Power of Attorney can not be construed to 
have any relationship one with the other. Instead, the Power of Attorney must be strictly 
construed to apply only to property belonging to Blaine Hanney individually. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Power of Attorney could be construed to relate to 
unidentified property belonging to the Hanney Family Trust, neither Plaintiff, nor American 
General can claim to have relied on the Power of Attorney, as both refused to accept or rely upon 
the Power of Attorney at the time the deeds in question were executed. To the contrary, Shirley 
Hanney's sworn affidavit reflects that on both occasions, she was advised by title company 
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agents that neither Bank One nor American General would accept the 1995 Power of Attorney as 
a legitimate basis for executing the deeds in question on Blaine Hanney's behalf. On both 
occasions, Bank One and American General required Shirley to create Special Powers of 
Attorney, which the undisputed facts establish are forgeries having no legal effect. Having 
refused to accept the 1995 Power of Attorney at the time the deeds in question were executed, 
Plaintiff and American General are not in a position to claim to have relied on the powers of 
attorney now. 
Shirley Hanney Did Not Have Apparent or Implied Authority to Encumber Trust Property. 
Apparent or implied authority, as noted in Plaintiffs memorandum, always flows from 
specific acts of the principal. Plaintiff asserts that Shirley Hanney had apparent or implied 
authority to encumber Trust property because of the 1995 Power of Attorney, and because 
Shirley Hanney illegally signed Blaine Hanney's name on the couple's joint tax returns. As 
previously set forth, the 1995 Power of Attorney, which must be strictly construed, makes no 
reference to property belonging to the Hanney Family Trust. Blaine Hanney has taken no 
specific act in executing that document, which would imply authority or establish that Shirley 
Hanney had apparent authority to encumber the Property. With regards to Shirley Hanney's 
custom of filing tax returns without her husband's input, there was no action by Blaine Hanney to 
make it appear that Shirley Hanney had authority to dispose of his property. There is simply no 
relationship between the two. Likewise, there is no evidence that Bank One or American 
General had any knowledge in this regard. Indeed, had the IRS known at the time that Shirley 
Hanney had forged Blaine Hanney's signature on tax returns, it certainly would not have 
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accepted the returns. Shirley Hanney's acts in that regard cannot create implied authority in 
herself to take unrelated action disposing of Hanney Family Trust property. 
III. GENERAL STATEMENT OF HANNEY DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS 
AND CROSS-CLAIMS AND RESPONSES OF FRANKLIN AND AMERICAN 
GENERAL 
A. GENERAL STATEMENT OF BLAINE HANNEY'S AND HIS TRUST'S 
CLAIM 
The trust deeds asserted in this action are wrongful liens under Utah's wrongful lien 
statute. They were not authorized by court order or statute. They were not authorized by the i 
trust or Blaine Hanney. Their removal has been demanded in writing, but they have not been 
released. For largely the same factual reasons stated hereinbefore, the two trust deeds are 
i 
wrongful liens. 
Both the American General Trust Deed and the Bank One Trust Deed were deeds 
obtained without the signature of Blaine Hanney, a trustee of the Hanney Family Trust whose 
consent was required in order to encumber the Property. Shirley Hanney executed both deeds 
relying on separately forged powers of attorney. Likewise, as previously discussed, Blaine 
Hanney's 1995 general durable power of attorney, made no mention to property of the Hanney 
Family Trust, and was insufficient to grant authority to Shirley Hanney to act in Blaine's stead 
with regards to trust property. Both the American General Trust Deed and the Bank One Trust 
I 
Deed fall squarely within the definition of a "wrongful lien" within the statute. Under these 
circumstances, both the American General Trust Deed and the Bank One Trust Deed, along with 
Shirley Hanney's other wrongfully filed deeds, should be declared void ab initio and the Hanney ( 
Family Trust should be awarded its costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this action. 
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B. FRANKLIN'S AND AMERICAN GENERAL'S RESPONSE TO HANNEY 
DEFENDANTS' WRONGFUL LIEN COUNTERCLAIM 
The Hanney Family Trust has asserted a Counterclaim against Franklin and a Cross-
Claim against American General for wrongful lien. The Bank One Trust Deed and AG Trust 
Deed are not wrongful liens because they were signed by Shirley Hanney as Blaine Hanney's 
attorney-in-fact pursuant to the 1995 General Power of Attorney, which was not revoked until 
October 19, 2006, over six years after the Bank One Trust Deed and AG Trust Deed were 
executed and recorded. Accordingly, the Bank One Trust Deed and AG Trust Deed are not 
wrongful liens, because they were "signed by" an owner of the Property (Shirley Hanney) as 
well as "authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the Property" (the 1995 
General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney). 
IV. JOINT STATEMENT OF INCONTROVERTED FACTS 
1. The house and real property that is the subject of this action is located at 3037 
East 3050 North, Layton, Utah 84040 ("Property"). 
2. On February 22, 1995, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney executed the 
Revocable Trust Agreement of the Hanney Family Trust ("Trust Agreement"). Blaine Hanney 
and Shirley Hanney were appointed Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. They were also 
beneficiaries of the Hanney Family Trust. 
3. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney executed a Special Warranty Deed conveying 
the Property to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney, as Trustees for the Hanney Family Trust. 
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4. The Special Warranty Deed was executed on February 22, 1995 and recorded on 
April 10, 1995. 
5. On February 22, 1995, Blaine Hanney executed a General Durable Power of 
Attorney ("General Power of Attorney"). 
6. The General Power of Attorney appoints Shirley Hanney as Blaine Hanney's 
"true and lawful attorney in fact." The General Power of Attorney gives Shirley Hanney: 
[F]ull power to do and perform all and every act that I may legally 
do through an attorney, in relation to all of my property, real or 
personal, where situate, to carry out the purposes for which this 
power is granted, specifically including the power to make 
deposits, sign checks, endorse items, and withdraw funds from 
checking, savings, or other accounts, with full power of ' ( 
substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming that 
which Shirley Hanney or my agent's substitute shall lawfully do or 
cause to be done by my agent or my agent's substitute lawfully 
designated by virtue of the power herein conferred upon my agent. 
\ 
7. The General Durable Power of Attorney was terminated in writing on October 19, 
2006. 
8. On June 9, 1998, a Home Equity Line Deed of Trust was executed in the amount ( 
of $50,000 in favor of Key Bank National Association ("First Key Bank Trust Deed"), which 
was recorded on June 16, 1998. 
9. On January 19, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Home Equity Line Deed of 
Trust in the amount of $80,000 in favor of Key Bank ("Second Key Bank Trust Deed"), which 
I 
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was recorded on January 20, 1999. Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Second 
Key Bank Trust Deed "by POA Shirley A. Hanney." 
10. Some of the proceeds of this loan were used to pay off the First Key Bank Trust 
Deed. 
11. A Deed of Reconveyance for the First Key Bank Trust Deed was recorded on 
March 31,1999. 
12. On April 16, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Modification of Key Equity 
Options Agreement that increased the credit line from $80,000 to $120,000. Shirley Hanney 
signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Modification "by POA Shirley A. Hanney." 
13. On February 28, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed an Open End Deed of Trust in 
the amount of $163,200 in favor of American General Finance ("AG Trust Deed"), which was 
recorded on February 29, 2000. Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the AG Trust 
Deed "by POA Shirley A. Hanney." 
14. Also on February 29, 2000, a Power of Attorney - Special (Specific Property 
Only), which purports to be executed by Blaine Hanney, was recorded for the Property. 
15. On August 24, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed a Deed of Trust in favor of Bank 
One NA ("Bank One Trust Deed") to secure a loan in the amount of $247,000 ("Bank One 
Loan"). Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Bank One Trust Deed "by Shirley 
A. Hanney as attorney in fact." The Bank One Trust Deed was recorded on August 29, 2000. 
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16. Also on August 29, 2000, a Power of Attorney - Special - Durable (Specific 
Property Only), which purports to be executed by Blaine Hanney, was recorded on the Property. 
17. The proceeds from the Bank One Loan were used to pay off the loan from Key 
Bank ($69,997.00) and to pay American General ($167,087.00). A check in the amount of 
$1,875.88, which represented the balance of the proceeds of the Bank One Loan, was issued in 
the name of Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney. 
18. Hanney & Hanney was formed in September 1994 and "expired" on January 21, ' 
2004. It was an "S" corporation and Shirley Hanney owned 60% and Blaine Hanney owned 
40%. 
19. Hanney Development, L.P. ("Hanney Development") was formed on April 27, 
1993. The general and limited partners of Hanney Development are Blaine Hanney and his 
mother and siblings. < 
20. The proceeds from the Key Bank Loan and AG Loan were used for Hanney and 
Hanney Construction. 
21. u The beneficial interest in the Bank One Trust Deed was subsequently assigned to 
Plaintiff 
• • • i 
22. The 1998 federal income tax return for Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney was 
filedxon or about September 23, 1999. The tax return shows a,deduction for "home mortgage 
interest" in the amount of $2,192.00. ( 
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:
 23 . ' ' ! 'be 10QQ federa1 b »c vnie ta: : reti lrn for Blaine I la iiney and Shirley Hanney was 
filed oi .»' iDou; Oeton-r \<\ 2000 The tax return shows a deduction for "home mortgage 
interest w ;-)e amoun: .r N "'. ' • ) . 
24. I he 2000 federal income ta;? :, i etui n for Blaine I lanney and Shirk y 1 Iaiine\ was 
filed on or about September !s: ''OJ lm tax return shows a deduction for "home mortgage 
interest" in the amount of $ i . ' - • > 
25. The amended • -eueru income • . ..• = • .. . ;• • ir-^y 
Hanney was filed on or about September 19, 2003. '\hi amended lax return show- a deduction 
for "home mortgage interest" in the amount of $29,622.00. 
26. I he 2002 federal income tax return. *.- r ,w^ Finney am M.I:* f; - .a: i i :^ v, :-
also filed on or about September 19, 2003. The tax returns shows a deduction for "home 
mortgage interest" in the amount of $25,852.00. 
?n. Rlainc Hanney and Shirley Hanney nice
 t! ne iu . v. . »r ^ napter bankruptcy on 
Mi '•-: - U' "!i.t:ikruptcy Action"). On their schedules, they listed the Bank One Trust 
Deed i:-; the amount of $247,000 as a secured claim. 
28 \mer i can General has stipulated that, pursuant to nu s...K>rdiru;:k>n Agreement 
<^  -1"11" • — ' • "^' v- .^rii i 6 . ^ 0 0 - , the Bank One 1 rust Deed is in 
senior lien priority posi.ti.on to the American General Trust Deed American General claims that 
the subordination applies c >nly tc the principal amount :)f the Ban k. One I oan , a rid ri :»! ti i,e 
interest. 
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29, On August 22, 2006, the Trustee in the Bankruptcy Action abandoned the 
Property. 
V. CONTROVERTED FACTS/ISSUES 
1. As Trustee of The Hanney Family Trust, did Shirley Hanney have actual, 
apparent or implied authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed and/or the AG Trust Deed and 
encumber the Property, including Blaine Hanney's interest in the Property? 
2. As Blaine Hanney's attorney-in-fact pursuant to the POA, did Shirley i 
Hanney have actual, apparent or implied authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed and /or 
the AG Trust Deed and encumber the Property, including Blaine Hanney's interest in the 
Property? 
3. Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, is the Bank One Trust Deed a 
valid lien on the Property because it "stands in the place" of the Key Bank Trust Deeds and the i 
AGTrustDeed? 
4. Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, is the AG Trust Deed a valid 
. . • ' - • < 
lien on the Property because it "stands in the place" of the Key Bank Trust Deeds? 
5. Under the doctrine of equitable liens, is the Bank One Trust Deed a valid 
lien on the Property to the extent that the proceeds from the Bank One Loan were used for the 
benefit of Blaine Hanney and/or the Hanney Family Trust? 
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•. 6. ' 1'ndei Ihi: docttntv* ot equit;*1^' II.MH. I«. |he \< i I rusl Deed ,i \;ili<i hen on 
the Proper;} u rne extent that the proceeds from the AL- iA ai- were used for the benefit of Blaine 
Hanney ana a: , , i.aniiC} :\,::../ •'n.-. 
'. • 7. I Jndei the equitable doctrine of unji ist en richment. is Blaine I lanney 01: the 
Hanney Family Trust obligated to repa) the AG Loan because the proceeds were used for his 
benefit? 
' 8. • I Inder the equitable doctrh le of unjust enrichment, is Blaine I Ianne> 01 the 
Hanney Family Trust obligated to repay the Bank One Loan because the proceeds were used for 
his benefit? 
9. - • Are Blaine Hanney anc UJL- Hanney i an.:.; , /ust equitably estopped from 
challenging the validity of the Bank One Trust Deed and/or the AG Trust Deed? 
iu. Did Blaine Hanney and/or the Hannev :-aniily I rust waive their righi i-_ 
challenge the validity of the Bani ou^ \ rus, Deco and or inc Z\-^ i•.»*; 
.. :>I^I;K lianne} arm j , ;:;. :;an:ie;- .•anil:1 . "us; ram "ML \rdUi '-
Trust Deed and/or the AG Trust Deed? 
Did Shirley Hanney have an interest n-, liu Propem. either from her joint 
ownersiiiD o: in. property or her beneficial interest uncle: -i^ : ,am;e\ : an,,:/* ; :L ;; 
Is ttic \ d 1 rust Deed a \alui hen on Sliirie) lianne) :, inleie.sl in the 
Property? 
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14. Is Bank One Trust Deed a valid lien on Shirley Hanney's interest in the 
Property? 
15. Under the Subordination Agreement, did American General subordinate 
the AG Trust Deed to the entire amount of the Bank One Trust Deed, including interest, or just 
the principal of the Bank One Trust Deed? 
16. Which power of attorneys were used to consummate the transactions in 
question: the general durable power of attorney or the two forged special powers of attorney? 
VL WITNESSES 
A. FRANKLIN WILL CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES 
1. Shirley A. Hanney 
2. Blaine J. Hanney 
3. Franklin will designate any additional will call witnesses no later than 
January 30, 2009, the deadline previously established by the Court. 
B. FRANKLIN MAY CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES 
1. Henry Vantienderen 
2. ErikK. Iverson 
3. Any other witness identified and/or called by Defendants. 
4. Any other witness that becomes necessary for impeachment or rebuttal, 
regardless of whether such witness has been previously identified or disclosed to Defendants. 
< 
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• -'5. ' ' Franklin, v • ill identify ai i\ additional may call w itnesses no later than 
January 30, 2009, the deadline previously established by the Court. 
C. HANNEY DEFENDANTS WILL CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES 
1. \ll ^ itnesses olhet\A ISC identified . ' , . 
2. Blaine Hanney 
3. Shirley I lanney ' • 
D. HANNEY DEFENDANTS MAY CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES 
1 . E r i k K I v e r s o n -• . . • '. 
2. Allison Hodges 
3. Other idenuiuc \\ii:ies^e.v identified ir. achanee v: . :- Janu?*™ ?;; 
4. TK" neeueu u> respond or rebut any witness identified by any 
party in advance of the 31: januar. 2009 deadline. 
E. - * ' - V , . ;L,..L_ , %• l i l t MM LOWING WITNESSES 
American Genera; wih designate an\ will eali witnesses no later than January 30, 2009, 
F. AMERICAN GENLR A.L MAY CAM. THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES 
American General w ill desigj iaic any rna\ ian witnesses no later than Jam iary 30,, 2009, 
the deadline previously established by the Court. " 
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VII. EXHIBITS 
A, EXHIBITS FRANKLIN EXPECTS TO OFFER AT TRIAL 
Chain of Title Documents 
Document No. 
STGC000818-820 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000821-824 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000825 - 826 
I (Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000510-513 
STGC000827 - 828 










Deed Granting Easement 
Deed Granting Easement 
Warranty Deed 
Affidavit of Death 
Quit Claim Deed 
Special Warranty Deed 
Hanney Family Trust Documents 
Document No. 
STGC000072 - 73 
STGC0000395 - 396 






STGC000392 - 393 
STGC000383-388 
STGC000373 - 380 
STGC000353 - 358 















General Durable Power of Attorney - Blaine 
Hanney 
General Durable Power of Attorney - Shirley 
Hanney 
John H. Geilmann Letter 
Client Instruction List 
Summary of Last Will 
Summary of Last Will 
Summary of Revocable Hanney Family Trust 
Abstract of Hanney Family Trust Agreement 
Review Procedures and Future Planning For 
Estate Plan of Blaine and Shirley Hanney 
Personal Data and Estate Inventory 
The Last Will of Shirley Hanney 
The Last Will of Blaine Hanney 
1
 Franklin does not anticipate offering all of the exhibits listed on the table. Counsel for the parties have agreed to 
meet to discuss and further refine the exhibits that will be offered at trial. Because of conflicting schedules, 
however, counsel were unable to meet prior to filing this Pre-Trial Order. Consequently, for sake of inclusiveness, 
all of the potential exhibits have been included in the table. 
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STGC000381-382 
STGC000400-401 
STGC000327 - 328 
STGC000323 - 324 










Special Power of Attorney: Blaine Hanney 
Special Power of Attorney: Shirley Hanney 
Blaine Hanney Directive to Physicians and 
Medical Services 
Shirley Hanney Directive to Physicians and 
Medical Services 
Special Warranty Deed 
Hanney Family Revocable Trust Agreement 







STGC000087 - 92 
STGC000507 - 508 








Letter from Key Bank re Subpoena 
Key Bank Home Equity Line Deed of Trust 
(June 9, 1998) 
Deed of Reconveyance 
Key Bank Home Equity Line Deed of Trust 
(January 19, 1999) 
Modification of Key Equity Options 
Agreement and Deed of Trust 
Deed of Reconveyance 
American General Loan Documents 
Document No. 
STGC000621-625 
STGC000505 - 506 


















STGC000831-833 1 02/25/2000 
1 1 
Description 
American General Loan Documents 
Power of Attorney - Special 
Shirley Hanney Letter 
Check to Key Bank 
Fax to American General 
General Durable Power of Attorney 
Revocable Trust Agreement 
Schedule C - Title Commitment 
Quit Claim Deed 
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(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000834-835 
(Produced by Inwest) 
02/29/2000 Power of Attorney - Special (Recorded) 




STGC000695 - 698 
STGC000784 - 796 
STGC000780-781 
STGC000797 - 800 




(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000806 
STGC000648 - 649 
AGF0105-106 
STGC000769 
STGC000585 - 597 
STGC000774 
STGC000775 
STGC000841 - 844 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000845 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000846 - 848 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000849-851 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000852 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000853 
(Produced by Inwest) 
STGC000836 - 837 




























Promissory Note 1 
Bank One Deed of Trust 1 
Loan Documents 
Truth-In-Lending Statement 1 
Loan Documents 1 
Disbursement Request 
Disclosure Statement 1 
Warranty Deed 1 
Warranty Deed (Recorded) 
Quit Claim Deed 
Power of Attorney - Special - Durable 
Allstate Insurance Policy 
Letter from Blaine Hanney 
Letter from Brad Smith & Affidavit of 
Shirley Hanney 
Notice of Default 
Letter from Bank One 
Loan Application 
Recording Checklist 
Letter from Inwest and Related Documents 
Checks 
Pay-Off Inquiry 
Letter from Inwest Title 
Power of Authority - Special - Durable 
[(Recorded) 
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STGC000298 - 300 08/29/2000 Checks 








Notice of Interest 
Notice of Trustee's Intent To Dismiss 
Adversary Claim Against STI Holdings and 
Opportunity For Objection 
lllamt lhiiuuit ami Mifiit't I'm Return* and Hank liecnnh 
Document No. 







STGC000421-429 j 00/00/1997 
STGC000430 - 440 
STGC000441-451 
STGC000453-469 





F000039 - F000040 
1 (Produced by Blaine Hanney) 












Hanney 2000 Income Tax Return 
Hanney 1995 Income Tax Return 
Hanney 1996 Income Tax Return 
Hanney 1997 Income Tax Return 
Hanney 1999 Amended Tax Return 
Hanney 1999 Income Tax Return 
Hannev 1999 Amended Tax Return 
Hanney 2000 Income Tax Return 
Hanney 1999 Income Tax Return 
First National Bank Authorization Letter 
First National Bank Checking Account 
Records 
First National Bank Checking Account 
Records - 1995 through 2002 
IRS Innocent Spouse Documents 
flaunts S llannry '" onstructwu !hn nmenis 
Document No. Date 
STGC000925 - 940 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC000941 -977 





2002 Income Tax Return for Hanney & 
Hanney 
Hanney & Hanney Checking Account 
Statements 
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STGC000978-1030 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC001031 -1046 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC001087-1149 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC001051-1063 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC001064-1075 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC001077-1086 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC001047-1050 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC000001-002 
(Produced by Blaine Hanney) 









Hanney & Hanney Money Market Account 
Statements 
2001 Income Tax Return for Hanney & 
Hanney 
Various Hanney & Hanney Financial 
Documents for 1998 
1998 Income Tax Return 
1997 Income Tax Return 
1996 Income Tax Return 
Various Hanney & Hanney Financial 
Documents for 1997 
Business Entity Search for Hanney & Hanney 
First Security Bank Statements for Hanney & 
Hanney 
Barnes Banking - Unpaid Checks and Credit 
Line Advances 
Barnes Banking Statements 
( 
Document No. 
B000663 - 664; B000676; 








B000804 - 807 
1 (Produced by Barnes Banking) 
Date Description 
Barnes Banking Checking Account 
Statements for Hanney & Hanney 
' • • • 
^ ^ 
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STGC000881-916 
(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC000917-924 




Barnes Banking Checking Account 
Statements for Hanney & Hanney with 
Handwritten Notes 
Hanney & Hanney Payables 






(Produced by Henry Van 
Tienderen) 
STGC000862-88(> 
(Produced by lien:y Van 
Tienderen) 
B00001-004;B000422-423; 
(Produced by Barnes Banking) 
B00012;B000343;B000324; 
B000321;B000316 








Certificate and Agreement of Limited 
Partnership of Hanney Development 
Partnership Borrowing Authorization 
Business Entity Search for Hanney 
Development 
Various Documents with Handwritten Notes 
re Hanney Partnership 
Hanney & Hanney Reconciliations - Van 
Tienderen 
Signature Cards for Hanney Development 
Accounts with Barnes Banking 
Hanney Development Checks 









Various Documents Produced by Barnes 
Banking (Various Documents Regarding 
Hanney & Hanney Construction Produced by 
Henry Van Tienderen) 
Bankruptcy '' -
Document No. 






Trustee's Response to Bank One's Motion 
for Relief from Automatic Stay 
Objection to Discharge of Shirley Hanney 
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STGC000615 




Settlement Agreement between Trustee and 
Blaine Hanney 
Schedule D of the Hanneys' Bankruptcy 
Schedules 
Bankruptcy Schedules 














Handwritten "Answer" of Shirley Hanney 
(Bankruptcy Action) 
Affidavit of Shirley Ann Hanney 
Affidavit of Shirley Hanney 
(Barnes Banking) 
Handwritten Answer of Shirley Hanney (First 
Franklin) 
Handwritten Letter of Shirley Hanney to 
Clerk of Court 
(Bankruptcy Action) 
Handwritten "Answer" of Shirley Hanney 
(First Franklin) 
Affidavit of Shirley Hanney 
(First Franklin) 
Handwritten Answer of Shirley Hanney 
(Barnes Banking) 
Depositions from Barnes Banking Action and Bankruptcy Action 







Deposition of Henry Van 
Tienderen (Barnes Banking) 
Deposition of Henry Van 
Tienderen Vol. II (Barnes 
Banking) 
Deposition of Blaine J. Hanney 
(Barnes Banking) 
Deposition of Blaine Hanney 
Vol. II (Barnes Banking) 
Deposition of Shirley A. Hanney 
(Barnes Banking) 
Stipulated 
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2004 Examination of Blaine 
Hanney (Bankruptcy Action) 
2004 Examination of Blaine 
Hanney (Bankruptcy Action) 
Deposition of Eric Iverson 
(Bankruptcy Action) 
Deposition of Blaine Hanney 
(Bankruptcy Action) 
Exhibit Schedule (Bankruptcy 
Action) 




B. EXHIBITS FRANKLIN MAY OFFER AT TRIAL 
1. Any exnim: uscvi r\ :^iendants at: W,L •/- lucnunec r>\ .^enaanb- a- a 
exhibit the> expect to use or may use at trial. 
2. Any other document produced by am pun . o- xmrc narty in the course of 
this litigation and not identified as an exhibit herein, but rmH* insula: as sucn document becomes 
necessary for ii npeachment oi rebi lttal 
3 ^ n y o t j : i e r document that becomes necessary for impeachment or rebuttal 
regardless of whether such document has been previously identified or disclosed. 
C. EXHIBITS HANNEY DEFENDA> I N L X P E C T TO Of U' r - JLAL 
1. All documents identified by Plaintiff or any other Deienaan;;:: the pretrial 
order. 
2. Ml il("[n'>siiioii transcript; ironi the Unimex ban;-- *>: ^ • riding or the 
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matter of Hanney Development v. Barnes Banking Company. -
3. All documents executed by Shirley Hanney at or in connection with the 
closing of the two loan transaction at issue in this case. 
4. All affidavits of Shirley Hanney from this case, the Hanney bankruptcy 
proceeding or the matter of Hanney Development v. Barnes Banking Company. 
5. Warranty Deed from Chris S. Hanney and Mabel J. Hanney to Blain J. 
Hanney, dated 20 January 1979. 
6. Quit Claim Deed from Mabel J. Hanney to Blaine J. Hanney and Shirley 
Ann Hanney, Trustees, dated 13 January 1999. 
7. Forged Special Power of Attorney dated 2 February 2000, recorded 29 
February 2000. 
8. Forged Quit Claim Deed dated 25 February 2000, recorded 29 February 
2000. 
9. Forged Quit Claim Deed dated 28 February 2000, recorded 30 March 
2000. 
10. Forged Special Power of Attorney dated 18 August 2000, recorded 29 
August 2000. 
11. Forged Warranty Deed dated 22 August 2000, recorded 29 August 2000. 
12. Forged Quit Claim Deed dated 24 August 2000, recorded 29 August 2000. 
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D. • . I 'MI IHI II'S AIMEKK ** < - ' ^NLIUI EXPECTS 1 '< > I >l VFM A I I Kl \I 
' 1. American General Revolving Line of Credit Agreement and Disclosure 
Statement in the am* >unt < >f $163,200, cta.1 ed I <ebr uar> 28, 2,000. . 
2. On-p-l rt- ! >e r o! '!rusi irom Blaine J. and Shirley Ann Hanney to 
American General daiec; rcDrtuir> Jh. _.KK recorded rehr:ur\ ._>- _:*-'"H-
3. Subordination Agreement executed by American General in favor of Bank 
One, dated April 17,2002. . • . •' •"> .•-••• .• . - ' • . ' ' • . - . ' . • • 
.; E, EXHIT - ••; - f ^ < v :**- ^ • •. — - ,: 
1. Am c\ninus listed by me uiiur parlies. 
Vllil. POSSIBILITY OI S E T T L E M E N T 
Ihc possibility of settlement is considered poor, 
• ^ •--
:
 ihis jiig^diiN oi January 3)()LL 
BYTHECOI JRT: 
> _ . •
 t v^ -^ 
Honorable j^pdne) S. Page 
Second Judicial D'sHc* ' our:.
 t;u\i> L ountv 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BRAD C. SMITH 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Hanney Defendants 
GEORGE W. PRATT 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
Attorneys for American General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this l\j) day of January, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JOINT FINAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
to: 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
George W. Pratt 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 / \ 
MPQMU 
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Ill *~I mm VD30802338 Pa9es: 1 1 
C 507002*1 HANNEY,BLA!NE J 
JAN I g 2010 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAr 
COUNTY OF DAVIS., FARMINGTON DEPARTMEN" 
SECOND 
21§ZMT COURT-
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 




BLAINE J. HANNE r , ai i individual; 
SHIRLEY A HANNEY, an individual; 
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF 
UTAH INC., a Utah corporation; STI 
HOLDINGS, INC.. a Nevada corporation; 




Case No. 050700241 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This mattei having come before the court for trial and the court having heard the 
witnesses and received tne evidei ice ai id com isel \ iavii ig subi r lifted the writtei i ciosii ig 
arguments and the court having reviewed the same and having disposed of the 
plaintiff's Mor***- " Reopen nnc nemo fuhv advised r tr'r premises "uses a? Tohows 
L\ -.' 
Trust Dee: or tn~ IOI neid D^; plaintiffs predecessor !: merest Bank One 
Tne lot was deeded to defendant Blane u .an r-- w* ZJB\'\ :*\ a Vva^anty Deed 
signed by his Dai ents, tviabL- at id Ct n is He . - _,.-: t . n .- . ^ ~:
 v.;ei ved a 
life estate to the grantors :" was recorded with the Davis County Recorder in 1982. It 
was deeaed to Blaine at the same time that othei iots his parents had developed were 
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deeded to his siblings. After the lot was deeded, Blaine and Shirley proceeded to build 
a home on the lot. Blaine did most of the work on the home and it was completed lien 
free. The Hanneys thought that they may have paid some for the lot but could not 
remember. 
Blaine and Shirley were married in 1973. After the marriage Blaine worked in 
construction and spent the last 33 years working for Interwest Construction until his 
retirement a few years ago. Shirley worked at various jobs but spent 20 years working 
at Cover Club Foods until it was sold in 1994. Over the years they put their money in a 
joint account out of which family expenses were paid. Shirley was primarily responsible 
for keeping track of the family finances , paying the bills , seeing the taxes were taken 
care of and for the financial management for the family. She signed checks in Blaine's 
name and tax returns when he was out of town. In 1991 Blaine's construction job begin 
to take him out of town most of the time and he would only come home once or twice a 
month. Shirley took on even more responsibility for family finances and he became 
less and less involved, relying on Shirley's representation and to how things were going. 
He trusted her completely. 
Over the years Blaine's family had been involved in the development and sale of 
land owned by his parents. [ the lot in question was one developed by his family ]. They 
did business as Hanney Development. In April of 1993 the family decided to create a 
Limited Partnership to carry on the business. They organized Hanney Development a 
Limited Partnership. Blaine, his mother Mable, and his sister Fay Shumway were 
designated as the General Partners with his other five siblings as Limited Partners. The 
Business Accounts and checking was maintained at Barnes Bank. Shirley, even 
though not a part of the limited partnership, had full control of the finances of the 
company she had authority on all the accounts at Barnes Bank and did all the 
bookkeeping for the company. She was the one who paid all the bills deposited all the 
funds and kept the books of the company . She would deal directly with the accountant 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
o -
in preparing taxes and prepared financial reports for the members of the partnership. 
She often signed Blaine's name on checks, other business documents and the tax 
returns and would deliver documents to the other general partners to sign. Everyone 
relied on her to take care of the financial part of the business. They relied on her reports 
as to the financial condition of the Partnership. 
In 1992, about the same time as the limited partnership was created, Blaine's 
Parents suggested that Blaine and Shirley create a Family Trust. Blaine and Shirley 
met with a representative of an Attorney by the name of John Geilmann to discuss a 
trust. They decided to create the Hanney Family Revocable Trust. The document was 
drawn up by Mr. Geiimann's office and the representative came to their home and went 
over it with them. They understood that the trust would become effective if something 
happened to either one of them, but would have no effect as long as they were both 
still alive. The Trust named Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees. It provided 
in paragraph 11.1 that the trustees in their sole and absolute discretion could exercise 
the powers listed [ emphases added ]. Paragraph 11.2 provided that if they could not 
agree on a matter then a decision of a majority would govern. It further provided that if 
their was an equal number of trustees another could be added to break the deadlock as 
provided in paragraph 13.2 of the Trust. They signed the Trust on February 22, 1995. 
On that same day Blaine Hanney, as grantor, signed a Special Warranty Deed 
conveying the lot here in question to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees of 
the HANNEY Family Trust. Shirley Hanney was not listed as a grantor but also signed 
the deed. It was recorded on April 10, 1995. The Hanneys also signed a General 
Power of Attorney to each other in conjunction with signing the Trust; however, it was 
never recorded. 
The Hanneys never transferred any other property 1o the trust as they were 
instructed. Their bank accounts, stocks , insurance policies and other property 
remained as it was before the Trust was created. They treated their property just as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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they had before the Trust was created. They testified that they understood the trust 
would only take effect after one of them died and that the General Power of Attorney 
could only be used in the event one of them was disabled. 
In 1994, after Shirley had left Clover Club, it was her desire to start a 
construction company, so on September 9, 1994, Hanney and Hanney Construction 
inc. Was organized. Shirley had 60% of the stock and Blaine 40%. Shirley was listed 
as Director, President, Secretary / Treasurer and Registered Agent of the Company. 
Blaine was listed as Director and Vice President. A business account was set up a 
Barnes Bank. The Hanneys agreed that they would use $45,000 that they had In 
savings at America First to buy equipment for the company, but that it would be repaid. 
It was agreed that construction would be financed by construction loans. It was during 
this time that Biaine was out of town most of the time and in keeping with the 
Incorporation agreement, Shirley was almost entirely in charge of running the business. 
She kept all of the records, managed the finances, paid the bills. She provided all the 
information to the accountant and saw that tax returns were prepared and did 
everything else to run the business. She signed Blaine's name when she needed to 
when he was out of town even including tax returns,. If he asked to look at bank 
records or tax returns she would generally tell him they were at the accountants or 
make some other excuse 
She did not have a contractors license. In order to be able to build she teamed 
up with a contractor by the name of Bernie Slack to build homes and used his license. 
They would build homes together and share costs after the home was finished they 
would split any profits. Mr. Slack eventually signed with her so that she could get her 
license. At one point she, through Hanney and Hanney construction, entered into a 
partnership with her brother Ted in a concrete business. 
At first Shirley only used money that they had agreed on from savings at America 
First and construction loans: however. At some point she opened up a line of credit with 
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First Security Bank which she paid off each year. Blaine was not on that and had no 
knowledge of it. 
The business got to a point that she could not meet her obligations this came to 
a head when she incurred a $160,000 concrete bill and had no money to meet it. At 
this point she begin taking money from Hanney Development accounts at Barnes Bank 
to meet her Hanney Construction obligations. Neither Blaine nor any fo the members of 
Hanney Development had any knowledge of this. Shirley manipulated the books and 
records so that it was not apparent from the records. 
In 1998 Shirley went to Key Bank to get a home equity line of credit to pay the 
bills of Hanney Construction so she would not have to take any further money from the 
Hanney Development accounts..On June 9, 1998 she obtained a $50,000 Home Equity 
Line of Credit and signed a Trust Deed on the lot in question. She signed her name and 
Blaine's name individually and as trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. The documents 
never referred to any Power of Attorney. Blaine did not sign it nor was he aware of it. 
The notary could remember Shirley but could not remember anything else about the 
signing. 
On January 19, 1999, the Line of Credit was increase to $80,000. Shirley again 
signed her name and Blaine's name to the documents and this time referenced a 
Power Of Attorney, but there was no signature for the trust. Again the evidence was 
that Blaine did not sign nor was he aware of it. 
Again on April 16, 1999, the Line of Credit at Key Bank was increased to 
$120,000. The documents carried the signature of Blaine and Shirley individually and 
as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. Again it referenced the Power of Attorney. 
Again the testimony was that Shirley signed all the names and that Biaine was not 
aware of it. ~" 
In February of 2000, Shirley contacted American General Finance to refinance 
the Key Bank Line of Credit. She met with their representatives and in conjunction with 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
acquiring the loan signed a Quit Claim Deed on February 25, 2000 transferring the lot in 
question from Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust 
to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney. It bore the signature of Blaine Hanney and 
Shirley Hanney. There was no reference to any Power Of Attorney. It was recorded at 
the request of Interwest Title on February 29, 2000 at 12:28p.m. as document No. 
1577645. The evidence was that Blaine never signed the document nor was ever aware 
of it. 
This was the first document in the chain of title that purported to transfer any 
interest to Shirley in her own right. There had been documents in form of easements 
that included Shirley's signature or referred to her as a joint tenant, but it was unclear 
form a legal standpoint and title perspective what interest they represented other than 
to recognize her possible inchoate interest as a spouse. 
On February 28y2000 , Shirley Hanney signed an Open Ended Trust Deed on 
the lot to secure a $163,000 Loan from American General. The document bore the 
signature of Blaine and Shirley and referenced that Blaine's name was signed by 
Shirley under a Power of Attorney. This document was recorded by Interwest Title on 
February 29, 2000 at 12:29 p.m. as document No. 1577647 Again the evidence was 
that Blaine did not sign the document nor was he aware of it. 
American General required that Shirley have a Special Power of Attorney 
specific to the lot in question in order to sign for Blaine. Interwest Title prepared the 
Special Power of Attorney for Blaine's signature. The document was executed on 
February 2, 2000 and bore Blaine's signature. Interestingly enough it was notarized by 
Eric Iverson a person who notarized numerous documents in these matters .prepared 
by interwest Title. The document was recorded by Interwest Title on February.29,2000 
at 12;29 p.m. as document No. 1577646.. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not 
sign this document nor was he aware of it. 
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On March 30, 2000, another Quit Claim Deed was recorded by Interwest Title. 
This deed bore the signatures of Blaine and Shirley and conveyed the property from the 
Hanneys back to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. Shirley 
signed both names and referenced the Special Power of Attorney. Again the evidence 
was that Blaine was not aware of it. 
The monies received from American General were applied to pay off a part of 
the Key Bank Loan and obligations that Shirley had incurred through Hanney 
Construction. 
In August 2000, Shirley refinanced the American General Loan. 
On August 29, 2000, a Warranty Deed conveying the lot from Blaine Hanney and 
Shirley Hanney as Trustees to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as joint tenants was 
recorded by Interwest Title. It bore the signatures of Blaine and Shirley Hanney as 
trustees but made no reference to a Power of Attorney. It was signed on August 
22,2000. It was again notarized by Mr. Iverson. It was recorded at 4:15 p.m. as 
document No. 1610660. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not sign the document 
nor was he aware of it. 
On August 24, 2000, another Trust Deed was signed to secure a loan for 
$247,000 from Bank One plaintiff's predecessor in interest. It bore the signature of 
Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and referenced a Power of 
Attorney. It was recorded at the request of Interwest Title on August 29, 2000 at 4:20 
p.m. as document 1610662. Again the evidence was that Biaine had no Knowledge of 
this. 
in this matter Bank One also required a Special Power of Attorney as to specific 
property. Again the Special Power of Attorney was provided by Shirley. It was dated 
August 18, 2000 and bore Blaine's signature. It was notarized by Mr. Iversion. It was 
recorded at the request of interwest Title on August 29, 2000 at 4:19 p.m. as document 
No. 1610661, just prior to the Trust Deed. 
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Again on August 29, 2000 another Quit Claim Deed was recorded at the request 
of Interwest Title. The deed was signed on August 24, 2000 and bore the signature of 
Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and referenced the Power of 
Attorney. It conveyed the lot from the Hanneys back to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees 
of the Hanney Family Trust. It was recorded at 4:20 p.m. as document No. 1610663 
Again Blaine was never aware of this document. 
The proceeds from this loan were used to pay off the amounts owing to Key 
Bank and other obligations owing by Hanney Construction. 
Plaintiff, who's burden it was, never presented any evidence as to the identity of 
the handwriting in question nor was there any testimony from anyone from the financial 
institutions or the title companies or notaries that Blaine had personally appeared 
before them or that they know him or had met him. 
Testimony was that Shirley Hanney as book keeper of Hanney Development and 
as President, Secretary/treasurer, Director and Registered Agent of Hanney 
Construction, controlled all the records kept and controlled all of the records of these 
two companies. That she falsified the records and tax returns and withheld information 
from Blaine Hanney so that he had no idea what was going on. 
There was no evidence that any of the monies received by Shirley Hanney went 
to improve the lot in question or to provide for family expenses or property. 
From the foregoing findings of fact the court concludes as follows: 
In the first instance it is important to note that the plaintiff as assignee of 
Bank One stands in the shoes of Bank One. 
The court concludes that Shirley Hanney never held title to the' lot in question 
either as a joint tenant or a tenant in common. That her only interest was an inchoate 
interest as a spouse of Blaine Hanney. 
The court further concludes that any powers that were granted to Blaine Hanney 
and Shirley Hanney as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust had to be exercised jointly. 
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Further the General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney at the time of the 
creation of the Family Trust, as an estate planning tool, was insufficient to grant Shirley 
the authority to use it as she did here. That is further evidenced by the fact that 
plaintiffs predecessor in interest would not allow her to proceed without a Special 
Power of Attorney as to specific property. 
The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove that Blaine Hanney signed 
the Special Power of Attorney or that he had knowledge of or authorized Shirley 
Hanney to act in his behalf. 
The court therefore concludes that the Trust Deed granted to Bank One on the 
lot in question is void. 
As to the claim of the plaintiff for unjust enrichment, the law requires that in order 
to recover under that theory, the plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff conferred a benefit 
on Mr Hanney, that he was aware of that benefit and that Mr Hanney retained the 
benefit under circumstances such as to make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit.. 
In this matter the court sees no benefit to Mr. Hanney. He never received any of 
the moneys loaned by the plaintiff nor were they used to improve the lot in question or 
provide anything for the family. The monies all went to pay obligations of Shirley 
Hanney. There is nothing to show that he received any benefit from Hanney 
Construction of any significant nature. In fact if anything , Mr Hanney was damaged by 
the manner Bank One and interwest Title handled the loan in question. 
The most credible evidence shows that Mr. Hanney had no Knowledge of the 
loan by Bank One to Ms. Hanney and never signed any of the documents or powers of 
attorney it was claimed he signed in conjunction with the loan. 
The court further finds that this case is a good example of the lax procedures 
followed by lending institutions and lock-step title companies in their haste to close 
loans. 
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The court denies plaintiff's claims for Waiver, Estoppel and Ratifications based on 
the arguments set forth in defendants closing arguments and the facts of this case. 
The court therefore enters judgment in favor of the Defendant for no qause of 
action and declares the Trust Deed held by the plaintiff on the lot in question to be void. 
.Costs to the defendant. 
Defendant is to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the courts 
ruling and submit a copy to the plaintiff at least five days before it is submitted to the 
court for signature. 
Dated this c^T^day of January, A P. 2010 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney S.^age 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to 
Laura Scott 
201 So. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Slat Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Brad C. Smith ' ' " 
3986 Wash. Bt;vd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
postage prepaid this 2b day of January, AD, 2070 
Alyson Brown 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
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BLAINE J. HANNEY, et al. 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 050700241 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on April 2009 before 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Plaintiff was not present in court, but was 
represented by Laura Scott of the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer. 
Defendant Blaine Hanney was present in court, individually and as trustee of the 
Hanney Family Trust, and was represented by Brad C. Smith of the law firm of 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. The court, having heard the evidence of the parties, 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. V. HANNEY, ET AL. 
CASE No. 050700241 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 of 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reviewed the trial exhibits, reviewed the parties written closing arguments, and 
disposed of the Plaintiffs post-trial motion to reopen the evidence, hereby makes 
the following findings of fact: 
Findings of Fact 
Introductory and Background Facts 
1. This case revolves around the title to a certain Lot ["Lot"] and the validity of 
a certain Trust Deed on the Lot held by Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, 
Bank One. 
2. The Lot is located in Davis County, Utah, and is described in the attached 
Exhibit A. 
3. The Lot was deeded to defendant Blaine Hanney ["Blaine"] individually by a 
Warranty Deed signed by his parents, Mabel and Chris Hanney dated 
January 20, 1978. 
4. The 1978 Warranty Deed reserved a life estate to Chris and Mabel 
Hanney. It was recorded with the Davis County Recorder in 1982. 
5. The Lot was deeded to Blaine at the same time that other lots his parents 
had developed were deeded to his siblings. 
6. After the Lot was deeded, Blaine and his then-wife, Shirley Hanney 
["Shirley"] proceeded to build a home on the Lot. 
1 
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7. Blaine did most of the work on the home and it was completed lien free. 
Blaine and Shirley thought that they may have paid some for the Lot but 
could not remember. 
8. Blaine and Shirley were married in 1973. 
9. After the marriage Blaine worked in construction and spent the last 33 
years working for Inwest Construction until his retirement a few years ago. 
10. Shirley worked at various jobs but spent 20 years working at Clover Club 
Foods until 1994. 
Immediate and Extended Family Financial Matters 
11. Over the years they put their money in a joint account out of which family 
expenses were paid. 
12. Shirley was primarily responsible for keeping track of the family finances, 
paying the bills, seeing the taxes were taken care of and for the financial 
management for the family. She signed checks in Blaine's name and tax 
returns when he was out of town. 
13. In 1991 Blaine's construction job begin to take him out of town most of the 
time and he would only come home once or twice a month. Shirley took on 
even more responsibility for family finances and he became less and less 
involved, relying on Shirley's representation and to how things were going. 
He trusted her completely. 
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14. Over the years Blaine's family had been involved in the development and 
sale of the land owned by his parents. 
15. Blaine's family conducted business as Hanney Development, Ltd, a Utah 
limited partnership. ' 
16. In April of 1993 the family decided to create a Limited Partnership to carry 
on the business and organized Hanney Development a Limited 
Partnership. 
17. Blaine, his mother Mabel Hanney, and his sister Faye Shumway were 
designated as the General Partners with his other five siblings as Limited < 
Partners. 
18. The partnership's banking accounts and checking were maintained at 
Barnes Bank. 
19. Shirley, even though not a part of the limited partnership, had full control of 
the finances of the company. She had authority on all accounts at Barnes < 
Bank and did all the bookkeeping for the company. She paid the bills, 
deposited the funds, and kept the books of the company. She dealt directly 
i 
with the accountant in preparing taxes and prepared financial reports for 
the members of the partnership. She often signed Blaine's name on 
checks, other business documents and the tax returns and would deliver
 { 
documents to the other general partners to sign. Everyone relied on her to 
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take care of the financial part of the business. They relied on her reports 
as to the financial condition of the Partnership. 
Establishment of Hanney Family Trust 
20. In 1992, about the same time as the limited partnership was created, 
Blaine's Parents suggested that Blaine and Shirley create a Family Trust. 
21. Blaine and Shirley met with a representative of an Attorney by the name c 
John Geilmann to discuss a trust. They decided to create the Hanney 
Family Revocable Trust. 
22. The trust document was drafted by Mr. Geilmann's office and a 
representative came to their home and went over it with them. 
23. They understood that the trust would become effective if something 
happened to either one of them, but would have no effect as long as they 
were both still alive. 
24. The Trust named Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees. 
25. The Trust provided in paragraph 11.1 that the trustees in their sole and 
absolute discretion could exercise the powers listed. 
26. Paragraph 11.2 provided that if they could not agree on a matter then a 
decision of a majority would govern. 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. V. HANNEY, ET AL. 
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27. It further provided that if there was an equal number of trustees another 
could be added to break the deadlock as provided in paragraph 13.2 of the 
Trust. 
28. Blaine and Shirley signed the Trust on February 22, 1995. 
29. On that same day Blaine Hanney, as grantor, signed a Special Warranty 
Deed conveying the Lot here in question to Blaine Hanney and Shirley 
Hanney as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. 
30. Although Shirley Hanney was not listed as a grantor, she also signed the 
deed. 
31. This deed was recorded on April 10, 1995. 
32. Blaine and Shirley also signed a General Power of Attorney to each other 
in conjunction with signing the Trust. Neither of the General Powers of 
Attorney were recorded. 
33. The Hanneys never transferred any other property to the trust as they were 
instructed. Their bank accounts, stocks, insurance policies and other 
property remained as before the Trust was created. They treated their 
property just as they had before the Trust was created. They testified that 
they understood the trust would only take effect after one of them died and 
that the General Power of Attorney could only be used in the event one of 
them was disabled. 
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Formation of Hanney and Hanney Construction 
34. In 1994, after Shirley had left Clover Club, it was her intent to start a 
construction company. On September 9, 1994, Hanney and Hanney 
Construction, Inc., was formed. Shirley had 60% of the stock and Blaine 
40%. Shirley was listed as Director, President, Secretary/Treasurer and 
Registered Agent of the Company. Blaine was listed as Director and Vice 
President. 
35. A business account was set up a Barnes Bank for Hanney and Hanney 
Construction, Inc. 
36. Blaine and Shirley agreed that they would use $45,000 that they had in 
savings at America First to buy equipment for the company, but that it 
would be repaid. 
37. It was also agreed that construction would be financed by constructions 
loans. 
38. It was during this time that Blaine was out of town most of the time and in 
keeping with the Incorporation agreement, Shirley was almost entirely in 
charge of running the business. She kept all of the records, managed the 
finances, paid the bills. She provided all the information to the accountant 
and saw that tax returns were prepared and did everything else to run the 
business. She signed Blaine's name when she needed to when he was out 
of town even including tax returns. If he asked to look at bank records or 
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tax returns she would generally tell him they were at the accountants or 
make some other excuse. 
39. Shirley did not have a contractor's license. In order to be able to build she 
teamed up with a contractor by the name of Bernie Stark to build homes { 
and operate under his license. They would build homes together, share 
costs, and after the home was finished, they would split any profits. Mr. 
Stark eventually signed with her so that she could get her license. 
40. At one point she, through Hanney and Hanney Construction, entered into a 
partnership with her brother Ted in a concrete business. ( 
Shirley's Embezzlement of Funds 
41. In the conduct of the construction business, Shirley initially used only 
money that they had agreed on from savings at America First and 
construction loans. However, at some point she opened up a line of credit ( 
with First Security Bank which she paid off each year. Blaine was not on 
that and had no knowledge of it. 
42. The business got to a point that she could not meet her obligations. This 
came to a head when she incurred a $160,000 concrete bill and had no 
money to meet it. At this point she beginlaking money from Hanney ^ 
Development accounts at Barnes Bank to meet her Hanney and Hanney 
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Construction obligations. Neither Blaine nor any of the partners of Hanney 
Development had any knowledge of this. 
43. Shirley manipulated the books and records of Hanney Development so that 
it was not apparent from the records that she had taken money from 
Hanney Development. 
Key Bank's 1998 Line of Credit 
44. In 1998 Shirley went to Key Bank to get a home equity line of credit to pay 
the bills of Hanney Construction so she would not have to take any further 
money from the Hanney Development accounts. 
45. On June 9, 1998 she obtained a $50,000 Home Equity Line of Credit and 
signed a Trust Deed on the Lot. She signed her name and Blaine's name 
individually and as trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. The documents 
never referred to any Power of Attorney. Blaine did not sign it nor was he 
aware of it. 
46. The notary could remember Shirley but could not remember anything else 
about the signing. 
47. On January 19, 1999, the Home Equity Line of Credit was increased 
$80,000. Shirley again signed her name and Blaine's name to the 
documents and this time referenced a Power of Attorney, but there was no 
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signature for the trust. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not sign nor 
was he aware of it. 
48. On April 16, 1999, the Line of Credit at Key Bank was increased to 
$120,000. The documents carried the signature of Blaine and Shirley { 
individually and as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. Again it 
referenced the Power of Attorney. Again the testimony was that Shirley 
signed all the names and that Blaine was not aware of it. 
American General's 2000 Loan 
49. In February of 2000, Shirley contacted American General Finance to { 
refinance the Key Bank Line of Credit. She met with representatives and in 
conjunction with acquiring the loan signed a Quit Claim Deed on February 
25, 2000. The Quit Claim Deed transferred the Lot from Blaine Hanney 
and Shirley Hanney Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust to Blaine Hanney 
and Shirley Hanney. It bore the signature of Blaine Hanney and Shirley ( 
Hanney. There was no reference to any Power of Attorney. 
50. The Quit Claim Deed was recorded at the request of Inwest Title on 
February 29, 2000 at 12:28 p.m. as document No. 1577645. The evidence 
was that Blaine never signed the document nor was ever aware of it. This 
Quit Claim Deed was the first document in the chain of title that purported < 
to transfer any interest to Shirley in her own right. 
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51. There had been prior documents in form of easements that included 
Shirley's signature or referred to her as a joint tenant, but it was unclear 
from a legal standpoint and title perspective, what interest they 
represented, other then recognizing Shirley's possible inchoate interest as 
a spouse. 
52. On February 28, 2000, Shirley Hanney signed an Open Ended Trust Deed 
on the Lot to secure a $163,000 Loan from American General. The 
document bore the signature of Blaine and Shirley and referenced that 
Blaine's name was signed by Shirley under a Power of Attorney. This 
document was recorded by Inwest Title on February 29, 2000 at 12:29 p.m. 
as document No. 1577647. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not 
sign the document nor was he aware of it. 
53. American General required that Shirley have a Special Power of Attorney 
specific to the Lot in order to sign for Blaine. 
54. Inwest Title prepared a Special Power of Attorney for Blaine's signature. 
55. The document was executed on February 2, 2000 and bore Blaine's 
signature. Interestingly enough it was notarized by Eric Iverson a person 
who notarized numerous documents in these matters prepared by Inwest. 
The document was recorded by Inwest Title on February 29, 2000 at 12:29 
p.m. as document No. 1577646. Again the evidence was that Blaine did 
not sign this document nor was he aware of it. 
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56. On March 30, 2000, another Quit Claim Deed was recorded by Inwest Title. 
This deed bore the signatures of Blaine and Shirley and conveyed the 
property from the Hanneys back to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of the 
Hanney Family Trust. Shirley signed both names and referenced the 
Special Power of Attorney. Agian the evidence was that Blaine was not 
aware of it. 
57. The monies received from American General were applied to pay off a part 
of the Key Bank Loan and obligations that Shirley had incurred through 
Hanney Construction. 
Bank One's 2000 Loan 
58. In August 2000, Shirley refinanced the American General Loan. 
59. On August 29, 2000, a Warranty Deed conveying the Lot from Blaine 
Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees to Blaine Hanney and Shirley 
Hanney as joint tenants was recorded but made no reference to a Power of 
Attorney. It was signed on August 22, 2000. It was again notarized by Mr. 
Iverson. It was recorded at 4:15 p.m. as document No. 1610660. Again 
the evidence was that Blaine did hot sign the document nor was he aware 
of it. 
60. On August 24, 2000, another Trust Deed was signed to secure a loan for 
$247,000 from Bank One, plaintiffs predecessor in interest. This Trust 
Deed is the trust deed in question before the Court. It bore the signature of 
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Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and referenced a 
Power of Attorney. It was recorded at the request of Inwest Title on August 
29, 2000 at 4:20 p.m. as document 1610662. Again the evidence was that 
Blaine had no knowledge of this. 
61 . In this matter Bank One also required a Special Power of Attorney as to 
specific property. Again the Special Power of Attorney was provided by 
Shirley. It was dated August 18, 2000 and purported to bear Blaine's 
signature. It was notarized by Mr. Iverson. It was recorded at the request 
of Inwest Title on August 29, 2000 at 4:19 p.m. as document No. 1610661, 
just prior to the Trust Deed. 
62. Again on August 29, 2000 another Quit Claim Deed was recorded at the 
request of Inwest Title. The deed was signed on August 24, 2000 and bore 
the signature of Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and 
referenced the Power of Attorney. It conveyed the Lot from the Hanneys 
back to the Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. It 
was recorded at 4:20 p.m. as document No. 1610663. Again Blaine was 
never aware of this document. 
63. The proceeds from this loan were used to pay off the amounts owning to 
Key Bank and other obligations owing by Hanney Construction. 
64. Plaintiff, who bore the burden of proof at trial, presented no evidence as to 
the identity of the handwriting in question nor was there any testimony from 
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anyone from the financial institutions or the title companies or notaries that 
Blaine had personally appeared before them or that they know him or had 
met him. Blaine denied ever signing any of the documents relating to any 
of the encumbrances or transfers of the Lot. * 
65. The testimony was that Shirley Hanney, as book keeper of Hanney 
Development and as President, Secretary/treasurer, Director and 
i 
Registered Agent of Hanney Construction, controlled all the records kept 
and controlled all of the records of these two companies; she falsified the 
records and tax returns and withheld information from Blaine Hanney so < 
that he had no idea what was going on. 
66. There was no evidence that any of the monies received by Shirley Hanney 
went to improve the Lot or to provide for family expenses or property. 
67. In addition to the terms of the General Power of Attorney which did not 
provide Shirley with authority to engage in the transactions in question, the ( 
limits of here authority were further evidenced by the fact that plaintiffs 
predecessor in interest would not allow her to proceed using the General 
< 
Power of Attorney, but required a Special Power of Attorney as to specific 
property. 
68. The most credible evidence shows that Mr. Hanney had no knowledge of ^ 
the loan by Bank One to Ms. Hanney and never signed any of the 
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documents or powers of attorney it was claimed he signed in conjunction 
with the loan. 
Conclusions of Law 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Plaintiff is merely the assignee of Bank One and stands in the shoes of 
Bank One. 
2. Shirley Hanney never held title to the Lot either as a joint tenant or a tenant 
in common. Shirley's only interest was an inchoate interest as a spouse of 
Blaine Hanney. 
3. Any powers that were granted to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as 
Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust had to be exercised jointly. 
4. The General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney at the time of 
the creation of the Family Trust, as an estate planning tool, was insufficient 
to grant Shirley the authority to use it as she did here. 
5. Plaintiff has failed has failed to prove that Blaine Hanney signed the 
Special Power of Attorney or that he had knowledge of or authorized 
Shirley Hanney to act in his behalf. 
6. The court therefore concludes that the Trust Deed granted to Bank One on 
the Lot is void. Judgment in Defendant's favor to that effect shall issue. 
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7. Plaintiff also claims a right to recovery under the equitable doctrine of 
unjust enrichment. In order to recover under that theory, the plaintiff must 
prove that the plaintiff conferred a benefit on Blaine, that he was aware of 
that benefit and that he retained the benefit under circumstances such as 1 
to make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit. 
8. The Court sees no benefit to Mr. Hanney. He never received any of the 
moneys loaned by the plaintiff nor were they used to improve the Lot or 
provide anything for the family. The monies all went to pay obligations of 
Shirley Hanney. There is nothing to show that he received any benefit from { 
Hanney Construction of any significant nature. In fact if anything, Mr. 
Hanney was damaged by the manner Bank One and Inwest Title handled 
{ 
the loan in question. 
9. The court denies plaintiffs claims for Waiver, Estoppel, and Ratifications 
based on the arguments set forth in defendants closing arguments and the < 
facts of this case. 
10. The court therefore enters judgment in favor of the Defendant for no cause 
< 
of action on Plaintiff s claim. 
11. The Trust Deed, Davis County Recorder's Entry No. 1610662, held by the 
plaintiff on the Lot to be void.
 ( 
12. Costs are awarded to Defendant Blaine Hanney who shall file a 
memorandum of costs in conformity to Utah R. Civ. P. 54. 
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DATED this 35 day of February 2010. 
Approved as to form: 
y SUTE'QX 
I (Sr io ! (Sp7 
mm m 
Laura Scott, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Rule 7 Notice 
Notice is hereby given that the foregoing document will be submitted to the 
Court upon the expiration of eight days from the date of mailing, below. 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to the following: 
Laura Scott 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
this _l!rday of February 2010. 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. V. HANNEY, ET AL. 
CASE No. 050700241 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 17 of 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954 
Attorney for Defendants Hanney 






 '•'•' LuiiS 
dECfOJsj'h ' 
^ S T R I C T CO H O T 
ui 










K ! F 








IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 




BLAINE J. HANNEY, et al. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT BLAINE J. HANNEY 
AND HANNEY FAMILY TRUST 
Civil No. 050700241 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on April 2009 before 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Plaintiff was not present in court, but was 
represented by Laura Scott of the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer. 
Defendant Blaine Hanney was present in court, individually and as trustee of the 
Hanney Family Trust, and was represented by Brad C. Smith of the law firm of 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. The court, having issued a memorandum decision and 
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entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following 
Judgment in favor of Defendant Blaine J. Hanney and the Hanney Family Trust: 
1. Plaintiffs Claims of No EffectThe Court hereby declares that Plaintiff 
Bank One's claims against Defendant Blaine J. Hanney and the Hanney 
Family Trust are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
2. Plaintiffs Trust Deed of No Further Effect The Court hereby declares 
that that certain Deed of Trust, dated 24 August 2000, and recorded in the 
office of the Davis County Recorder on 29 August 2000 as Entry No. 
1610662, is of no further force or effect and does not constitute a lien or 
claim upon the real property described in the attached Exhibit A. 
DATED this A> day of February 2010. 
Rule 7 Notice 
Notice is hereby given 1hat the foregoing document will be submitted to the 
Court upon the expiration of eight days from the date of mailing, below. 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to the following: 
Laura Scott 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
this ^zday of February 2010. 
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625967 W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
Chr?s S. Hanney and Mabel J . Hanney, husband ana wife 
of Lay ton , County of Dr. v i s 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to B l a i n e J . Hanney, 
, grantor
 s 
State of Utah, 
, grantee 
of I-ay ton , County of Davis , f tate of Utah 
fnr the sum of Ten D o l l a r and othf>r good and v a l u a b l e considerationsDOfabAftB, 
m$$%% &»*^^ 
H pa r t of S e c t i o n 1 , Townahip U Nor th , Range 1 West, Sa l t Lake Meridian, 
x r . p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s t -
:
 Beginning a t a p o i n t S 89*58 '22" K. 60b .60 f e e t , li. 0 ° 2 2 l 3 6 " East 
f l i?.75 f e e t and N 88°08 f55 , ? E. 1*6.02 f e e t from the S.W. C o m e r of 
saJd S e c t i o n 1 , and running t h e n c e N. 0 o 2 2 f 3 6 " £* 66U.55 f e e t ; thence 
N. 89°.?7fli6w E . 222*00 f e e t ; t h e n c e S 0 o 2 2 , 3 6 l West 658.52 f e e t ; 
thence S 8 8 ° 0 8 , 5 5 " West 222-12 f e e t t o t he p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g , 
con ta in ing 3.38 a c r e s , more or l e s s , 
Mii-.jcct to u a i u ^ e n t s , ag reemen t s , r e s e r v a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s cf r e c o r d , and 
T V.LTiiLK N:.7.-. AMD SUBJECT TO the rirrht. o f way and p r i v i l e g e s j s t a b l i s e d in 
L/.:»ic;t "A" -Mracne.d h e r e t o and by r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t h ? r e o f . 
i?y^&,c^v,iir^ jfii^ chu g r a n t o r s h e r e i n , and*eaah<*<>£'*~thMj'G! -lift. c s t a V in 'and-'tc ''trl'CV* 
2&&&&pM3f\-i 4 - ; o r sc ion^ as t h -y both'^ s^aM<--.*l'ifcvitjr*^ 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor* , this 20th day of January . 19 78 
Signed «'< thr presence of .'...; I..;.l-.i 
S'l'A'.'-K OP" I TAP., 
(loimty of iVtvi s 
On tiie 20 th 
personally appeared b^for.. me 
83. 
«i anua ly 
STGC000825 
,19 78 
tii.' si..rwr s of i.K> above instrument, who duly acknowledged to mo (hat l he v vxcoutwl the 
.s;illir. • • \ / • 
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EXHIBIT "A'' >71 
a 25.0 foot .-ide right of v-.y, 12.50 feet on each side of and parallel to the follcvino 
described cente.rli.ne, to ho used in common with the grantors, the grantees, and ether 
parties owning adjacent property to said riqht of way, for ingress, egress, ror.r^ss, 
cind all other purposes for which a road may be used: Beginning at a point on an exist-
ing highway at a point South 89°58,22,f East 271.98 feet and North 26°M7'52M East 9.8u 
fe«-t and North ]6°39,50n East 215.30 feet and Northerly 199.b0 feet along the- arc or ?. 
34,257.Mb foot radius curve through a central angle of 0°20', and North 5°^9,38" West 
303.32 feet and Northerly 199.63 feet along the arc of a 3^,307.^8 foot radius curve 
through a central angle of 0°20' and South 85°25'21M East 20. bO feet frorr, the Southwest 
corner of Section 1, Township n North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
lutncc Southeasterly 250.0 feet, more or ltss, to a point Soi'th 8l*058'22" rast 271.98 
feet and North 260M7I52,, East 9. ft** feet and North 1G°39'50" East ?lc.30 feet and 
Nortnerly 199.30 fe^t along the arc of a 3M257.U8 foot radius curve through a central 
angle of 0°20f and Korth 5°29!38" West 227.32 feat and North 88°oe'55" East UO.O 5L<V: 
(Point A) fro.-n the Southwest corner of said Section 1; thence South ^°52,36t' East ^20,0 
feet; thence along the arc of a M2.02 foot radius curve to the left 73.27 feet; thence 
North 75°15' Eas~ 150.0 feet; thence along the arc of a 78.0U foot eadius curve to the 
left. 131.05 feet; thence North 21° West 85.0 feet; thence along the arc of a 25l*«9l foot 
radius curve to the right 98.83 feet; thence North 0°22'36" E-ist 72.0 feet, more-or IK'SS, 
to a point of curvature; thence along the arc of a 70 foot radius curve to the r-'^ ht 
107.23 feet; thence North 8fi°08,55M East 98.0 feet (parallel to and 7.50 feet South of 
a line extending South 88°08,55M West from a point South 8^058*22n East 1321.0 feet and 
North 09221 36" Eas.t 6 5.8^ .81 feet and West ^ 6 . MO feet froi.i the Southwest corner of said 
Suction 1); thence Easterly 62.37 feet along the arc of a 518.0 fcot radius curve to the 
left; thunce Easterly 62.32 feet along the arc of a M08.10 foot radius curve to the 
right; thence East 191.98 fe*t to a point South 89°58f22" East 1321.0 feet and North 0°22f 
36" East ''.58.81 feet and Vest 223.20 feet from the Southwest comer of said Section 1. 
STGC000826 
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REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT 
OF THE 










We, BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, hereby make and enter i n t o : : ^ | | I ^ 
-JW 
WP^feS tbis Revocable Trust Agreement with BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY,Sil 
and the survivor thereof and successors thereto, who are hereby appointed Trustees of th^iSltil 
•- t^llill 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST and hereafter sometimes called "Trustees." -••-'•'.^ v&ass? 
• • • v ^ - . i ^ S K ®&s 
ARTICLE ONE 
Trust, Beneficiaries and Successor Trustees 
1.1 - The Trust created by this Revocable Trust Agreement is hereby designated and 
' • . • - .Y. :T 'SV 
'"X$$& 




1.2 - The beneficiaries of this Trust are the Trustmakers, BLAINE J. HANNEY andj§}| 
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, a n ^ o u T c M l ^ ^ HANNEY and BRETT.^ | 
OVERTON HANNEY and any and all children adopted by us or born as our issue after the date - - Q 
of this Trust Agreement, and all other beneficiaries described herein.
 ;v..;> 4 j : % 
1.3 - In the event of the resignation, inability or refusal to act and, in any event, upon 
the death or disqualification of both the Trustees named above, we hereby nominate and appoint 










resignation, inability or refusal to act, and in any event, upon the death or disqualification of the:sl1i^SSL™ 
•m^m^m 
. . w p ^ t 
--., .>, %fct.vfe£p3 
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W&N& 
Successor Trustee named above, we hereby nominate and appoint BRETT OVERTON 
HANNEY as a Successor Trustee. 
ARTICLE TWO 
Schedule of Distributions 







our beneficiaries in specific ways and amounts, and at certain times. The purpose of this Article .~,-{.^J^: 
is to specifically describe the ways, amounts and times of the distributions. This Article is - ^S l^^p 
• ^M&m. 
modified by other specific Articles of this Trust Agreement. 
2.2 - All of the then balance of each of the Trust Shares held in the FAMILY TRUST 
.v i^Sm 
« 
as provided in paragraph 9.2 below shall be distributed in a "Final Distribution" as soon as is 
reasonably practicable after the death of the survivor of BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY 
ANN HANNEY, if the beneficiary of such share is then Twenty-One (21) years of age or older, ; | | ^ ^ 
••--••••••••.•K^&L 
or at such time thereafter as such beneficiary shall reach Twenty-One (21) years of age. "iv^^^» 
'"•' '•'•"•'vV"^^8^a„ 
ARTICLE THREE 
Trust Property •s^^^m 
•j ••'•".• •••S&S^^^ 
3.1 -f Wp^hereby assign, transfer and convey to the Trustees, or there is otherwise;^^^f 
assigned, transferred and conveyed to the Trustees, the property described in Schedule "AM of '[:^^^^ 
this Agreement. Th^TrusteesJhereby accept such property, with all increments or additions 
thereto, for the purposes and on the conditions hereafter set forth. All property subject to this • v | ^ ^ 
Agreement shall constitute the Trust Property and shall be held, managed and distributed as 
.provided herein. 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT, Page 2 of Nineteen Pages 
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.„ ARTICLE FOUR 
Reserved Powers 
4.1 - We reserve the power for ourselves or any other person to increase the Trust 
Property at any time by delivering to the Trustees any property, or by naming the Trustees as 
beneficiaries of any Jife insurance policy or bequest by Last Will and Testament. 





••• : • * - , * « 6 S L j 
••; rstrg^^ggSSi 
'• . ^ S S ^ 
7-'&$#$£$Rffi 
:'<iM&Wk 
.'•••' ^ ; : ^ ^ ? p S 
..•:---r/v-VrrS 
•"-^fe^ 
' . • •'• .7} S'vi'^^g 
serve\to ourselves) the following powers:-
(a) The right to withdraw property from this Trust in any amount and 
at any time upon giving reasonable noticgJn writing to any one or more of the 
Trustees. gucLaQMg^i^equ^ 0Dty i£w&-ate not then serving as a Trustee of 
this Trust, r " — 
(b) The right to amend, modify, or revoke all or any part of this Trust 
Agreement in any respect. 
4.3 - Upon revocation of this Trust, the entire Trust Property shall be distributed 
outright to us or in accordance with our discretion and direction. 
4.4 - Upon the death of the survivor of BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN 
HANNEY this Trust shall become irrevocable. 
4.5 - So long as either BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY is alive, 
and whether or not we are Tiustees,(oS)decision shall prevail and be binding upon all of the . ^ 4 § | 
Trustees as to all matters concerning the Trust Property without any liability on the part of the v ® ^ ^ 
other Trustees for our decision. We may resign as Trustee at any time by filing a written •••-•^sss 
resignation with the other Trustees and shall thereupon be relieved of and discharged from all Sf l l l lP 
•-•^wM 
• rv'YoGjei^iW 
future duties as Trustee. In the event of the death, resignation, or incompetence as defined in
 : ^ ^ 
' • ' S i ^ ^ 
paragraph 5.2 of either BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, all of the rights | g g ^ ' ^ 
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' I 'JW^^M 
and powers of the Trustees shall thereupon vest in and be thereafter exercised by the remaining | | ^ 
Trustees. •A^mM 
'&mM 
• • v ^ ^ M ^ > 
4.6 - The powers reserved herein shall not be exercised to substantially increase the - - ^ g | 
- • " • • > * • ' * • - ' • ' > « " " ' • 
<-^ys|| 




provide for their increased compensation. • S # ^ 
4.7 - Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, the powers we have reserved shall ^^g^^" 
be exercisable by instruments in writing signed by us and delivered to the Trustees. 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Disposition of Trust Property During mv Lifetime 
5.1 - During the lifetime of either of us, the Trustees shall pay to us all of the net ^ | | | ^ 
.r.--.:;.:v...ig^ 
income to the Trust in such installments as we may request. Such payments shall be made at '•Si^ 
least annually unless we direct to the contrary, in which event the Trustees shall follow our 
directions. 
5.2 - If at any time either or both BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN H A N N E Y l H ^ g 
'" "iii^M 
should become incompetent, or for any reason we are imable to act in our own behalf, t h e S l ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Trustees may pay or apply for the benefit of such Trustmaker all or any part of the income and if |f|||| 
principal of the Trust Property as the Trustees may from time to time deem necessary or 
advisable for the support, comfort, medical and dental care, hospital and nursing expenses, and 
all other monies needed for the benefit of such Trustmaker. The Trustees shall add any^a-M 
undistributed income to principal. The incompetency of BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY^g§| 
ANN HANNEY may be established by the written opinion of two (2) independent, licensed 
medical doctors. 
. . . . . " ' . ' '" .^rSf^ ^g 
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RETICLE SIX 
J:. • : • ' ;^ i . S i *^g> ^ . w ^ . 
Payment of Taxes, Debts and Obligations ^ I H l l I ^ 
6.1- Upon the death of either BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, * i ! f f l 
• -^:§§&$ 
the Trustees shall pay all taxes, debts and other obligations which shall be properly charged MM$M 
. • . -
J > ^ M 
against the Trust Property or either Trustmaker's individual estate by reason of their death or 3 S | | ^ y 
otherwise. If any personal representative, administrator or other person acting in a trust or -^^^? 
fiduciary capacity shall have paid any estate, inheritance or succession tax upon or with ^specttlpf 
" ^ lif 
to any or all of the Trust Property required to be included in the gross estate, the Trustees shaUjp^ 
reimburse such person for the amount of such taxes paid. 
ARTICLE SEVEN 
Division of Trust Property At Death 
•£!8®s* 
Wm 
^ f ® 
•' .• .••r^;»'s?» 
#2£m,™ 
•^^mm 
'^'SSISI 7.1 - Upon the death of First Spouse, as defined by Article Seven paragraph 7 . 3 3 p | 
below, the Trustees shall proceed as follows: 
(a) The Trustees shall make payments, or retain reserves for making such 
payments, as directed by Article Six. 
(b) In the event that there is in existence at the time of either of our 
deaths, a written statement or list in either of our handwriting or signed by either 
of us, disposing of all or part of our tangible personal property (other than 
money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title or securities, and property 
used in trade or business) which is subject to the terms of this Trust and which 
has not otherwise been specifically disposed of hereunder, each such item of 
personal property shall be distributed to the person whose name is set forth on the 
list as the intended beneficiary of that item as his or her sole and separate 
property, as soon after my death as is reasonably practicable, The Trustees may 
consider such distributions in determining the nature and extent of any 
discretionary distributions authorized by this Trust Agreement; but no distribution 
to any beneficiary made pursuant to this paragraph shall reduce or be considered 
an advancement against any mandatory distribution to such beneficiary from the 
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(c) Upon the death of First Spouse and if our estate is of such value that 
any federal estate taxes thereon would be reduced by a marital deduction, the 
Trustees shall divide the Trust Property into two separate Trusts known as the 
MARITAL TRUST and the FAMILY TRUST. The assets of the two Trusts shall 
be determined as stated below. 
(d) The Trustees shall allocate to the FAMILY TRUST all of the Trust 
Property not otherwise allocated, paid or reserved in this paragraph 7.1. Any 
unused reserves shall be divided and allocated as required by this paragraph 7.1 
when the Trustees determine that such reserves are no longer needed. 









7.2 - The MARITAL TRUST shall contain that portion of the Trust Property to be 
'determined as follows: 
(a) The Trustee shall, as of the date of the death of First Spouse, 
allocate a fraction of the "qualified property11 to the MARITAL TRUST, which 
shall not be reduced by any taxes payable by reason of such death. The 
numerator of the fraction shall be the largest amount that, without causing or 
increasing a state death tax based on the Federal credit for state death taxes, will 
produce a marital deduction resulting in no or the minimum Federal estate tax 
payable by reason of the death of First Spouse, after allowing for the unified 
credit against federal estate tax and all available credits and deductions. When 
calculating the minimum Federal estate tax payable by reason of the death of First 
Spouse, any taxes which may become payable by reason of Second Spouse's 
subsequent death shall be taken into account. The denominator of the fraction 
shall be the value of the qualified property. The numerator and denominator shall 
be based on values as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes. We 
intend that the MARITAL TRUST qualify for the marital deduction, and any 
provision of this instrument that is inconsistent with that intention shall not apply 













(b) "Qualified property" is that trust property, or the proceeds of any sale 
or disposition thereof, which is not expended or disposed of pursuant to the 
preceding provision of this Article and which is included in the gross estate for 
Federal estate tax purposes and for which a marital deduction would be allowed, 
by election or otherwise, if allocated to the MARITAL TRUST. We direct that 
any election be made which is necessary to qualify the MARITAL TRUST for the 
marital deduction. 
"'£*$& 
• • : $ > » 
(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, if Second Spouse survives 
First spouse for less than 170 days, the numerator of the fraction shall not 
exceed one-half of First Spouse's adjusted gross estate (meaning the gross estate 
for Federal estate tax purposes less any deductions allowed under Sections 2053 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT, Page 6 of Nineteen Pages STGC0003^7 
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and 2054 of the Internal Revenue Code or any amendments thereto) less the 
amount of the marital deduction allowed to my estate for Federal estate tax 
purposes for interests passing to Second Spouse other than under this Article. 
7.3 - The FAMILY TRUST shall contain the balance of the Trust Property remaining 
after deducting all amounts allocated to the MARITAL TRUST, and the items of personal 
property allocated by the list described in paragraph 7.1 (b). Subject to the personal property 
list described in paragraph 7.1 (b), the Trustees shall have the sole discretion to select the 
properties to be allocated to the MARITAL TRUST, provided that the properties shall be 
selected in such a manner that the fair market value of the properties of each trust at the time 
of the allocation shall be representative of that trust's proportionate share of the depreciation or \ 
appreciation of all property then available for allocation to the MARITAL TRUST which 
occurred between the date of death and the date of allocation. In no event shall there be 
allocated to the MARITAL TRUST any properties for which the marital deduction would not 
be allowed if they were included. 
7.4 - Upon the death of the Second Spouse, then all of the Trust Property shall be held, 
by the Trustees in the FAMILY TRUST. 
7.5 - For purposes of this Trust Agreement, the following definitions shall apply: 
(a) When reference is made to a child, grandchild, descendant or issue, 
or the plural thereof, such references shall include both those who are adopted 
and those who are natural born. 
(b) When reference is made to the spouse of any of our descendants, 
even if the spouse is named, such reference shall include only that spouse to 
whom such descendant is legally married at the time described in such reference, 
or was so married immediately prior to the death of such descendant. If such 
spouse neither is nor was then so married, then such spouse shall receive nothing 
under or through this Trust Agreement after the termination of said marriage. 
The foregoing shall not be construed to create, transfer or grant to any person any 












• '' '^XZ&fr^ 
-^^mmi 
)£${&*&• 
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beneficial interest in the Trust Property as a result of any second marriage oif 
other remarriage of ourselves or any of our descendants. 
vfelKi 
v. - ••^^.*H^4sfeg* 
(c) When reference is made to First Spouse, such reference shall mean 
the first of BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY who dies. 
(d) When reference is made to Second Spouse, such reference shall 




ARTICLE EIGHT" ^ r f l l i 
Disposition of Marital Trust 
8.1- After dividing the Trust Property as provided above, the MARITAL TRUSTS 
any) shall be held, managed, distributed and transferred as follows: 
(a) During the lifetime of Second Spouse, the Trustees shall pay to i ^ | S ^ | l i 
'^•%0^ 
Second Spouse all of the income of the MARITAL TRUST at least quarterly, and 
as much of the principal of the MARITAL TRUST as the Trustees determine 
advisable for the support, comfort, and well-being of Second Spouse. 
(b) Upon written request, Second Spouse may at any time direct the 
Trustees to pay out principal or income or both from the MARITAL TRUST to 
Second Spouse, to our then living children or their living descendants, or to 
anyone else, in amounts specified by Second Spouse. 
*wm 
•^^•mk 
•'/ "-"rv'-V:".'• Ki&ig 'tyj&jjf 
'^$^M 





(c) Upon the death of Second Spouse, the Trustees shall distribute the ; ; l i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
property of this MARITAL TRUST as Second Spouse may appoint and direct b y 4 ^ ^ ^ 
Last Will and Testament or by other written legal instrument specifically referring -;-W§$il~ 
to this power of appointment. In the absence of such an appointment as to all or # S | ^ ^ 1 
any part
 :, of the MARITAJL TRUST property, the Trustees shall add r . to•^^^^& S (^^ i 
administer the same as property held in the FAMILY TRUST. Second SpoiisellSmw^ 
may exercise this general power of appointment in favor of Second Spouse's'W^^^§ 
estate, creditors, the creditors of the estate, or any other persons. ':''-::'-W^^m" 
r
'0;'rd^m&M 
• • :•• - - ^ ^ ^ m m 
S R T I C L E N I N E ; ••••••^K>-*S:*± 'MWm 
Disposition of Family Trust 
9 .1-
'"•'•. •;•••.•• l * » S i ? v v 
• ^ S ^ S , 
During the life of Second Spouse, the FAMILY TRUST shall be held, managed, '1^! 
distributed and transferred as follows: ^liJ^iM 
> # • * 
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(a) The Trustees shall pay to Second Spouse all of the net income of fiST" 
FAMILY TRUST at least quarterly. 
(b) The Trustees are authorized to pay to Second Spouse at any time any! 
portion of principal as they deem necessary or advisable for Second Spouse's 
maintenance in health, support in reasonable comfort, college, trade, business, 
professional or other education, medical, dental, hospital and nursing expenses, 
and expenses of invalidism. However, no such distribution of principal shall be 
made to Second Spouse until the MARITAL TRUST shall have become 
exhausted, unless it is impractical or un\yise to distribute from the MARITAL 
TRUST. In addition, in any calendar year the Trustees shall pay over to Second 
Spouse from the principal such amounts as Second Spouse shall request i n ' l ^ . ^ . ^ 
writing; provided, however, that the aggregate of such additional distributions;\|^^J| 
shall not exceed the greater of (a) Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or (b) five^^^^ 
percent (5%) of the value of the principal of the FAMILY TRUST determined onl§|§j""* 
the last day of such calendar year. If Second Spouse should fail to exercise th i s j | | ^S 
power before the end of any calendar year, it shall lapse as to that year and u n d e r | | ^ ^ g 








(c) The Trustees are further authorized to pay to or for any of our living '8§§f 
children any portion of the principal as the Trustees shall deem necessary or 
advisable from time to time for the maintenance in health, support in reasonable 
comfort, medical, dental, hospital and nursing expenses, expenses of invalidism, 
expenses in connection with the donation of time and services for religious 
purposes, and expenses for the trade, business, college, professional or other 
education of such child. The Trustees shall have the same authority and 
discretion to make payments of principal to or for those of our grandchildren, one 
or both of whose parents have died, become incapacitated or otherwise become ^ ^ . ^ 
unable to adequately provide the basic support for such grandchildren. In - ^ ^ ^ ^ 
carrying out this provision, the Trustees shall take into consideration the basic | ^ ^ ^ ^ 
needs of Second Spouse and the essential needs of our children and grandchildren;||^^^^ 
i. and their ability to provide part or all of their essential needs • The decision o f ^ p j * ^ ^ 
the Trustees as to invasion of principal for these purposes shall be final, and o u r v ! ? ^ ^ | ^ 
children and grandchildren shall have no right or authority to have the decision v g ^ ^ ^ 
of the Trustees changed, amended or revoked in any way. ;v S | ^ t f 
-: '•':'- ' :•<,•'• ' '¥l@ttq 
9.2 - After both BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY have d ied ; ' twi l l 
m%Wm 
'•-V.:-xry'> :-•. *V.*V«^'-" 
rest, residue and remainder of the FAMILY TRUST shall be held, managed, distributedvand^i! 
. transferred to or for the benefit of our children named in Article One, and all children adopted I f l 
K by us or born as our issue after the date of this Trust Agreement, or their children as follows: 
•H5K5S 
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(a) Except as may otherwise be required by Article Two, the Trustees 
shall divide the Trust Property into separate equal portions, and thereby provide 
one portion for the benefit of each of our children then living, and one portion 
for the benefit of the then living lawful descendants, by right of representation, 
of each of our then deceased children. The portion or part thereof, hereafter 
called "Trust Share/ which is allocated to each individual beneficiary shall 
constitute and be administered as a separate trust. Except for the items described 
in the personal property list described in paragraph 7.1 (b), the Trustees shall 
have the sole discretion to select the properties to be allocated to each Trust 
Share, provided that the properties shall be, selected in such a manner that the fair 
market value of the properties of each Trust Share at the time of allocation shall 
be representative of that Trust Share's proportionate share of the depreciation or 
appreciation of all property then available for allocation which occurred after the, 
deaths of both BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY and before, 
the date of allocation. Separate books and records shall be kept for each Trust; 
Share, but it shall not be necessary that physical division of the assets be made 
as to each Trust Share. The income and principal of each Trust Share shall be 




' ^ * ? ^ t $ $ 




(b) The Trustees shall distribute the income and principal of each Trust 
Share to or for the beneficiary of such Share in such amounts as the Trustees in 
their sole discretion deem necessary or advisable for the health, support, 
education, and general welfare of each beneficiary and expenses in connection 
with the donation of time and services for religious purposes. All income not so 
distributed shall be accumulated and added to the principal of each Trust Share. 
• * 
:
^ ® § $ j 
(c) When a beneficiary reached the age of Twenty-One (21) years the 




both BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY if such beneficiary,^ |^B" 
has already reached such age, the Trustee shall distribute to such beneficiary all | |§§| 
of the then balance of that beneficiary's Trust Share. This portion of t h e | ^ ^ 
FAMILY TRUST shall terminate completely as to any beneficiary who has l ^ ^ ^ p 
received complete distribution of that beneficiary's Trust Share as provided in this ^ ^ ^ ^ 
paragraph 9.2: Mmm 
(d) If any beneficiary of a Trust Share dies before the complete 
distribution of that beneficiary's Share, the Trust Share of that beneficiary as then 
constituted shall be distributed to any of our then living descendants or their 
spouses in such proportions and subject to such terms, trust, and conditions as 
such beneficiary may appoint (without violating any applicable rule against 
perpetuities or accumulations) by specific reference to this power in a valid Last^  
Will and Testament or other written legal instrument. This power of appointment 
shall not be exercised in favor of the creditors of the deceased beneficiary, or the 
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5. -: > ; 
(e) Except as may otherwise be required by Article Two, if anyi |^^ 
beneficiary effectually exercised the foregoing testamentary power of ^ 
appointment, then that beneficiary's Trust Share as then constituted or the part 
thereof not effectually appointed, shall be distributed in equal shares to the then 
living descendants of such beneficiary, by right of representation.•••; If the 
beneficiary leaves no living descendants, the Trust Share shall be distributed 
equally to our then living descendants by right of representation. However, any 
share otherwise distributable to one of our descendants for whom any property 
is then being held in trust under this paragraph 9.2 shall be added to such trust 
property. In addition, any share otherwise distributable to a minor for whom no 
property is then being held in trust under this paragraph 9.2 shall immediately 
vest in such minor, but the Trustees shall hold, use and expend so much of the 
income and principal of such retained share as they shall deem necessary o r f f ^ ^ ^ q 
advisable for the health, education, support, and general welfare of such m i n o r . - | ^ ^ ^ 
Any income not so expended shall be added to the: principal. The Trustees shallH 
have with respect to each such retained share all of the powers, discretion andJ| 
duties of management and distribution which they have with respect to the Trust,,.ify 







10.1 - If we die in a common disaster or from illness or disease under circuinstancesjfg^ 
^^M^M 
where it is not possible to determine with certainty which of us survived the other, it shall. P&m 
.conclusively presumed that BLAINE J, HANNEY survived SHIRLEY ANN H A N N E Y . v ^ ^ ^ ^ 
s> 2:-, 
ARTICLE ELEVEN 
Powers and Authority of Trustees 
'^m$0& 
''y^ M^M*.^  
• '^W^ir^i^^^^-
• - ' • • • . ' •
> i - - £ v ; ' & r — 
}£>%. 
X %' 
11.1 - Without regard to any legal restrictions otherwise applicable to^  trustee^ 




sole and absolute discretion. 
(a) To retain, purchase or otherwise acquire any property, without 
diversification as to kind or amount, whether or not such property was originally 
a part of the Trust Property, or is authorized for investment by law, or is 




 _ - --*•- • '-isira^feSSffii^ 
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(b) To dispose of any property at any time by sale, exchange, partition, 
lease, mortgage, pledge, or option, at public or private sale, for such price and 
on such terms and conditions as they may determine, whether for cash or other 
consideration, or on credit with or without security. 
(c) To hold any part of the Trust Property in cash or invested for any 
period deemed advisable. 
(d) To extend, modify or waive the terms of any bond and mortgage at 
any time forming a part of the Trust Property; to foreclose any such mortgage or 
take title to the property securing it by deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise; 
to protect or redeem any such property from forfeiture for non-payment of taxes 
or other liens; and generally to exercise as to such bond and mortgage or such 
property all powers that an absolute owner might exercise. 
(e) To exercise any option, right or privilege to convert or subscribe for 
bonds, notes stocks, or other securities; to make such conversions or 
subscriptions; to make payments therefor and to advance or borrow money for the 
purpose of exercising any such option, right or privilege; and to hold as 
investments such bonds, notes, stocks and other securities notwithstanding that 
i they are not of a character authorized for investments by law or by other 
'provisions of this Agreement. 
(f) To vote any corporate stock held by them in person, through their 
designees or by proxy, with or without power of substitution, and to execute 
authority or proxies to one or more designees or nominees. 
(g) To borrow money for any trust purpose and to pledge all or part of 
the Trust Property to secure such borrowing without incurring any personal 
liability therefor. 
(h) To pay, extend renew, modify or compromise, upon such terms as 
they may determine and upon such evidence as they may deem sufficient, any 
obligation or claim, including taxes, either in favor of or against the Trust 
Property. 
(i) To hold or register any securities or other Trust Property in the name 
of a nominee or in such form as to pass by delivery with or without indicating the 
fiduciary character of such securities or other property. 
(j) To hold any separate parts or shares of the Trust Property wholly 
or partly in undivided form for convenience or investment and administration. 
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(k) To buy, sell, and trade in securities of any nature, including short 
sales, on margin, and for such purposes may maintain and operate accounts with 
brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them with such 
broker as security for loans and advances made to the Trustees. 
G) To make distributions or allocations in cash or in kind, including 
in undivided interests, by prorata or non-prorata division or any combinations of 
these ways in discretion of our trustees and on termination of the estate or trust, 
to distribute property to a custodian for a minor beneficiary under the Gifts to 
Minors Act of any state, or to use any other means of making distributions to a 
minor under applicable law or terms of this trust. 
11.2 - In the event the Trustees do not agree on any matter, and except as otherwise 
provided by the powers which we have elsewhere specifically reserved to ourselves or others, 
the decision of a majority of the Trustees shall govern and be binding on the Trustees and the 
Trust. If there is an even number of Trustees, another Trustee may be added pursuant to 
paragraph 13.2, below. 
11.3 - Every Successor Trustee shall have the same title, rights, powers, duties and 
discretion herein given the Trustees, without any act of conveyance or transfer. The Successor 
Trustee shall only be responsible for the property delivered to them aind shall not be responsible 
for transactions and occurrences regarding the trust prior to the time of their appointment. 
11.4 - No person paying money or delivering any property to any Trustee shall be 
required to see to its application. 
11.5 - The guardian or conservator of the estate of a beneficiary under legal disability, 
or the parents or surviving parent of a minor beneficiary for whose estate no guardian has been 
appointed, may act for such beneficiary in making any appointment and giving any direction 
under this Trust Agreement. The Trustees may make any payments hereunder directly to any 
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such beneficiary or to the guardian, conservator, or parent of such beneficiary, or to any person 
deemed suitable by the Trustees, or by direct payment of such beneficiary's expenses. 
ARTICLE TWELVE 
Qualification and Compensation of Trustees 
12.1 - To the extent that any such requirement can legally be waived and except in 
connection with a breach of trust, no Trustee shall ever be required to give any bond or qualify, 
or be appointed by or account to any court, or obtain the order of approval of any court in the 
exercise of any power or discretion hereunder. 
12.2 - Notwithstanding paragraph 12.1, the spouse of any of our descendants shall not 
be appointed or continue to serve as a Trustee after the filing, by any person and in any court, 
of any petition for the separate maintenance or divorce of such spouse, except upon written 
• * * . • - * - . 
consent of those who are then the beneficiaries of at least two thirds of the current income of 
the Trust Property. Upon the filing of any such petition, such spouse shall be immediately... 
disqualified as a Trustee and a Successor Trustee shall be appointed as required by paragraph 
13.2, below. 
12.3 - The Trustees may, in their discretion, receive reasonable compensation for their 
services, such compensation to be that which is normally charged by trust organizations for 
similar services under similar circumstances. 
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ARTICLE THIRTEEN 
Resignation of Trustees 
13.1 - Any of the Trustees may resign at any time by giving written notice specifying 
the effective date of such resignation to the then existing beneficiaries of the current income of 
the Trust Property. 
13.2 - If all of the Trustees resign or are unable to act, a corporation authorized to 
administer trusts under the laws of any state or of the United States, or an individual, may be 
appointed as Successor Trustee by an instrument delivered to such successor and signed by those 
who are beneficiaries, or their legal guardians, at the time of such appointment of at least two-
thirds of the current income of the Trust Property, and such beneficiaries may direct the 
Successor Trustee to accept the accounts of any former Trustee, for which the Successor Trustee 
shall have no responsibility. 
ARTICLE FOURTEEN 
Spendthrift Clause 
14.1 - No interest of any beneficiary in the principal or income of any fund or trust 
created herein shall be subject to pledge, assignment, sale or transfer in manner, or be liable for 
or subject to the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements or torts of such beneficiary in any 
manner to anticipate, charge or encumber any such interest. 
ARTICLE FIFTEEN 
Provisions Relating to Vesting of Interests 
15.1- All interestomder this Trust Agreement shall vest absolutely not later than twenty-
one (21) years after the date of death of the survivor of the group composed of ourselves, all 
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persons named herein, and all members of classes specified in this Agreement who are living 
on the date of its execution. Any assets then in the hands of the Trustees shall be forthwith 
distributed to the persons to whom the Trustees could then distribute income as a result of any 
provision of this Agreement in the proportion in which such income would be distributed among 
them if the Trustees were, in fact, distributing all income of the Trust Property. For purposes 
of this Article, any discretionary distributions of income among possible beneficiaries shall be 
considered to be distributable among our living descendants in equal shares if they are all 
members of a single generation, or by right of representation if they are members of more than 
i VJJ 
""•^jjl 
one generation. Illi 
• ! ^ % % ^ 
ARTICLE SIXTEEN M 




: C ^ | 
16.1- Under no circumstances shall this Trust be considered a reciprocal Trust, nor shall J | | 
it be considered as having been given in consideration of any other trust which may be created -
on a date identical with or reasonably close to the effective date of this Trust. 
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN 
Effective Date and Governing Law 
17.1- This Trust shall take effect upon our execution of this Agreement, and it shall be 
governed and construed in all respects according to the laws of the State of Utah. In no event 




• • - • " 4 
m 
Wr 
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ARTICLE EIGHTEEN 
Unenforceability Provisions 
18.1 - If any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining 
provisions shall nevertheless be carried into effect 
EXECUTED this g X day of 1A. . 1995. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
Q>JL~^ xj 2 /1 
: ss. 
) 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, 
Trustmaker 















The foregoing Revocable Trust Agreement was subscribed and sworn to before me by 
BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, whose signatures appears above on the 
^ 2 day of 4 0 N . , 1 9 9 5 . 
DAVID ESHELTON 
N0TJWPV8UC *S7ATEolUTAH 
692 EAST 3060 NORTH 
NORTH OGDENUT * U U 
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.' £*4 
ACCEPTANCE OF TRUSTEES 
We certify that we have read the foregoing Revocable Trust Agreement and understand 
the terms and conditions upon which the Trust Property is to be held, managed and disposed of 
by us as Trustees. We accept the Revocable Trust Agreement in all particulars and acknowledge 
receipt of the Trust Property described in the attached Schedule WA\ 
"KQ~^ J" v l 

















)HN H. GEILMANN DATE 
Attorney at Law 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801)627-3846 
.•t:m&f 
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Schedule of Trust Property 
The property described below is subject to the terms of the REVOCABLE HANNEY 
FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT: 
1. Personal property described in an Assignment in Trust, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Schedule "A-l". 
2. Real property described in a Special Warranty Deed, a copy of which is attached 














BLAINE J. HANNEY 
Trustmaker and Trustee 
SHIRLEY 
Trustmaker and Trustee 
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SCHEDULE "A-l 
ASSIGNMENT 
For valuable consideration, we, BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, 
do assign, transfer and set over to BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY and 
their Successor Trustees, to hold as Trustees for the HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, the 
following described property: 
1. All personal and household effects ..of both Trustmakers, including antiques, art 
objects, books, papers, clothing, household goods and supplies, furniture and furnishings, 
jewelry, paintings, silverware, musical instruments, hobby collections, sporting equipment, tools 
and vehicles, including but not limited to: 
1992 TOYOTA 4TARN01P2NZ031298 
1992 TOYOTA 4TARN81A7N2031517 
2. All our interest in all bank and savings accounts including time certificates of 
deposit and shares in savings and loan associations and credit unions, including but not limited 
to: 
A. Checking Accounts: 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON #0113033506 
BARNES BANK #02-0021001243 
B. Savings Accounts: 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION #12230-9 
CLOVER CLUB EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Kaysville #3022-1 
CLOVER CLUB EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Kaysville #2191-5 
C. Certificates of Deposit: 
D. Money Market Certificates: 
E. Savings Certificates: 
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3. All our interest in all corporate and mutual fund shares, corporate funds, and U.S. 
Government Savings Bonds, regardless of title or registration, including but not limited to: 
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY #76 25 SHARES 
HANNEY & HANNEY CONSTRUCTION, INC. #001 1800 SHARES 
HANNEY & HANNEY CONSTRUCTION, INC. #002 1200 SHARES 
HANNEY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP #LP006822 
Si 
4. All our interest in the HANNEY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, NO. 
LP006822. 
5. All our interest in the following described real property located in Davis County, 
State of Utah: 
ALL OF LOT 27, WILDRIDGE ESTATES PHASE NO. 2. CONTAINS 0.27 ACRES. 
(09:218:0027) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, BLAINEJ. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, 






BLAINE J. HANNEY, Assignor 
:.<^n 
STATE OF UTAH 





HANNEY,'Ass^ r 6 
The foregoing Assignment was subscribed and sworn to before u.c 
and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, whose signatures appear above c> 




d a y 
DAVID E.SHELTON 
NOTARY PUBUC'STATEctVTAH] 
692 EAST 3060 NORTH 
NORTH OGDENUT 84414 
COMM. EXP. 1-3-98 
• : • • * » 
"',. S8*& 
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEE 
J I C V F W HAHHEY' BUIHE J. 
:D 
••'••* "8LAINE J. HANNEY, Grantors of 3182 North Highway 89, City of Layton, County 
of Davis, State of Utah, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS the below described tract of real 
property to BLAINE J. HANNEY of 3182 North; Highway 89, City of Layton, County of 
Davis, State of Utah, and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, of 3182 North Highway 89, City of •:•••; 
Layton, County of Davis, State of Utah, and their Successor Trustees, as Trustees for the 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, Grantees for the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable 
consideration. 
Said tract of real property being situate in Davis County, State of Utah and more 
particularly described as follows: 
A PART OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, MORE 
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89058'22" EAST 604.60 FEET, NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 649.75 
FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE S.W. CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1, AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22,36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'46" EAST.222.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 0°22'36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH SP0V55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. CONTAINING 338 ACRES; MORE OR LESS. 0?- 003•* oOfy 
SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS, AGREEMENTS, RESERVATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD 
AND TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT OF WAY AND PRIVILEGES ESTABLISHED DT 
EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY REFERENCE MADE A PART THEREOF. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this 2-"X day of \3b^ ~ .. 1995. 
Signed in the Presence of) -O^-g -^—^ J " fif <ZL 
J 
BLAINE J. HANNEY 
$w . Hf, 
SHIRLEY HANNEY 
. c •>•->! 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
ss. 
On the c ^ day of 4-lW- • 1995 personally appeared before me BLAINE 
J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY the signers of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
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3^'32Vfcbt,>nd;Northerly' 199,63vfeet' along the 'aro!\6fra"". 34^307,48"foot radius curve? 
>ough^a?<3fentral fiast''':20V'5'0':feet-from'We-''SoutHttast 
?ner:of-'Sectional, Township 4 North,'Range 1 West,:• Salt Lake Meridian, and running ' 
in,C0. Southeasterly 250,0 feet, moro or l e s s , t o a point South 89°58,22" East 271,98 
itrvancJ;North^26c^7l5?,feEast 9.84^feet::and::North?16^3?»50»;-East 215;30'feet and.,it*r^ . 5thfcrlyJ199i 30.; featialongv the arc. of .a 34257,48; foot radius curve through a central .; 
;le of 0o20pand North 5°29'38^ West-227,32 feet-and; North 88^08'55" East W,Q*fepi:£: 
>int; A).?frpmVthfc*^ 
it];.thence; alpngv:th&>arc ;of: a 42,02, .foot radius' curve to the' left 73,27 "feetj"thence •. -; 
'th 75015^;East ;^ > 
^131^05 .feetj.ithence^North 21<\.West 85,0 feetj;£thence along the arc of a^264,91vfoptr"?c 
ius curye>.to:,:thti.right .98,83.feetj .-thence North 0?22• 35^ . East 72,0 feet;-more Jor less., ;; 
a point;Vof'.curvature):;thence along.the:arc ?of\a .70 foot radius curve: to;the right-';• ; W-K 
,23 feet;^thence;North;88?08'55!UEast>9.8,0 :fee.tc(parallel to and;?7,50,ifeet;South of 
ine.extending';South/88?08l55M::We8tiifrom^a'point?iSouth 89?58^22,,;Ea9t^l321i0^feet^ndwSlS 
h'p°22^36!,.East:65'8;;8I feet: and :West>»l46.40^ feet-from the'Southwest ;corrier'bf i sa id lS i l i jS 
ion Df^tbence Easterly /62,37|f eet -along ther'arc of a?518,0')foot;radius curve.to t h e ; | ? ^ i 
tj;thenc0'Easterly. 52.32 feet along the'arc of a 408,10 foot radius curve to. the -/^-:^§|lii 
ht^thence-East:19lV98:fee^toiapoint;cSouth;^9?58,22,^East 1321.0 feet^and North'0o£2!l$fl 
— • • • • • • - • - - - • - • • • ! • - • • - . - . - • • - • • .«!£.• . _ •_ . • . . . . . . . . . • - ' : ' . . - i ' - > v ^ . f e % 5 i 4 
Wm 
^ZM 
East 55Br8Xfeet and West 223,20 feW;fr^ of said Section 1 
'••• f K I U* 
: ' . k ! - - - i . . 
> : * : 
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GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
Know all men by these presents, that I, BLAINE J. HANNEY, the undersigned, of 3182 
North Highway 89, City of Layton, State of Utah, hereby make, constitute, and appoint 
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY of 3182 North Highway 89, City of Layton, State of Utah, my true 
and lawful attorney in fact for me and in my name, place and stead, giving unto said 
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY full power to do and perform all and every act that I mayj,ggal|y 
do through an attorney, in relation to all of my property, real or personal, wherever situate, to 
carry out the purposes for which this power is granted, specifically including the power to 
make deposits, sign checks, endorse items, and withdraw funds from checking, savings, on 
other accounts, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming 
that which SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY or my agent's substitute shall lawfully do or cause to 
be done by my agent or my agent's substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the power herein 
conferred upon my agent. 
In the event that SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY fails to survive me, declines to serve or 
for any reason fails to serve as my agent with this power of attorney, then I nominate and 
appoint MICHAEL DOYLE HANNEY of Layton, Utah, to serve as my agent with the same 
powers and discretions described above. 
In the event that MICHAEL DOYLE HANNEY fails to survive me, declines to serve 
BLAINE J. HANNEY POWER OF ATTORNEY, Page 1 of Two Pages 
_ STGC000072 
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or for any reason fails to serve as my agent with this power of attorney, then I nominate and 
appoint BRETT OVERTON HANNEY of Layton, Utah, to serve as my agent with the same 
powers and discretions described above. 
This power shall terminate upon the physical destruction of this power of attorney by 
the principal, BLAINE J. HANNEY. 
This power shall not be affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal, 
BLAINE J. HANNEY. 
DATED this 2&L day of _, 1995. 
IRiL^. ?r*hC 
BLAINE J. HANNEY 
Personally appeared before me BLAINE J. HANNEY, who acknowledged, sworn to, 
subscribed and executed the foregoing power of attorney on the " ^ - O — day of 
-4-^Jr- 1995. 





COMM. EXP. 1.3.g8 
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WARRANTY DEED 
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, AND THEIR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY 
FAMILY TRUST 
OF LAYTON, COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
HEREBY CONVEY AND WARRANT TO 
BLAINE 4. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEYr A S J 0 I N T T E N A N T S 
GRANTOR(S) 
OF LAYTON, COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, 
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED TRACT OF LAND IN DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATEOFUT: 
{09-003-0021) 
See Attached Exhibit "A" 
GRANTEE(S) 
SUBJECTTO EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY OF RECORD. AND TAXES FOR THE YEAR 
2000 AND THEREAFTER. 
WITNESS, THE HAND(S) OF SAID GRANTOR(S), THIS /-Z ~^DAYOF hUL>Q^7
 f ZOOD 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF l^JJ/U*^- J fiOwiuu/'. dOUAAfcU; 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, TRUSTEE T~^ 
)Ala£< &* HlMUtf*t+. ^-JMAAfof 
'SHIRLEY A~N^ HANNEY, TRUST^c J 
STATE OF ( / T W - f l - ) 
:SS 
COUNTY OF t / J g f f £ / £ ) 
,2000. PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE WIE^  ON ft- ,7^ -
THE SIGNER(S) OF THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, WHO DULY ACKNOWLEDGE 
THE SAME. 
MM/ufc/^W 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
(ss. 
) 
h. 1 6 I 1 5 6 6 Q B P 6 5 3 
On the 28th day of August, 2000, personally appeared before me SHIRMEY ANN HANNEY. AND THEIR 
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, the signer ( ) of the foregoing instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that SHE executed the same 
A 
My Commission Expires: n^ffi^ [jfwftl 
Residing at^
 n J ^ w " 
NOTARY PUBLIC U 
KorriW Fu&li& 
AUU3CJJ HODGES (ifc^'Xm "^^'ssrBieJnwjHijw, •; 
(jlcwjl?) wmw,m-ft»jf 
^TTC^ KOVEi2CEa 10. a r e 
• — ___ BTCTc 0 ? i m > | j 
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EXHIBIT "A" F 1610660 B 26S6 P &5-4 
A PART OF SECTION 1. TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, MORE PARTICULARLY 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 604.60 FEET. NORTH 0°22,36M EAST 
649.75 FEET AND NORTH SS'WSS" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1, 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57*46" EAST 222.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 0°22'36" WEST 658.52 FEET. THENCE SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. D^'OOD ' OO £\ } 
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER LINE. TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS. THE GRANTEES. AND 
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY, FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, REGRESS 
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING AT A POINT ON AN EXISTING 
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89058'22" EAST 271 98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47,52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 
16°39'50" EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20\ AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY 
199.63 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,307.46 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND 
SOUTH 85°25*21" EAST 20.50 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, 
RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 250.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS. 
TO A POINT SOUTH WSW22" EAST 271 98 FEET AND NORTH 26047'52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 16°39'50M 
EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE 
THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 227 32 FEET AND NORTH 88o08'55M EAST 
40.0 FEET (POINT A) FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1, THENCE SOUTH 4°52'35H EAST 
420.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 42.02 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 73.27 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 75°15' EAST 150.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 78.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 
131.05 FEET; THENCE NORTH 21° WEST 85.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 264.91 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE TO THE RIGHT 98.83 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0°22'36M EAST 72.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT OF 
CURVATURE; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 70 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 107,23 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 98.0 FEET (PARALLEL TO AND 7.50 FEET SOUTH OF A LINE EXTENDING SOUTH 88°08'55M 
WEST FROM A POINT SOUTH 89°58,22" EAST 1321.0 FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 
446.40 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1); THENCE EASTERLY 62.37 FEET ALONG 
THE ARC OF A 518.0 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT; THENCE EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF 
A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH WS$7T EAST 1321.0 
FEET AND NORTH 0o22,36M EAST 658 81 FEET AND WEST 223 20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF 
SAID SECTION 1. 
SITUATE IN DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
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WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
INWEST TITLE SERVICES, INC. 
471 W. HERITAGE PARK BLVD. #6 
tAYTON, UT 54041 
FIE: 25859 
A I M t l t l iW POWER OF ATTORNEY-SPECIAL-DURABLE 
3lL) \ 1M \w (SPECIFIC PROPERTY ONLY) 
E 1 6 1 0 6 6 ^ B 2 6 8 6 P 6 5 5 
KNOW ALL MEN BYTHESE PRESENTS, THAT , g j g * f t L . JUTE* mi$ CNTY BORDER 
fc-iffi?,^2?'..-'4819 Pt1 ^ *2.QQ DEP AC 
BIAINKLHANNEY m D F0R I K y E S T T I T L E S E R V I ^ IffC 
HAVE(S) MADE, CONSTITUTED AND APPOINTED. AND BYTHESE PRESENTS DO(ES) HEREBY MAKE. 
CONSTITUTE AND APPOINT 
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY 
MY (OUR) TRUE AND LAWFUL ATTORNEY(lES) AND IN MY (OUR) NAME(S), PLACE(S) AND STEAD TO DO AND 
PERFORM THE FOLLOWING ACT OR ACTS, WHICH ARE HEREBY HOTTED, HOWEVER, TO THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY AND ANY IMPROVEMENTS AND FIXTURES LOCATED THEREON: 
09-003-0021 
See Attached Exh ib i t 
to ask, demand, sue for, recover, cotlect. and receive all such sums of money, debts, and demands whatsoever as are now 
or shall hereafter become due. owing, payable, or belonging to the undersigned; and have, use, and take all lawful ways 
and means in the name of the undersigned, or otherwise, for the recovery thereof, by legal process, and to compromise and 
agree for the same, and grant aqufttances or other sufficient discharges forthe same, for the undersigned, and tn the name 
of the undersigned to make, seal, and deliver the same; to compromise any and all debts owing by the undersigned, and to 
convey, transfer, and/or assign said property in satisfaction of any debt owing by me (either oi us): to bargain, contract, 
agree for, purchase, receive, and take said property, and accept the sefcen and possession thereof, and alt deeds, and 
other assurances In the law therefor; and to lease, let, demise, bargain, sell, remise, release, convey, mortgage, convey in 
trust, and hypothecate said property, upon such terms and conditions, and under such covenants as said Attorney shall 
think fit; to exchange saU property for other real or personal property, and to execute and deliver the necessary instruments 
of transfer or conveyance to consummate such e>change; to e>ecute and defiver subordination agreements subordinating 
any lien, encumbrance or other right in said property to any other Hen, encumbrance, or other right therein; also to bargain 
and agree for. buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, convey in trust or otherwise, and in any and every way and manner deal In 
and with the improvements and fbiures located on said real property, including authority to utBke by eTigMty for VA 
Guaranty; and, also, for the undersigned and in the name and as the act and deed of the undersigned, to sign, seal, 
execute, deliver, and acknowledge such deeds, convenants, leases, indentures, agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, 
hypothecations, assignments, notes, receipts, evidences of debts, assumption agreements, settlement documents, releases 
and satisfactions of mortgage, and such other instruments in writing, of whatever kind or nature, as may be reasonable, 
advisable, necessary, or proper in the premises, but only with respect to said property. 
GIVING AND GRANTING UNTO SAID ATTORNEY FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DO AND PERFORM ALL AND 
EVERY ACT AND THING WHATSOEVER REQUISITE AND NECESSARY TO BE DONE IN AND ABOUT THE 
PREMISES, AS FULLY TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES AS THE UNDERSIGNED MIGHT OR COULD DO IF 
PERSONALLY PRESENT, THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY EXPRESSLY RATIFYING AND CONFIRMING ALL THAT SAID 
ATTORNEY SHALL LAWFULLY DO OR CAUSE TO BE DONE BY VIRTUE OF THESE PRESENTS. 
THIS POWER SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY SUBSEQUENT DISABILITY OR INCAPACITY OF THE PRINCIPAL 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND THIS 18th DAY OF August, 2000 
A&k^r- y J/CQyu, C^7WJAC UTFWJ _ _ 
STATE OFi&flW^ ) BLAIN0. HANNEY 
^ *SS 
COUNTY O F \ ^ 6 e f L ) 
ON THE •/% DAY OF August, 2000, PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, BLAllJS. HANNEY THE SIGNER OF 
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EXHIBIT "A" E i 6 i O ^ c b i B 2 - 6 3 6 P 65<S 
A PART OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH. RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN. MORE PARTICULARLY 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°5&2T EAST 604.60 FEET*. NORTH 0°22*36" EAST 
649.75 FEET AND NORTH SB'OS'SS" EAST 48 02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1. 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22,36" EAST 664 55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'46n EAST 222.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 0°22,36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER LINE. TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS. THE GRANTEES. AND 
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY. FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, REGRESS 
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING ATA POINT ON AN EXISTING 
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89'58,22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26047'52M EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 
16o39'50n EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.257.48 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20', AND NORTH 5*29r38r WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY 
199.63 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.307 46 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20* AND 
SOUTH BS^S^r EAST 20.50 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH. 
RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 250.0 FEET. MORE OR LESS. 
TO A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47,52" EAST 9 84 FEET AND NORTH <\6r3V5T 
EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE 
THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND NORTH 5°29'38M WEST 227.32 FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 
40.0 FEET (POINT A) FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1; THENCE SOUTH 4*52'35M EAST 
420.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 42.02 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 73.27 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 75015' EAST 150.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 78.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 
131.05 FEET; THENCE NORTH 21° WEST 85.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 264.91 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE TO THE RIGHT 98 83 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0°22,36M EAST 72.0 FEET. MORE OR LESS. TO A POINT OF 
CURVATURE; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 70 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 10723 FEET; THENCE * 
NORTH 88e08'55w EAST 98.0 FEET (PARALLEL TO AND 7 50 FEET SOUTH OF A LINE EXTENDING SOUTH 88*08'55" 
WEST FROM A POINT SOUTH 89058,22" EAST 1321 0 FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36M EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 
446.40 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1); THENCE EASTERLY 62.37 FEET ALONG 
THE ARC OF A 518.0 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT; THENCE EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF 
A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH 89*58'22" EAST 1321.0 
FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36"'EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 223.20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF 
SAID SECTION 1. 
SITUATE IN DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
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RECORDATION REQUESTED BY: 
Bank One, NA 
Horn* Loan Servlcae 
P.O. Box 710097 
Cokmr***. OH 43271-0097 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Ban* Ona-Cotateral Mgt-
132 E. WMMngton 8 t 
Suite M1-1032 
hdlanaptota, M 4S2O4-3S60 
€>L0\ HM^ u) 
E 1 A 1 0 6 6 2 B 2 6 8 A P 6 5 7 
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REC'D FOR I^CST TITLE SERVICES IHC 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LME IS FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
BAMCsONE 
DEED OF TRUST, ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND RENTS, 
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND FINANCING STATEMENT 
THIS DEED OF TRUST, ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND RENTS, SECURITY AGREEMENT AND FINANCING 
STATEMENT IS DATED AUGUST 24 , 2000 , by BU INE J HANNEY and SHIRLEY AflH HANNEY , whosa address 
It 3037 EAST 3060 NORTH , tAYTON, UT 8 4 0 4 0 trafafrad to balow as -Trustor") for tha benaftt of Bank Ona, 
NA. w h o H tddraaa It Horn* Loan Setvicaa, P.O. Box 710097, Columbus, OH 43271-0097 (referred to below 
aometJme* as "Laodex" and t txna&rot a* •Eernaficbry''} and Bank Onar NA (referred to bolow at Tru«te«",). 
CONVEYANCE AND GRANT. For valuable cerieMereiiori, Trustor erewcabCy grants and conveys to Trustee In trust, with power of safe, for the 
benefit ofLender <ae Bemfidary, e l of Trustor's right," tide, and interest In end to the following described reel property, together with ell tenant 
security deposit*, utiftry tfepoeits end aH proceeds (including without limitation premium refund*) of each policy of insurance relating to any of 
th«>npToverriem*/tne Personaf Property or tha Real Property; aft rente, Issues, profltt, revenues, royalties or other benefit* of the 
Improvements; the Personal Property or the Reel Property; all easement*, rights of way, end eppurtsnsnccc; ell water, water rights and ditch 
right* (including stock in utiHtie* wfth ditch or irrigation f.Jti»); arid e l other rights, royeftie*, end profits relating to the reel property, including 
without Hmttation a* miner els, oH, gas, geothermel and eknfter matters, located in D A V I S County , State of Utah (tha " R a t i 
Proparty"): 
PLEASE SEE ATTACHH) 
Th« R«a! Proparty or Ha addraat It commonly knovvn at 3037 EAST 3060 NORTH, LAYTON, UT 84040. The Rest 
Property tax Wertfffcetjon number is.090030021. 
DCFtfMTIONS. The following worde shell have the following mannings when used in this Deed of Trust. Terms not otherwise defined in this 
Deed of Truet ebell have the rTwar^s atttibutad to *uch twrns in the Uniform Commercial Code. Alt references to dollar emounts shell me en 
amounts in law W money oltha Urwted.^Ute* of America. 
' Guarantor. The word 'Guarantc*"-means end Irwrudes vwrd^ oct Umhation, any and ail guarantors, sureties, and accommodation parties in 
correction with to Indebtedness. 
irnprovements., The w o ^ 'Improvement** means e ^ includae witr>out Rmrte^n en exielir^ and future improvements, fixtures, buildings, 
structures, mobilehtwriea affixed oh the Reel Property, tellttiea, adcHtiorm, replecemerit* end other construction on the R««l Property. 
Indebtedness.
 :Tha word •Indebtedness" means alli principal and interest payable under the Mote and any amounts expended or advanced 
by Lender to discharge obligations,of True^w ;expens«.mco^ by Trustee or Lerhder to enforce obligations of Trustor under this Deed of 
Trust, te^ethy vritfi interest ori such amounts as provided In this Deed of Trust. 
.»Uaaaa.^Tna;^^ rij^i,.M:and^lritaraat of Grantor in and to ell leeses relating to the Reel Property, together with all 
" modificatiorw.; extanelbrW and guwanoe* thereof, presently e>deting or rtereaher.arising. 
Note. Th« wtn^ _"»Me" meam t M tha principal amount of $ 2 4 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 from 
truetor.to Lenda^/togetha end substitutiona 
.(Peracnai Pi openyy the iworda "Personal ; Property * mean aK equipment, fixtures; end other articlea of personal property now or hereafter 
owned by Truator, and now or hereafter attached or affixed to, or located on, the Reel Property; together with afl accessions, parts, and 
7 a ^ ^ any of euch property; and together wjtti aB proceeds (including without limitation 
../ad Insuranca p* oc*»ri» and refunds of promkjma) from any sale or other disposition of the Property. 
: > f r e * * r * y ; ^ Real Property and the Personal Property. 
.'/' j R a ^ Property, 17>ew property. Interests and rights described above in the "Conveyance and Grant" section. 
, -M Reasis 4': Decwwewte.: The. words "Related}Docurnenta" mean arid .Include without Hmrtation tha Note and eN credit agreements, Joen 
•"• %-ayjeament*^,'eovirownentti' agreements,guaranties, security agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, and all other instruments, agreements 
.i&andoteuments, wlttther how.or hereafter existing, executed In.connection with the Note. 
p f i R e ^ . TTie.Woc^ Income, issues, royalties, profits, and other benefits derived from 
•"-• ' X*W ;P»e^^ 
?Tnaet*r; 'Tha w«nl."Tnartor" means any and e l pereone arid entitle* executing this Deed of Trust, Including without Kmrtetion etf Trustors 
" "" l,aiiov»;:;"-. Z:>;-:- - •''"• /?""< 
VTMW D S D OF TRUST>:WOU0WG THE ASSIOWIlttNT OF LEASES AMD RENTS AND THE SECURITY ffiTEREST W THE RENTS AND 
. PSISONAL PROPERTY. IS OIVBi TO SECURE (1) PAYMENT OF THE WDEBTEDNESS AND (2) PERFORMANCE OF ANY AND ALL 
OBLKIATIONS Of TIWSTOR L ^ THIS DEED OF TRUST IS GIVEN 
AND ACCEPTS) ON THE FOLLOVnNQTQWS: 
POSSESSION AND IULAJNTENANCE OF THE PROPERTY^ Trustor agrees that Trusted* possession and use of the Property shall be governed by 
the folio wing provisions: 
Posaaeelen and Use. Until the occurrence of an Event of Default, Trustor may (a) remain in possession and control of the Property, (b) 
use, operate or manege the Property, and (c) collect any Rents from the Property. Tha following provisions relate to the use of the 
Property or to other Imitations on the Property. Thla Instrument is • Trust Deed executed In conformity wfth the Utah Trust Deed Act, 
UCA 57-1-19, etseq. 
Duty to Maintain. Trustor shell maintain the Property in good condition end promptly perform all repairs, replacements, and maintenance 
necessary to preearve its velue. Grentor shell els© observe and comply with all conditions and requirements (If any) necesaery to preserve 
and extend aH rights, easements, licenses, permits (including, without fimrtation, zoning variations and any non-conforming uses and 
structures), privileges, franchise* and concessions applicable to the Real Property or contracted for in connection with any present or luture 
use of the Reel Property. 
Hazardous Substance*. Trustor represents end warrents that the Property never has been, and never will be so long as this Deed of Trust 
remains a lien on the Property, used for the generation, manufacture, storage, treatment, disposal, release or threatened release oi eny 
hazardous waste or substance, as those terms are defined in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensetion and Liability Act 
_* «««« ^A~* At 11 e r c^»i«« o«m ** • * « f r e n n A H tk- c , •« . , * ,^ Am.nXm.M. . ^ oa.„»hAfi»i»H A t^ / - C A R A - 1 
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upon the Property to make such inspections and tests as Lender may deem appropriate to determine compliance of the Property with this 
section of the Deed of Trust. Trustor hereby (a) releases and waives any future claims against Lender for indemnity or contribution in Vie 
event Trustor becomee liable for cleanup or other costs under eny such lews, and (b! agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Lender 
against any and aO claims and losses resulting from a breach of this paragraph of tha Deed of Trust. This obligation to indemnify shall 
aurvfvc the payment of the Indebtedness and the satisfaction ot this Deed of Trust. 
Nuisance, Waste. Trustor shall not cause, conduct or permit any nuisance nor commit permit, or suffer any stripping of or waste on or to 
the Property or any portion of the Property. Without firnrting the Generality of tha foregoing, Tructor wOJ not remove, or grant to any other 
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DUE OH SALE • CONSENT BY LENDER. Lander may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable itfl sums secured by thia Deed of Trust 
Upon tho toto or transfer, without the Lender's prior written conaertt of ail or any part of tha Boa* Property, or any interact in the Real Property. 
A "eafa ot tranafer" meena the conveyance of Real Property or any right titie or Interest therein; whether legal, beneficial ot equitable; whether 
voluntary or invc^unterv; whether by outright sale, deed, instalment safe contract, land contract, contract for dead, lease-option contract, or by 
•a*, assignment, or tranafer of any beneficial interest in or to any land truat holding trfJe to tht Real Property, or by any other method of 
conveyance of Real Property interest. If any Trustor is a corporation (unless such Grantor's stock is pub6c*y traded), partnership or Umrted 
SaWHy company, "sale or tranafer" atoo includes any change in ownership without tha prior written consent of Beneficiary of the voting stock. 
partner ship interests or Brnftsd Eabittty company intareata, aa the caae may be. of Trustor: 
TAXES ANO UBsS. 
Grantor she* pay when due aft taxes, assessments, water charges and aawer service chargaa levied or assessed against tha 
Property, or any part thereof, and ahaJI pay whan due al claime for work done on or for services rendered or materiel furnished to tha 
Property. Grantor ahsll maintain tha Property free and clear of all Kens, axcept for Bone of taxes and asseeamenta not due and except as 
otherwise provided herein. 
PROPERTY DAMAGE HSU RANCE. 
Maintenance of Insurance. Trustor shad procure and maintain policies of tire insurance with standard extended coverage endorsements on 
a replacement basis for tha ful" Insurable value covering aH Improvements on tha Real Property in an amount sufficient to avoid application 
of any coinsurance clause, and with a standard mortgagee clause in favor of Lender. Trustor shsl also procure and maintain 
cc*riprafiensfve public Kabahy^ ^ Insurance for injuries to persona ftncluxfing death) and property damage or loss of use, and such otUr 
insurance aa may be required by Lender. Policies shall be written inform, amounts, coverages and basis reasonably acceptable to Lender 
and issued by a company or companies reasonably acceptable to Lander. Trustor, upon request of Lender, will deliver to Lander from time 
to time the policies or certificates of Insurance in form satis factory to Lender, including stipulations that coverages will not be cancelled cr 
diminished without at least tan (10) days' prior written notice1*) Lender. Each insurance policy afro aha* include an endorsement providing 
that coverage In favor of Lander wW not be impaired in any way by *riy act, orniasion or default of Trustor or any other person. Should the 
Real Property at any time become located in an area designated by the Director of tha federal Emergency Management Agency as a special 
flood hazard area. Trustor agreee to obtain and maintain Federal Rood Ineurance for the fuft unpaid principal balance of the loan, up to tbs 
maximum potty limit* set under the National Rood Insurance Program, or aa otherwise rcqubjd by Lender, and to maintain auch insurance 
for the term of the loan. 
EXPBiprTURES fY LENDER. If Trustor falls to comply with any provision of this Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding Is commenced 
that would materiallyaffect Lander's interests in the Property, Larxier on Trustor's behalf may, but shall not be required to, tska any action that 
Lender de«me appropriate. Any amount that Lender expends In ao doing will bear interest at the rate provided for in the Note from the data 
incuffad or paid by Ufxler to tiSedete of rapayment by Trustor. All such expenses wi» be payable on demand and shall be secured by this 
Imtrumant. Thia Deed of Truat also wfll secure payment of these amounts. The rights provided for in thia paragraph ahaU be in eddrtionto any 
other righttorany remedies to Which Lander may be emftled on account of the default. Any such action by Lender shell not be construed as 
curing the default so as to bar Lander from any remedy that H otherwise would have had. 
WARfyUfTYrDEPOISE Of TITUS. 
TWe. Trustor warrants that: (a) Trustor holds good and marketable true of record to tha Real Property in fee simple, free and clear of alt 
fterva and arv^urr^anew other tt in the legal description of the Real Property aet forth herein or attached hereto or in any 
title Insurance policy^'trtJajrapb^ in favor of, and accepted.by. Lender in connection with thia Deed of Trust, and 
|b) Trustor has the fuijright, power, sind authority to execute and deliver this Deed of Trust to Lender. 
Defense of TWt. Subject to the exceptionm tha paragrsph above. Trustor warrants and will foraver dsfend the title to the Property against 
the lawful claims of afl parsons. 
No Other Uens. Grantor wHJ not wrthout the prior written consent of Lander, create, place, or permit to be created or placed, or. through 
any act or failure to act, ac f^Uieaca in the placing of, or eflow to remain, any deed of trust, voluntary or involuntary lien, whether statutory, 
consfttirttofttl or c^^ ad veiorwn Uxas on the Reef Property which are not delinquent], security, imerest, 
ericunSbfaTCe b ^ Property, or any part thereof, other than as permitted herein, regardless if Same era 
f^SXpVeaary O T ^ DeetforTrustrs^iBrwuld-sny-of u>o-f©f09c^4>e<»ma 
--•ttacheo* hereafto fr^ wrthout the prior written consent of Lender, Grantor will cause the same to be 
^promptlydiectorged and released. . . 
DEFAULT.'IEachf:of uSe foHcrwing, at the option of Lender, eheif constitute an event of default ("Event of Default") under thia Deed of Trust: 
1
 .Defmta em<M psyrneht when due ori'tM Indebtedness or sny other indebtedness DrtJbfceaTJon 
.=., .notw'ot hereaftar owkvj i© Lander. ^ ;^ 
. .• Other Defaults. 'Faflure' to comply with-any oihar term* obegation, covenant or condrtidn contained in this Deed of Trust, the Note, in any of 
the other ReUt^: Documents^ herefter arising between Beneficiary and Grantor. 
r —De^a^to : Th^Par ty , - ^ olanyindebtedness.owing byJSrantor; 
.* J:" oir ^ ' G u * * a m o r ^ agreernant or undertaking. 
" I ; aUns^uptcy':or-Inaorvsncy. ;If the Grantor:or.any Guarantor: (D becomes Irtaofvent, or makes a transfer in fraud of creditors, or makes an 
^t;l;asa^gnfT>ent for :the benefit of oedrtors, or admits in wTitirvj rta inaWrty to pay its debt* as they become due; (9) generally ia not paying lu 
'.r r;'••• 'debta as' aiich deott:becoma due;. (HJ has a rscerver, trustee or cuatocUan appointed ( j, or tike possession of, a* or rubstsrrbally. aflof the 
ii: ^tsfaM m i itfoce^riing brought by such party or ina proceexfing brought agairwt such party and 
•
: :
 -' a possession ia r»t terminated within aixty (601 days after the affactrve data thereol or auch 
:£- r party consents to or acquiesces at auch appoihtmant or possession; frv) fftes a petition for refief under the United States Bankruptcy Code 
;<• or ariy other pr a sent or future federal or otste irtsofvancy. bankruptcy or similar taws (all of the forw^orng hereinafter cdttectivery cattad 
• -AppicAbia tankruptcy Law'Jbr aViy bvokjnta^ petition for relief te filed against such party under any Appficabia Bfar^ kniptcY Law^  and 
sur^ irwoiuntary petftkyii it rxK dismiased within sixty (60) days after tha fMng thereof, or an ordar for^  raWef rwrning w h party ia entered 
under the^  any' Appficabla Bankruptcy Law, or any compoertJorv rea^aogernent, extension, rscrgancation or other relief of debtora howr or 
hereafter axtsbng te'raqiiaitBd Of consantad to by auch party; fvj fafts to have cSscharged within a period of abcty |f30) days any 
^ttachrr»er^^aequestrsh<xt^^ir^^ upon anyj>roperty of auch party; or (vt) fails to pay within thirty (30) days any final rnoney 
ju^ment hoainax auch party.:^ 
. Uqusdanbfu Desiibi and Related Events. If Grantor or any Guarantor Is an entity, tha Bquidatkm, dissolution, merger or consolidation of any 
such entity or, if any of siich parties is an individual, tha daath or leosf incapacity of any such individual. 
Absjftdofwnant. Grantor abandons afl or a portion of the Property. 
Action by Other UenhcWer. Tha hoWar of any Ben or aacurity interest on the Property (wrthout hereby implying the conaent of Beneficiary 
to the existence or creation of any auch Sen or aacurity interest) declarea a defaurt thereunder or instrtutas foreclosure or other proceedings 
for the enforcement of its remedies thereunder. 
Destruction of Property. The Property la ao demolished, destroyed or damaged that, in the judgment of Beneficiary, it cannot be reetored or 
rebuilt with available funds to a profitable condition within a reasonable period of time. 
Condemnation. So much of the Property is taken in condemnation, or sold in lieu of condemnation, or the Property b so diminished in value 
due to any injury or damage to tho Property, that tha remainder thereof cannot, in the judgment of Beneficiary, continue to be operatad 
profitably for the purpose for which it was being used immediately prior to auch taking, sale or diminution. 
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES ON DEFAULT. Upon tha occurrence of any Event of Defaurt and at any time thereafter, Truatee or Lender, at fts 
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Accelerato Indebtedness. Lender shall have the right at its option without notice to Trustor to declare the entire Indebtedness immediately 
due and payable, including any prepayment penalty which Trustor would be required to pay. 
Foreclosure. With respect to all or any pert of the Real Property, the Trustee shall have ihe right to foreclose by notice and sale, and 
Lender shall have the right to foreclose by judicial foreclosure, in either case in accordance with and to the full extent provided by 
applicable law. 
Other Remedies. Trustee or Lender shall have any other right or remedy provided in this Deed of Trust or the Note or by law. 
$eit of the Property. To the extent permitted by applicable taw. Trustor hereby waives any and all rights to have the Property marshalled. 
In exercising its rights and remedies, the Trustee or Lender shall be free to sell ail or any pari of the Property together or separately, in one 
sale or by separate sates. Lender shaft" be entitled to bid at any public sale on ail or any portion of the Property. 
Attorneys' Fees; Expenses. If '^snder institutes any suit or action to enforce any of the terms of the Deed of Trust Lender shall be entroed 
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees as attorneys' fa*s at thai and on any appeal. Whether or not any court action is involved, aH 
reasonable expenses incurred by Lender which in Lender's oorrvon are necessary at any time for the protection of its interest or the 
enforcement of its rights sha* become a pan of the Irxiebtedness payable on demand and shati bear interest at the rVote rats from the date 
of expenditure unt3 repaid. Expenses covered by this paragraph include, without Dmrtewn, however subject to arry Bouts unoetappfcsbts 
law, Lender's reasonable attorneys' fees whether or not there b a lawsuit including reasonable attorneys' fees for bankruptcy proceedings 
(including efforts to'-mboSfcorv vacate any automatic stay or injunction), appeals and any anticipated r»st-judgment collection services, the 
cost of searching records, obtaining tide reports (including foreclosure reports), surveyors' reports, enwomerttsl reports, appraisal fees, 
thle insurance, e^fees for the Trustee, to the extent perrnitted by applicable law. Trustor also win pay any court costs, in addition tc all 
other sums provided by law. . 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 
Appictbto Law. This Deed of Trust has been deftvered to Lender and accepted by Lender In the State of Utah. This Deed of Trust shaft* be 
governed by and construed In accordance with the taws of the Stats of Utsfc. 
Time to of the Esccnct. Tirneris of the essence m the performance of this Deed of Trust 
Waivers and Cortsef<ts. Under shall not be deemfd to have waived any rights under this Deed of Trust for under the Related Documents) 
unless such waiver (tin writing and signsd by Under. No delay or omission on the part of Under in exercising any right sha8 operate as a 
waiver of such .right or any other right A waiver by any party of a provision of this Deed of Trust shall not constitute a waiver of or 
prejudice the party's rigM otherwise to demand strict compliance wrth that provision or any other provision. No prior waiver by Under, nor 
any course of docBng between Lender and Trustor, shelf constitute a waiver of any of Lender's rights or any of Trustor's obligations as to 
any future transactions. Whenever consent by Lender is required in this Deed of Trust the granting of such consent by Lender in any 
Instance shsH not constitute continuing consent to subsequent instances where such consent is required. 




STATE OF (MVi 
COUNTTOF P&Vfe )se 
MCWfY PUBUC 
ALXSCW HOOGES 
cn WEST mroct «wc so/o « 
LAYTOK UT 840*1 
ytf OTTiaiion LuAi>4 
WOVEMBEB m a » 
rare of irwi 
On this day before me, the undersigned NotaryPublic, personally appeared BLAJNE J HANNEY POA BY SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY and SHIRLEY 
ANN HANNEY, to me known to be-the individual* described in and who executad the Deed of Trust, and acknowledged that they signed the 
Deed of Trust as their free and: voluntary act and deed, for the uses and pwposet therein mentioned. 
of tyQIAbt 
Kottry PuMSc in and f o r * * Sttt* of WhUh 
\Mfim , vtt*h 
_.2oJ2Q_ 
R t t M n g M . 
My comniMion tuptrw urn 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used onry when obligations have been paid in tuff) 
1
 •> , Trustee to: . :>-; 
The undersigned it the legal owner vend holder of aO ino^btedness; secured by this Deed of Trust M sums secured by this Deed of Trust have 
been tufy paid and satisfied. You are hereby directed, upon payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of this Deed of Trust or 
pursuant to einy afpfoabk statute; to cancel the Note eecured fry this Deed of Trust (which is delivered to you togetherwith this Deed of Tajstt, 
^end tojfecofwey, wrri>out warranty, to the p a ^ the estate now held by you under this Deed of 
1
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EXHIBIT "A" 
A PART OF SECTION 1. TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST. SALT LAKE MERIDIAN. MORE PARTICULARLY 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58-22- EAST 604.60 FEET, NORTH 0*22-36" EAST 
649.75 FEET AND NORTH SS'WSS" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1, 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0*22'36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89*5746" EAST 222.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 0*22*36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 88*0ff55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. r 1610662 B 2686 P 66Q 
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER UNE, TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS. THE GRANTEES. AND 
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY. FOR INGRESS, EGRESS. REGRESS 
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING AT A POINT ON AN EXISTING 
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89#58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26*47:5r EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 
16*39"50* EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHeRLY 199.3*) FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.25748 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF0*20\AND NORTH 5*29-38" WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY 
199:63 FEET ALCING THE ARC OF A 34.307:46 F 
SOUTH 85^521" EAST 2frW ^ ^ 
RANGE 1WEST; SALT^LAI« MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING TO 
TO A POINT SOLTO 89*587T EAST 27^ 
EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY199:30 FEETAlONG THE ARC OF A34.257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE 
THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGL^ OfeO^O" AND NORTH^5*29^8" WEST227:32 FEET AND NORTH SSWSS" EAST 
40:0 FECT (FOINT A) FROM THE S ^ ^ 
420.0 FE^THENCEALONGYrHfe^^ CURVE TO THE LEFT73.27 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 7& IffEAST 1506 F^Et;;THENCE A t O N G T H E ^ & 6 F A 7 8 ^ f 0 0 T RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 
ISt.WFEE^^^ 
^URVETOTHE RIGHT EH3.83^  FEET; THENCEN6RTtiM236" EAST72.6 FEET^MORE OR LESS; TO A POINT OF 
CtlRVATOREVtHENCE to 
NORTH &8*08i55,l EAST 98.tf FEET (PARAlM:¥6 Allb^MFEET SOUTH OF A LlNEEXTENbiNG SOUTH88*bff55* 
;W^TFROM A POIhfr SOUTH;89*^ 
446M0;FJEET FROM THE SO^  
•WE ARCOF A518 0 FOOT RADIUS CURVETO THE ^ F T ^ T H E N C E EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF 
A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH 89f58'22" EAST 1321,0 
FEET AND NORTH 0*22"36" EAST 658.81 F E ^ AND WEST 223.20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF 
SAID SECTION 1. 
SITUATE IN DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH. 
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WHEN RECORDED MAH TO: 
BtAWEJ.HANNEY 
3037 EAST 305O NORTH 
LAYTCN, UT64040 
SPACE ABOVE THfcUNE FOR ReCORDBTS USE ONLY^ 
£ 1 6 1 0 6 & 3 * 2A8A t 6>6> 1 
W*TL U miJlt WVISCHTT K£C0»g 
:38>Iu6 2t iiaipgra i2*oo J? * 
tfCD F<* D*OT TITU KWKCI lie 
RECORDED AT THE REQUEST OF »WEST TTOE SOlNrtCES, »KJ. ORDER # 2 5 ^ 
MA* TAX NOTICE TO; BAINE J. HANNEY 
3C37 EAST 3050 NORTH. LAYTON UT B4040T 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
BLAHE J, KANNSY AN0 $H*L£Y ANN HAHHCt 
OP LAYTON, COUNTY OF DAVta. STATE OT 
HEREBY GRANT, CONVEY AM FOREVER OUTT OAJM TO 
UT, 
0RANT0R<8) 
*LA*fc X RAN8EY AND BHKLET ANN KANHCY, AW) THCJR WJCCHMORTmUBTttAFORTHCHANHCY 
KAI«lYTRUrr 
GRANTEEfS) 
OF LAYTON CTTY, DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUAfiLE CONSIDERATION. 
THE FOUCWNQ DESCRIBED TRACT OF LAND ft* OAVtS COUNTY, 
STATEOF 
GM»-0«H 
WITNESS, THE HAND<8) OF SAK) GRANTOR(8), THtS 24 
SJGNEDJN THE PRESENCE OF 
DAY OF August .2000, 
SZt 
STATE OF ITT ) 
:8S 
COUNTY OF DAV?$) 
ON THE 24 DAY CKAup*, 2000. PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFOREME 
BLAINE J. HANNOftnd SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY THE 8I0NER() OF THE m H I N INSTRUMENT. WHO DULY 
ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT 0 HE ( ) EXECUTED THE SAME. 
v\ Shirty <mn totoey » rttawf w fief me NOTARY PUB'JG 
&] JNWU7 TITLE *eRVJC€8. INC. 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
$35,000.00 ' Date: October 25,2001 
For value received, the undersigned Hanney & Hanney Construction (the "Borrower"), at 
5506 S. Heath Ave, Kearns, Utah 84118, promises to pay to the order of Interwest 
Construction, (the "Lender"), at 35 N. Redwood Road, N. Salt Lake, Utah 84054, (or at 
such other place as the Lender may designate in writing) the sum of $35,000.00. 
Unpaid principal after the Due Date shown below shall accrue interest at a rate of 12.00% 
annually until paid. 
The principal shall be payable in full on November 25, 2001 (the "Due Date"). 
The Borrower reserves the right to prepay this Note by making payment in ftill of the 
then remaining unpaid principal and accrued interest. 
If any payment obligation under this Note is not paid when due, the Borrower promises to 
pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, whether or not a lawsuit is 
commenced as part of the collection process^ 
This Note is secured by a Geil Skid Loader: Sen # FER80-15Rider Riding Trowel: Ser. 
# M-HPN24NTCSLWhitman Riding Trowel: Ser. #HA61065., dated October 25, 2001. 
The Lender is not required to rely on the above security instrument and the assets secured 
therein for the payment of this Note in the case of default, but may proceed directly 
against the Borrower. 
If any of the following events of default occur, this Note and any other obligations of the 
Borrower to the Lender, shall become due immediately, without demand or notice: 
1) the failure of the Borrower to pay the principal and any accrued interest in full on 
or before the Due Date; 
2) the death of the Borrower or Lender; 
3) the filing of bankruptcy proceedings invoking the Borrower as a debtor; 
4) the application for the appointment of a receiver for the Borrower; 
5) the making of a general assignment for the benefit of the Borrowers creditors; 
6) the insolvency of the Borrower, 
7) a misrepresentation by the Borrower to the Lender for the purpose of obtaining or 
extending credit. 
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In addition, the Borrower shall be in default if there is a sale, transfer, assignment, or any 
other disposition of any assets pledged as security for the payment of this Note, or if there 
is a default in any security agreement which secures this Note. 
If any one or more of the provisions of this Note are determined to be unenforceable, in 
whole or in part, for any reason, the remaining provisions shall remain fully operative. 
All payments of principal and interest on this Note shall be paid in the legal currency of 
the United States. The Borrower waives presentment for payment, protest, and notice of 
protest and nonpayment of this Note. 
No renewal or extension of this Note, delay in enforcing any right of the Lender under 
this Note, or assignment by Lender of this Note shall affect the liability or the obligations 
of the Borrower. All rights of the Lender under this Note are cumulative and may be 
exercised concurrently or consecutively at the Lender's option. 
This Note shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
Signed this td> day of OchseZ- tioi , at jJoie4U ^ r / / Qkg \ 
vZvf •—: • 
Borrower: 
Hanney & Hanney Construction 
^^jCUiA^^/ / 4 w ^ 
Shirley Hannev^ 7 hirley Hannej^ 7 ) 
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£v) j Barnes Banking Co. 
849 West Hillfield Road • Layton. Utah 84041 • 546-BQ22 
Serving Th» Community Since 1B91 
3037 E. 3050 N. STREET 771-8025 
LAYTON, UT 84040 
DEPOSIT TICKET 
DATE 
CHECKS AND OTHER ITEMS ARE RECEIVED FOR DEPOSIT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OR ANY APPLICABLE COLLECTION AGREEMENT. 
•; DEPOSITS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. 
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USE OTHER SIDE F Q ^ ^ ^ ^ ] } ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
ADDITIONAL LISTING)/) PjCHECKSlf $ 3 M U & © " 
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MffflBi 
.'• fo*0 0 3 L, U ? 5 0 0 / 
Barnes Banking Co. 
.Since 1891 
Bountiful Branch 
100 South 500 West - Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801)296-1010 
Need Cash? Consider a Home Equity Loan! 
304^ 10/26/01/ 9*51:49 000350 
DDA\Q£PC 
0021001243 ?4?475.00 
FDIC THIS IS YOUR RECEIPT - THANK YOU 
AH items received are credited to your account subject to final payment. 
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(Check the names above for Judgments , & tax liens before recording) 
<^\'0!)^-tZ)<^ INITIALS 
Before you record: 
Did the Notary sign and stamp the document? 
Write the file number and tax serial # on the document. 
Compare the legal description with the Commitment, (right county?) 
Verify that Grantor, Trustor and/or Buyers names on the document 
exactly match Schedule A. . 
Compare names on the grantor line with the acknowledgement. 
Is there a return address on conveyances? 
Check for judgments filed after the effective date 
Check for federal tax Hens filed after the effective date. 
.' Check for any recordings filed after the effective date. 
» A- i <• •/yr\
 toeo-0<> ' 
Recording Info r l l * ..__ Ins t rument 
W P C/2--I 
POft e*u> 
T D t*%7~ 
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SCHEDULE A 
Order Number: 25859 
1. Effective Date: JULY 26, 2000 @ 6:00 PM 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued: 
(a) A.L.T.A. Owner's 
Proposed Insured 
(b) A.LT.A. Mortgagee's 
Proposed insured: 
BANK ONE, NA, ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
Commitment Number: 25859 





















TOTAL: S 861.00 
3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein is 
FEE SIMPLE 
4. Title to the estate or interest in said land is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND SHIRLEY ANN HANEY, AND THEIR SUCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY 
FAMILY TRUST 
5. The land referred to in this commitment is described as follows: 
See Attached Exhibit "A" 
PROPERTY KNOWN AS: 3037 EAST 3050 NORTH LAYTON, UT 84040 
TO: TWENTIETH CENTURY MORTGAGE 
ATTN: KASEY 
EWw^ J. Qoj/4 
Authorized Counter Signature 
INWEST TITLE SERVICES, INC. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
A PART OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, MORE PARTICULARLY 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 604.60 FEET, NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 
649.75 FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1 AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'46" EAST 222 00 FEET THENCE 
SOUTH 0°22'36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER LINE, TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS, THE GRANTEES, AND 
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY, FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, REGRESS 
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING AT A POINT ON AN EXISTING 
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47'52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 
16°39'50" EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20', AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.63 
FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,307.46 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND SOUTH 
85°25'21" EAST 20.50 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 
WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 250.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO A 
POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47'52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 16o39'50" EAST 
215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A 
CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 227.32 FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 40.0 FEET (POINT 
A) FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1; THENCE SOUTH 4°52'35" EAST 420.0 FEET; THENCE 
ALONG THE ARC OF A 42.02 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 73.27 FEET; THENCE NORTH 75°15' EAST 150.0 
FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 78.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 131.05 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
21° WEST 85.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 264.91 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 98.83 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 72.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT OF CURVATURE; THENCE ALONG THE 
ARC OF A 70 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 107.23 FEET; THENCE NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 98.0 FEET 
(PARALLEL TO AND 7.50 FEET SOUTH OF A LINE EXTENDING SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST FROM A POINT SOUTH 
irSS'ir EAST 1321.0 FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 446.40 FEET FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1); THENCE EASTERLY 62.37 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 518.0 FOOT 
RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT; THENCE EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO 
THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 1321.0 FEET AND NORTH O'lTZB" 
EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 223.20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1. 
SITUATE IN DAVIS OCUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
STEWART TITLE* 
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SCHEDULE B 
ORDER NUMBER: 25859 C O M M I T M E N T NUMBER: 25859 
Showing matters which will be excepted in the Policy unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the company. 
(SECTIONS) 
1 Defects, Hens, encumbrances, adverse claims of other matters, if any, created first appearing in the public records or attaching subsequent to 
the effective date hereof but prior to the date of the proposed insured acquires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage theron 
covered by this commitment. 
2. Taxes for the current year. 
3. Any discrepancies, conflicts, or shortages in area or boundry lines, or any encrochments of any overlapping of improvements or other boundry 
or location disputes (can be eliminated or amended in mortgagee's policy upon proper evidence being furnished). 
4. Restrictive covenants affecting the property described in Schedule A. 
5. Rights of claims of parties in possession, and not of record in the public records; liens for labor, services or material or claim to same which are 
not of record in said records. 
6. Any roadway or easement, similar or dissimilar, on, under, over or across said property, or any part thereof and not of record in said records. 
7. Any adverse claim based upon the assertion that 
a. Some portion of the land forms the bed or bank of a navigable river or lake, or lies below the mean high water mark thereof. 
b. the boundry of the land has been affected by a change in the course or water level of a navigabie river or lake. 
c. the land is subject to water rights, claims or title to water, and to any governmental regulation pertaining to wetlands. 
(Section-2) 
The following matters will be excepted in Schedule B of the policy to be issued: 
TAXES FOR THE YEAR 2000 ACCRUING AS A LIEN, BUT NOT YET DUE AND 




SERIAL NO.: 09-003-0021 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SPECIAL 
ASSESSMENT DISTRICT(S) SHOWN BELOW, AND IS SUBJECT TO ALL CHARGES 
AND/OR ASSESSMENTS LEVIED THEREBY: 
DISTRICTS): DAVIS COUNTY 
DISTRICT(S): WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
DISTRICT(S): NORTH DAVIS SEWER IMROVEMENT DISTRICT 
DISTRICT(S): SPECIAL SERVICE AREA 
DISTRICT(S): HOOPER WATER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
DISTRICT(S): MUTTON HOLLOW IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
C-1 
S T E W A R T TITLE® 
GUARANTY COMFAKY 
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CONTINUATION SHEET 
SCHEDULE B 
ORDER NUMBER: 25859 COMMITMENT NUMBER: 25859 
EASEMENT 
DATED: FEBRUARY 26, 1954 
RECORDED: MARCH 12, 1954 
ENTRY NO: 135487 
BOOK/PAGE: 62/50 
VENDOR. CHRIS S. HANNEY AND MABEL J. HANNEY 
VENDEE: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
PURPOSE: TO CONSTRUCT, RECONSTRUCT, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN AN 
UNDERGROUND PIPELINE AND APPURTENANT STRUCTURES 
WHICH LATTER MAY PROTRUDE ABOVE THE GROUND SURFACE 
ON, OVER OR ACROSS THE PROPERTY; ALSO A PERPETUAL 
EASEMENTS TO CONSTRUCT, RECONSTRUCT, OPERATE AND 
MAINTAIN A ROAD FOR ACCESS TO, AND OPERATION AND 
MAINTENANCE OF SAID PIPELINE, ON, OVER, OR ACROSS THE 
PROPERTY; ALSO A TEMPORARY EASEMENTS DURING THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE UNDERGROUND PIPELINE AND 
APPURTENANT STRUCTURES ABOVE-REFERRED TO, FOR 
CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES ON, OVER OR ACROSS THE 
PROPERTY. 
4. RIGHT OF WAY AND EASEMENT GRANT 
DATED: FEBRUARY 1, 1979 
RECORDED: MARCH 6, 1979 
ENTRY NO: 524533 
BOOK/PAGE: 755/982 
GRANTOR: CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL J. HANNEY 
GRANTEE: MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
PURPOSE: TO LAY MAINTAIN, OPERATE, REPAIR, INSPECT, PROTECT, REMOVE 
AND REPLACE PIPELINES, VALVES, VALVE BOXES AND OTHER GAS 
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES 
5. DEED GRANTING EASEMENT: 
DATED: MARCH 10,1979 
RECORDED: MARCH 15, 1979 
ENTRY NO: 525339 
BOOK/PAGE: 757/487 
GRANTOR: CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL HANNEY, DONALD SHUMWAY AND FAY 
SHUMWAY, EMMA LOU EISENHOUR, BLAINE HANNEY AND SHIRLEY 
HANNEY 
GRANTEE: BLAINE HANNEY AND SHIRLEY HANNEY AND MELVIN WEST AND 
LINDA WEST 
PURPOSE: MAINTAINING A CERTAIN WELL AND CONVEYING THE WATER FROM 
THAT WELL TO THE GRANTEE'S PROPERTY, IN. OVER, AND ACROSS 
A STRIP OF LAND TWENTY (20) FEET IN WIDTH 
STEWART TITLE' 
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CONTINUATION SHEET 
SCHEDULE B 
ORDER NUMBER: 25859 COMMITMENT NUMBER: 25859 








MARCH 10, 1979 
MARCH 15, 1979 
525340 
757/490 
CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL HANNEY, KEITH HANNEY AND CATHY 
HANNEY, LAREN HANNEY, DEAN HANNEY, BLAINE HANNEY AMD 
SHIRLEY HANNEY, MELVIN WEST AND LINDA WEST, DONALD 
SHUMWAY AND FAY SHUMWAY, NOLA JEAN ROBINSON AND EMMA 
LOU EISENHOUR 
CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL HANNEY, KEITH HANNEY AND CATHY 
HANNEY, LAREN HANNEY, DEAN HANNEY, BLAINE HANNEY AND 
SHIRLEY HANNEY, MELVIN WEST AND LINDA WEST, DONALD 
SHUMWAY AND FAY SHUMWAY, NOLA JEAN ROBINSON AND EMMA 
LOU EISENHOUR 
ROADWAY FOR THE JOINT USE OF GRANTEES 
•A & 
X
 $ y$ # ^ U 
7. SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, RESTRICTIONS, RIGHTS OF WAY AND RESERVATIONS APPEARING OF 
RECORD. 










9. MODIFICATION OF KEY EQUITY OPptDNS AGREEMENT AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND KEY EQUITY OPTIONS DEED 
OF TRUST / 
DATED: APRIL 16/1999 
RECORDED: MAY 1^1999 
ENTRY NO: 1515563 
BOOK/PAGE: 2501/441 
PURPOSE: /TO INCREASE LOAN AMOUNT FROM $80,000.00 TO $120,000.00 





SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY AND BLAINE J. HANNEY, AS TRUSTEES 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 














BLAINE J, and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY 
INWESTTITLE SERVICES, INC. 
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE, INC. 
' a /-x. 9_- UJ0-o r
i
 ^ P 0 > y. 
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SCHEDULE C 
ORDER NUMBER: 25859 COMMITMENT NUMBER: 25859 
The following requirements must be met and completed to the satisfaction of the Company before its policy of title 
insurance wiJI be issued: 
1. Show that restrictions or restrictive covenants have not been violated 
2. Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the estate of interest, mortgage or lien to be issued. 
3. Furnish proof of payment of all bills for labor and material furnished or to be furnished in connection with improvements erected or to be 
erected. 
4. Pay all general and special taxes now due and payable. 
NOTICE TO APPLICANT: The land covered herein may be serviced by districts, service companies and/or muncipalities which 
assess charges for water, sewer, electricity and other utilities, etc. Which are not covered by this report or insured under a Titie 
insurance Policy. 
Any matter in dispute between you and the Company may be subject to arbitration as an alternative to court action pursuant to 
the Titie Insurance Rules of the American Arbitration Association, a copy of which is available on request from the Company. 
Any decision reached by arbitration shall be binding upon both you and the Company. The arbitration award may include 
attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may be entered as a judgement in any court of proper jurisdiction. 
1. PAYMENT OF ALL OUTSTANDING ASSESSMENTS, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND CHARGES BY REASON OF THE 
LAND BEING INCLUDED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF ANY SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICT AS PROVIDED BY STATUTE. 
THE PUBLIC RECORD DISCLOSES INCLUSION OF THE LAND WITHIN SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICTS THAT MAY LEW 
SUCH ASSESSMENTS, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND CHARGES AS SET OUT AS EXCEPTION NO. 2, OF SCHEDULE B, 
HEREOF. 
2. A COPY OF HANNEY FAMILY TRUST , AS SET OUT AS NO. 4, SCHEDULE A, HEREOF. 
3. RECONVEYANCE OF TRUST DEED SET OUT AS EXCEPTION NO. 8 AND 10, OF SCHEDULE B, HEREOF. 
4. TRUST DEED SECURING YOUR NOTE EXECUTED BY: BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, AND THEIR 
SUCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST 
5. THE FOLLOWING NAMES HAVE BEEN CHECKED FOR JUDGMENTS, FEDERAL AND STATE TAX LIENS, 
NONE HAVE BEEN FOUND EXCEPT AS NOTED ON SCHEDULE B. 
BLAINE J. HANNEY 
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY 
• * 
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February 5, 2003 
Biyan W. Cannon, P,C. 
8919 South Sandy Parkway 
Building A, Suite 111 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
RE: Bank One Notice Of Default 
Mr, Bryan W, Cannon: 
I have received Notice of Default, I am notify you that I, Blaine J. Hanney, had no 
knowledge of this loan made against my home, I never received any money from this loan, I 
am writing this notice to inform you of the VALIDITY of this loan. 
Please advise. 
Thank you, 
Blaine J. Hanney 
3" 
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